Explaining the Inequality Puzzles in the Turkish Labour Market by Yılmaz, Okan
  
 
 
 
EXPLAINING THE INEQUALITY PUZZLES IN THE TURKISH 
LABOUR MARKET 
 
Okan Yılmaz 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the University of Sheffield for the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in the Department of Economics 
 
 
Date Submitted: 7 JULY 2015 
 
 
 
2 
 
1 ABSTRACT 
Turkey constitutes an economic and cultural bridge between the Eastern and the 
Western world and through its development process it has become an industrial, 
urbanised country with stronger relations to the global economy. The overall purpose of 
this thesis is to analyse the Turkish labour market in order to understand the unusual 
inequality patterns that are observed in it over the post 2000 period.  
The first empirical study presented in Chapter 2 investigates the underlying reasons for 
the decrease in wage inequality in Turkey. The results of the study show that the 
increasing supply of the educated labour, which is due to increases in the number of 
universities and the reform to the education system which increased the years of 
compulsory education, played a substantial role in the decreasing wage inequality in 
Turkey between 2002 and 2010. Chapter 3 analyses the relationship between domestic 
violence, traditional social norms, and female autonomy in the household which is one 
of the factors that plays an important role in the labour force participation decision of 
women in Turkey. The findings of the analyses suggest that: domestic violence has a 
negative effect on female autonomy; female autonomy in turn has a significant and 
negative effect on domestic violence; and finally the strength of the husband’s social 
norms on traditional gender roles positively affects the risk of violence. The final 
empirical study of the thesis presented in chapter 4 focuses on the structure of the 
informal sector employment in Turkey. The results of the empirical analysis suggest a 
heterogeneous structure for the informal sector in Turkey in which the lower tier 
consists of workers who involuntarily participate in the informal sector and the higher 
tier includes the workers who voluntarily choose to be in the informal sector. 
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1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Aims and Motivation of the Thesis 
Due to its geographical location, Turkey constitutes an economic and cultural bridge 
between the Eastern and the Western world and it has experienced major 
transformations in its process through industrialisation. While its economy was mainly 
based on agricultural production previously, the contribution of industrial production 
has begun to outweigh the agricultural sector starting from the 1980’s. The rapid 
industrialisation has also been accompanied by urbanisation; only a third of the 
population was living in the urban areas in the 1960’s and this ratio doubled in the 
2000’s. Starting from the early 1990’s, the educational attainment of the population has 
increased dramatically. With the increasing number of universities, with 29 universities 
in 1991 to 165 in 2011, the number of students in university education increased by 
more than 300 per cent, rising from 1.2 million to 3.7 million over this period. The 
education reform which increased the compulsory education from 5 to 8 years came 
into effect in 1997 and played an important role in the schooling of the population. The 
total enrolment rate for primary education was around 84 per cent in 1997 and increased 
to 98 per cent in 2010. The education reform also closed the enrolment gap between 
boys and girls significantly; the enrolment rate for primary education was 90 per cent 
for boys and 78 per cent for girls in 1997,  these rates equalised at 98 per cent in 2010 
(Turkish National Statistics Institute). 
The socio-economic transformation within Turkey was also accompanied by a stronger 
relationship with the global economy, particularly with the European Union (EU 
hereafter). With a gradual process, which started in 1980 and ended in 1989, the 
movement of international capital was freed. In 1997, Turkey became a member of the 
Customs Union after agreement with the EU. Turkey also became a member of the G-
10 
 
20 organisation when it was established in 1999. In the same year, Turkey was 
officially recognised as a candidate for full membership to the EU and negotiations 
started in 2005.   
Based on the socio-economic developments and the stronger relations with the global 
economy, it can be argued that Turkey has followed a path towards the Western world 
and has become a more industrial, more urbanised, and more educated country. Yet, the 
Turkish labour market has exhibited surprising characteristics which are not observed 
among developed and developing countries that experienced or are experiencing similar 
transformations. This thesis focuses on three exceptional patterns that are observed in 
the Turkish labour market and tries to explore the reasons for these patterns with 
empirical analyses in the light of existing economic theories. 
The first interesting observation on the Turkish labour market is the decreasing wage 
inequality which is in contrast to increasing trends observed in many developed and 
developing countries. There has been considerable interest in studying the distribution 
of wages over the last three decades, following the dramatic increase in wage inequality 
observed across several countries. In particular, the steep increase in the wage gap 
between the college and the high school graduates in the United States (US) has been 
documented by many authors, such as Katz and Murphy (1992) and Bound and Johnson 
(1992). In line with these studies, most of the analysis in the literature has focused on 
wage inequality between workers with high and low educational qualifications. Besides 
the US, an increasing educational premium has also been documented for many OECD 
countries (Berman et al., 1997; Machin and Reenen 1998). 
The Stolper-Samuelson theory argues that competition with labour abundant countries 
decreases the relative price of labour-intensive goods and accordingly reduces the real 
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wages of less educated workers in both relative and absolute terms which in turn leads 
to an increase in wage inequality between workers with different educational 
qualifications (Hanson and Harrison, 1999). The skill biased technological change 
theory argues that in accordance with the diffusion of higher technologies of 
information and communication, labour demand has shifted in favour of skilled workers 
(Acemoglu, 2002). Therefore, the technological developments have increased the skill 
premiums and caused increases in wage inequality.  
Based on economic theories on changes in the wage distribution and the increasing 
trend in wage inequality observed in many countries, the first empirical contribution of 
the thesis is an attempt to explain the underlying reasons for the decreasing wage 
inequality observed in the Turkish labour market. The thesis focuses on the effect of 
increasing educational attainment on wage inequality. 
The second interesting observation on the Turkish labour market is the low level of 
female labour participation. According to the Global Gender Gap Report 2013, among 
136 countries, Turkey has the 120th rank in the global gender gap index1 and 127th rank 
in the sub-index for economic participation and opportunity for women. The Report 
also shows that Turkey has the 123rd rank in the female labour force participation rate. 
Another interesting aspect of this observation is that female labour force participation 
has been decreasing over last the 60 years. In 1950, the female labour force 
participation in Turkey was 52 per cent and this rate decreased to 35 per cent in 1988 
and to 25 per cent in 2006 (Fernandez and Fogli, 2005; Dayioglu and Kirdar, 2010). 
The decreasing female labour force participation in Turkey is surprising as decreases in 
                                                 
1 The global gender gap index examines the gap between men and women in four sub-indexes:  economic 
participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment. 
The overall index score is calculated as the un-weighted average of each sub-index score. The highest 
possible score 1 represents equality while the lowest possible score 0 indicates inequality. The value of 
the overall index score of Turkey for the year 2013 was 0.58.    
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fertility rates and increases in the educational attainment of women took place at the 
same period.  
The second empirical contribution of this thesis focuses on female autonomy in the 
household which is one of the factors that plays an important role in the labour force 
participation decision of women in Turkey. According to the Demographic and Health 
Survey for the year 2005, apart from many factors such as household responsibilities 
and education, around 24 per cent of women in Turkey do not work or look for a job 
because their husbands or elders prevent them from doing so. In that sense, the lack of 
autonomy of women within the household lowers the labour force participation. Goksel 
(2012) analyses the effect of conservativeness on female labour force participation in 
Turkey. She shows that in a conservative and traditional environment, where men have 
higher decision power and stronger social norms on traditional gender roles exist, 
women tend to stay at home and do not participate in the labour force.2 In accordance 
with these findings, this chapter focuses on the determinants of female autonomy in 
Turkey. The particular focus of the second empirical contribution is the relationship 
between female autonomy, domestic violence and social norms.  
The third issue that this thesis explores is the substantial size of informal sector 
employment in the Turkish labour market. One of the common features of the labour 
markets in developing countries is the high rates of informal employment.  According 
to the Global Employment Trends Report (ILO, 2013), between 40-50 per cent workers 
in countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region are employed in the informal 
sector, while this share is between 15-30 per cent in Central and South-eastern Europe 
                                                 
2 Goksel (2012) creates an index for the husband’s conservativeness using several questions provided in 
the Household Structure Survey for the year 2006. The same dataset and similar questions are used to 
capture social norms in the analysis of the third chapter. The details of the dataset and the questions used 
in the analysis are provided in Chapter 3. 
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(non-EU) countries. The size of informal employment in Turkey has been quite high 
compared to the neighbouring European and Middle Eastern countries. Although there 
has been a decreasing trend between 2000 and 2010, the share of informal sector 
workers in total employment in Turkey is still around 40 per cent, which is close to the 
values for the Latin American countries where the highest rates of informal 
employment in the world are observed. 
Analysis of informal sector employment is important because, traditionally, the 
informal sector has been seen as inferior compared to the formal sector in terms of 
wages, security and protection from exploitation regarding labour standards. As the 
informal sector is free of any regulation, wage offers can be below the minimum wage3 
level, the standards regarding age, length and time of working hours can be ignored, and 
workers may have to work in risky environments with unsafe equipment. In addition, 
employment benefits such as social security and compensation do not apply to informal 
employment due to its unrecorded nature (Losby et al, 2002). Supporting these 
arguments, a report by the Turkish Central Bank (2015) shows that 23 per cent of 
employees in Turkey work for wages below the national minimum wage level. The 
third empirical contribution of the thesis examines the structure of the informal sector 
employment in Turkey.        
1.2 Structure and Content of the Thesis 
In accordance with the aims and motivations described above, this thesis looks at labour 
market inequalities in Turkey from three angles: earnings inequality between employees 
which show a decreasing trend over the last decade; female autonomy which is a 
                                                 
3 Turkey introduced minimum wage laws in 1971. The minimum wage is set by the ‘The Minimum Wage 
Determination Commission’ which has representatives from the government, trade unions and employers. 
It should be noted that over the last few decades the power of unions has gone down considerably. Once 
the minimum wage is set, the Central Government (specifically, the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security) monitors the implementation of it, but only in the formal registered sectors of the economy. For 
further details on the minimum wage in Turkey and how they are set see Koçer and Visser (2009). 
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potential reason for the low female labour force participation; and finally the structure 
of the informal sector employment which constitutes a significant share of the total 
employment in Turkey. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 provide the empirical studies that focus on 
these angles. Chapter 5, the final chapter of the thesis, summaries the findings of the 
analyses and presents the overall conclusion. The contents of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are 
summarised below.  
1.2.1 Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 explores the underlying reasons behind the observed decrease in wage 
inequality in the Turkish labour market using data from the Labour Force Surveys 
(LFS). To understand the factors affecting wage inequality in Turkey, the change in the 
wage distribution between 2002 and 2010 is decomposed into three components, 
namely, the effect of returns to human capital (price of human capital), the effect of 
changes in the composition of human capital (changes in covariates) and changes in the 
residual distribution (price and composition of unmeasured human capital 
characteristics). The decomposition method used in this analysis is proposed by 
Lemieux (2002) and it is a unified form of the two commonly used decomposition 
techniques in the literature which were proposed by Juhn et al. (1993) and DiNardo et 
al. (1996). In order to correct for the possible selection bias related to participation in 
wage employment, a two-step procedure, proposed by Dubin and McFadden (1984), is 
used. 
The decomposition results reveal that decreasing wage inequality was mainly due to 
decreasing returns to human capital or, in other words, decreasing skill premiums and 
decreasing residual wage dispersion. Using the human capital approach it is also found 
that the decrease in residual wage dispersion was mainly due to the decreasing prices of 
unmeasured human capital. Finally, the effect of changes in the composition of human 
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capital is found to be moderate. The results of the study suggest that the increasing 
supply of educated labour, which is due to increases in the number of universities and 
the reform to the education system which increased the years of compulsory education, 
played a substantial role in the decreasing wage inequality in Turkey between 2002 and 
2010. 
1.2.2 Chapter 3 
In this chapter, using data from the Household Structure Survey (HSS) for the year 
2006, the relationship between domestic violence, social norms, and female autonomy 
in the household is analysed. Dyson and Moore (1983) define autonomy as the capacity 
to manipulate one’s personal environment and the technical, social and psychological 
abilities in order to obtain information and to use it as the basis for making decisions 
about one’s private concerns and those of one’s intimates. Empirically, it is found that 
higher levels of female autonomy within the household lead to better outcomes for the 
household members, especially for children. For instance, Quisumbing and Maluccio 
(2000) show that while husbands tend to spend money on tobacco and luxury 
consumption goods, women, when they have the control of assets, spend more on 
children’s education, health and clothing. Mason (1987) and Eswaran (2002) argue that 
the empowerment of women may lead to lower fertility rates as women face higher 
costs of children than men. To analyse the relationship between domestic violence, 
social norms, and female autonomy in the household, an Item Response Theory (IRT) 
model is applied. 
The key findings of the study suggest that, consistent with the arguments of feminist 
theory on domestic violence, violence has a significant and decreasing effect on female 
autonomy and the incidence of violence decreases with the level of female autonomy. It 
is also found that domestic violence is an increasing function of the strength of social 
16 
 
norms of a husband on traditional gender roles. Further, while education and income 
have an increasing effect on female autonomy, they have a decreasing effect on the 
strength of the social norms of the husband on traditional gender roles. Further analyses 
of the data show that education and having an income indirectly affect the level of the 
wife’s autonomy through their social norms. Once the level of the wife’s social norms is 
controlled for, there is no direct effect of these variables on female autonomy. 
1.2.3 Chapter 4 
This chapter investigates the heterogeneity of employment in the informal sector by 
looking at data from the Turkish labour market in which informal workers constitute 
more than 40 per cent of total employment. According to Stiglitz (1976), and Dickens 
and Lang (1985), being involved in the informal sector is not a voluntary decision, 
instead it is a survival strategy for people who are rationed out from the overly 
regulated formal sector. The neoclassical comparative market view, on the other hand, 
argues that informal employment can be the desirable option based on people’s rational 
evaluation of the relative costs and benefits of entering the formal system (De Soto, 
1989). Fields (2005) and Maloney (2004) argue that the different segments of the 
informal sector exhibit different properties. They assert that, in the “upper-tier” 
segment, or “voluntary” as Maloney (2004) puts it, given their individual 
characteristics, workers voluntarily choose the informal sector expecting relatively high 
earnings. On the other hand, the “lower-tier” or the “involuntary” is the segment which 
is seen as the last resort of employment by the workers who are rationed out from the 
formal sector. 
In order to understand the structure of the informal sector in Turkey, the differences 
between the informal and formal sector wages are decomposed along the entire 
distribution. To do so, a decomposition technique, which not only allows for correction 
17 
 
of the potential selection bias problem due to self-selection into formal and informal 
sector in wage estimations, but which also decomposes the informal/formal sector wage 
gap at any quantile of interest, is applied. The results of the analysis suggest a 
heterogeneous structure for the informal sector in Turkey in which the lower tier 
consists of workers who involuntarily participate in the informal sector and the higher 
tier includes the workers who voluntarily choose to be in the informal sector. It is also 
found that the wage gap between the formal and informal sectors is higher and the 
segmentation at the bottom end of the wage distribution is more spread out (i.e. 
observed in a wider range of quantiles) for females than for males. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
2 CHAPTER 2: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND WAGE INQUALITY IN 
TURKEY 
2.1 Introduction 
There has been considerable interest in studying the distribution of wages over the last 
three decades, following the dramatic increase in wage inequality observed across 
several countries.  In particular, the steep increase in the wage gap between college and 
the high school graduates in the United States has been documented by many authors, 
such as Katz and Murphy (1992) and Bound and Johnson (1992). In line with these 
studies, most of the analysis in the literature has focused on wage inequality between 
workers with high and low educational qualifications. Besides the US, an increasing 
educational premium has also been documented for many OECD countries (Berman, 
Bound, and Machin 1997; Machin and Reenen 1998). In these studies, the increasing 
wage inequality is mostly explained by the supply-demand approach and attributed to 
increasing skill demand.4 In this chapter, the relationship between the wage distribution 
and educational attainment of the workforce is analysed. While a number of studies 
have looked at the link between wage inequality and the demand for skills, studies 
analysing the supply of skill and its impact on wage inequality are very limited.5  
In this chapter, the effect of increasing supply of educated labour on decreasing wage 
inequality is explored. The focus of the analysis is the Turkish labour market which 
experienced a substantial decrease in wage inequality between 2002 and 2010. To 
understand the factors affecting wage inequality in Turkey over this period, the change 
in the wage distribution between 2002 and 2010 is decomposed into three components, 
namely, the effect of returns to human capital (price of human capital), the effect of 
                                                 
4 There are also some authors who assert that institutional factors such as, unionization, minimum wages 
and collective bargaining practices have substantial effects on the wage distribution (e.g. Card, Lemieux, 
and Riddell 2003; Lee 1999). 
5 See Naticchioni et al. (2008) for an analysis of the Italian labour market. 
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changes in the composition of human capital (changes in covariates) and changes in the 
residual distribution (price and composition of unmeasured human capital 
characteristics). The decomposition method used in this analysis is proposed by 
Lemieux (2002) and it is a unified form of the decomposition techniques which were 
proposed by Juhn et al. (1993) and DiNardo et al. (1996). In order to correct the 
possible selection bias related to the participation in wage employment, a two-step 
procedure, proposed by Dubin and McFadden (1984), is also applied.  
The results of the study show that the increasing supply of educated labour, which is 
due to increases in the number of universities and the reform to the education system, 
which increased the years of compulsory education, had a substantial effect on the wage 
distribution in Turkey between 2002 and 2010. As a result of the increase in supply, 
wage inequality decreased at both the top and the bottom of the wage distribution. The 
decomposition results reveal that decreasing wage inequality was mainly due to 
decreasing returns to human capital or, in other words, decreasing skill premiums and 
decreasing residual wage dispersion. Using the human capital approach, it is also found 
that the decrease in residual wage dispersion was mainly due to the decreasing prices of 
unmeasured human capital. Finally, the effect of changes in the composition of human 
capital is found to be moderate. 
The plan of the chapter is as follows: Section 2 summarizes the existing literature on 
developed and developing countries together with other empirical studies on the 
Turkish labour market. Section 3 presents the underlying theories and macroeconomic 
indicators of the Turkish economy. Section 4 outlines the methodology. Section 5 
presents the data and descriptive statistics. Section 6 shows the wage regression 
estimations and decomposition results, whilst Section 7 summarizes and concludes and 
finally Section 8 presents the policy implications of the study.       
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2.2 Literature Review  
Several theories have been proposed to reveal the underlying reasons for the increasing 
demand for skills. Two of the most popular theories are the Stolper-Samuelson effects 
and SBTC. The first theory argues that competition with labour abundant countries 
decreases the relative price of labour-intensive goods and accordingly reduces the real 
wages of less educated workers in both relative and absolute terms (Hanson and 
Harrison, 1999). The SBTC theory argues that in accordance with the diffusion of 
higher technologies of information and communication, labour demand has shifted in 
favour of skilled workers and increased the skill premiums (Acemoglu, 2002). 
Although there is no clear-cut agreement, it is generally believed that the SBTC is the 
main reason behind increasing wage inequality. Berman et al. (1997) summarized three 
factors leading to this belief. First, employment shifts to skill intensive sectors have 
been too small to be consistent with the arguments that are based on product demand 
shifts, such as sector biased technological changes and  Stolper-Samuelson type effects. 
Second, even though there had been increases in the relative cost of skilled labour in the 
US, in most of the sectors, shifts in the composition of employment were within the 
sector rather than between the sectors. Finally, indicators of technological change and 
skill demand reflect a strong positive correlation within the sectors.6   
Following the early paper of Katz and Murphy (1992), numerous studies have analysed 
the changes in skill demand and wage premia in the US. In support of the SBTC 
hypothesis, various economic models have been developed to explain the channels 
through which technology affects the demand for skills. Berman et al. (1994) suggested 
                                                 
6 Krugman (2008), however, argued that most of the empirical evidence for these arguments came from 
studies which used the data until the mid-1990’s. However, since then the trade between the US and 
developing countries like China and the imports of more sophisticated goods like computers and 
electronic products has increased. Therefore he asserted that the effect of trade on the wage distribution 
can be higher than it was in 1990’s. However, this is not a crucial point for this chapter, as Krugman 
argued in the same paper, the Stolper-Samulson process is not expected to be effective in the short run.      
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that the skill-biased technological change is the most likely explanation for the increase 
in the demand for white collar workers and in their relative wages. They argued that 
shifts are mostly due to changes in labour demand within sectors rather than 
reallocation of employment among sectors. Galor and Tsiddon (1997) argued that the 
major technological inventions increase the concentration of high ability workers in the 
technologically advanced sectors while stimulating future technological progress and 
growth and rising wage inequality. Caselli (1999) asserted that in technological 
revolutions, learning investments required to use the new machines are higher than 
those required to use the old existing machines. Therefore, these revolutions cause 
reallocation of capital from slow to fast learning workers and reduce both the absolute 
and relative wages of slow learning workers. Krusell et al. (2000) proposed a theory of 
acceleration in skill-biased technical change. They argued that the elasticity of 
substitution between capital equipment and unskilled labour is higher than the elasticity 
of substitution between capital equipment and skilled labour. Based on this argument, 
they asserted that the increases in wage inequality result from the new and efficient 
technologies that are embodied in new capital equipment.   
As the increasing trend in wage inequality was also observed in other OECD countries, 
many authors studied the changes in the wage distribution for these countries. One of 
the most comprehensive papers is Martins and Pereira (2004). In their paper, the authors 
analysed the effects of schooling on wage inequality for 16 European countries by 
looking at returns to schooling across quantiles. The main finding of their paper is that 
more skilled workers are associated with a stronger education-related earnings 
increment. Accordingly, they argued that schooling has a positive impact upon within-
levels wage inequality. Arguably the closest paper to this study is Naticchioni et al. 
(2008). In their paper, they analysed wage inequality in Italy and found that the change 
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in inequality was mainly driven by the decreasing educational premiums and stable skill 
demand. 
To a lesser extent, the evolution of the wage distribution has been analysed in 
developing countries. By using cross-sectional household data for Argentina, Chile, 
Costa Rica, Colombia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Chinese Taipei and Uruguay, 
Robbins (1996) found that trade liberalization was accompanied by a rise in relative 
wages and the demand for skilled workers. Hanson and Harrison (1995) examined the 
effects of Mexican trade reforms on wage inequality and they asserted that the rising 
wage gap was associated with changes internal to industries and that it could not be 
explained by the Stolper-Samuelson type effects. Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003) 
analysed the rapid trade liberalization process (which reduced the trade tariffs 
significantly and eliminated the import licences) that took place in Argentina during the 
1990’s and tested if the observed increase in wage inequality was triggered by the 
import penetrations. Their results showed that the trade openness explained only a small 
proportion of the increase in wage inequality. On the other hand, Berman and Machin 
(2000) analysed the SBTC in developing countries and found evidence that the demand 
for skilled labour increased in middle income countries and this increase was mainly 
due to skill-upgrading within industries rather than a reallocation of employment from 
low to high-skill industries. 
Studies on wage inequality in Turkey are few and not up to date. Kizilirmak (2003) 
analysed wage inequality in the manufacturing sector for the 1988-2000 period and 
argued that the change in relative demand for skilled workers was primarily due to the 
within-industry skill upgrading. Elveren and Galbraith (2009) examined the sub-sectors 
of Turkish manufacturing by using the between-group component of Theil’s T statistic 
and found an increase in the sector premiums between 1980 and 2001. Tansel (2005), 
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using the 1994 Household Expenditure Survey, investigated the gender wage gap and 
the wage gap between public and private sector workers. The results of her study 
indicated that for men, public sector wages were higher than private sector wages 
except at the university level, and state owned enterprise wages for men were higher 
than private sector wages.  Also, while wages of men and women were at parity in the 
public administration, there was a large gender wage gap in the private sector in favour 
of men. Ozkoc et al. (2011) found an increase in the wage inequality by gender and 
occupations between the years 2002 and 2006.  
Using the quantile regression technique, which makes it possible to analyse the changes 
in the wage inequality at different parts of the distribution, Tansel and Bodur (2012) 
analysed the evolution of male wage inequality over the 1994-2002 period.  Using the 
Household Budget Survey (HBS) they found an overall decline in wage inequality in 
Turkey; wage inequality declined in this period at the lower end of wage distribution 
while it increased at the top end.  Their results showed that education contributed to 
higher wage inequality through both within and between dimensions; the within-groups 
inequality increased and between-groups inequality decreased.  Therefore, they argued 
that the latter factor might have dominated the former contributing to the observed 
decline in male wage inequality over the 1994–2002 period. 
In contrast to the above studies, this study uses the most recent data from the Household 
Labour Force Survey (LFS), instead of the Household Budget Survey (HBS). The main 
aim of HBS is to collect consumption and expenditure information, although it has 
some information on the labour market. The LFS has numerous advantages over the 
HBS: in particular, it has a much wider coverage and more observations which allow us 
to look at women, who are underrepresented in the labour market; all the national 
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statistics are based on the LFS, and these are used for policy analysis; and lastly, the 
main aim of this survey, unlike the HBS, is to look at the labour market. 
This study will contribute to the existing literature in two main ways. First, it will 
analyse the impact of the increase in the education of the labour force on wage 
inequality: in contrast, the existing literature mainly focuses on other aspects such as 
technology and labour market institutions. Second, it will be the first application of the 
Lemieux (2002) model in the context of a developing country.  
2.3 Underlying Theories and the Turkish Labour Market 
2.3.1 Underlying Theories 
In his seminal paper, Mincer (1974) proposed his famous human capital earnings 
function in which wages are defined as a function of education and experience. Mincer 
asserted that individuals can accumulate human capital from two channels. First, they 
can increase their educational qualifications by increasing their schooling level and 
second they can increase their abilities by on-the-job training (experience). The wage 
function can accordingly be written as:  
iii Xy              (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖 is log wages, 𝑋𝑖 is the vector of individual characteristics that determine 
wages; 𝛽 is the coefficient vector giving the marginal returns to the covariates in 𝑋𝑖; 
and 𝜀𝑖 is the random error term. The key individual characteristics that Mincer stressed 
were education (schooling) and experience (years in the labour market, including but 
not restricted to, on-the-job training). However, in subsequent empirical work, vector 𝑋𝑖 
has included a wide range of wage-determining characteristics. Estimating the wage 
equation, as given by equation (1) is often referred to as the human capital approach. 
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Most of the empirical literature uses Mincer’s wage determination model or its 
extensions and finds that schooling and experience have significant and positive effects 
on wages. Accordingly, it is now well-accepted that individuals who make higher 
investments in human capital receive higher returns from the labour market.    
The second important implication of the human capital approach is that if the demand 
for the skill increases, returns for the unmeasured human capital such as unobservable 
skills linked to school quality, intrinsic ability and effort, which are the main reasons 
why workers with the same level of education and experience have different wages, 
increase as well. In particular, the rate of increase in returns to unmeasured 
characteristics is greater for individuals who have more education. In econometric 
terms, residuals in Mincerian-type equations are empirically heteroskedastic. Lemieux 
(2002) provides a possible explanation for this heteroscedasticity issue: schooling is an 
imperfect proxy for true educational inputs and the error term includes unmeasured 
aspects of educational inputs such as school quality. He further argued that systematic 
differences in the residual variance across education groups arise if the residual 
dispersion in school quality is different for different levels of schooling. Martin and 
Pereira (2004) also note that school quality differences are more likely to be prevalent 
at higher schooling levels, because those are the stages that exhibit greater 
heterogeneity in schooling paths and school quality. Moreover, differences in school 
quality and the variance of residuals increase even more dramatically if admissions to 
schools get more selective at higher levels of education. Therefore changes in skill 
premiums affect wage inequality in two ways simultaneously; first it affects the wage 
gap between workers with lower and higher education levels which causes an increase 
in the between-group inequality component. Second, it affects the wage dispersion 
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within workers who have the same level of education but studied at schools with 
different qualities, which causes an increase in the within-group inequality component.7  
While higher levels of education provide higher earnings at the individual level, an 
increase in the educational attainment of the whole population does not necessarily 
mean an increase in returns to education. In his very famous paper, Pritchett (2001) 
analysed the relationship between rising educational attainment of the labour force and 
the growth rate of output per worker. Using cross-national data, he found a negative 
relationship between these two indicators on average. He argued that the marginal 
return to adding an additional year of schooling in whole population can be 
substantially different from average returns estimated with a Mincerian regression at a 
single point in time depending on the shifts in skill demand.8 For instance, he asserted 
that marginal returns to education decrease as the supply of educated labour expands if 
the demand remains stagnant.  
One classic example of this condition is given by Schultz (1975). He asserted that rapid 
technological progresses require constant adaptations to technologically induced 
disequilibrium and education pays off only if new technologies and inputs are available. 
Therefore, he argued that in an agricultural environment where technological 
development is stagnant (so the requirement of adaptation to new disequilibrium is 
absent), production gains from education will be zero as even the least educated farmers 
can eventually reach the efficient allocation of factors. 
                                                 
7 Card and Krueger (1992) provided evidence that men who are educated at higher quality schools have a 
higher return to an additional year of schooling and returns are also higher for individuals who studied 
with better educated teachers.  
8 In fact, Pritchett summarized some of the empirical studies showing that the median coefficient for 
years of schooling increased in the US, decreased in Egypt during the 1980s and fluctuated in Chile 
between 1960 and 1993.  
27 
 
In their seminal paper, Katz and Murphy (1992) analysed the changes in wage 
inequality in the US during the 1963-1987 period. Their results show that the college 
wage premium decreased in the 1971-1979 period in which there was a large increase in 
the supply of college graduates. On the other hand, the college wage premium increased 
in the 1979-1987 period in which the growth of the supply of graduates was very small. 
Accordingly, they argued that, combined with the smooth increase in skill demand, the 
fluctuations in the growth of the supply of college graduates as a fraction of the labour 
force played an important role in explaining the large differences in the relative wages 
of college graduates between these two decades.  Based on the findings of Pritchett 
(2001) and Katz and Murphy (1992), it can be argued that the education premium and 
wage inequality can increase or decrease depending on the differences between the 
relative growth rate of the supply and demand for the skills.  
In this chapter, the changes in the wage inequality in Turkey between 2002 and 2010 
are analysed. Turkey is an interesting case as wage inequality has been showing a 
decreasing trend despite the rapid industrialisation. The next section documents the 
recent macroeconomic environment and descriptive statistics on the labour market in 
Turkey. 
2.3.2 Macroeconomic Environment in Turkey 
Turkey experienced several major economic crises starting from the 1990s. The first 
crisis occurred with the gulf war in 1991. The second crisis, which was triggered by the 
fiscal and external imbalances, occurred in 1994 and a GDP growth rate of negative 6.1 
was experienced. After a short period of recovery, due to the adverse effects of the 
Asian, Russian and Brazilian crises, the Turkish economy experienced a slowdown in 
1998 with a growth rate of 3.1 per cent, and then contracted in 1999 at the rate of 
negative 3.4 per cent. Even though the economy was in boom in 2000 with a 7.3 per 
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cent growth rate, the heaviest crisis of Turkey’s recent history, mainly due to the major 
capital outflows, which occurred in November 2000 and February 2001 and the GDP 
declined by 5.7 per cent in 2001 in real terms (Tansel and Bodur, 2012). 
 In terms of growth rates, the post-2001 period can be defined as the recovery period for 
Turkey. The real growth rate was 6.2 per cent in 2002 and the economy grew by 6 per 
cent on average until 2007 when the recent global economic crises first showed its 
effects on Turkey. On the other hand, in contrast to the fast growth performance across 
sectors, additional employment could not be generated. The rate of unemployment was 
6.5 per cent in 2000 and it increased to 10.4 per cent in 2002. The unemployment rate 
remained high and never fell below 10 per cent despite the rapid surges in GDP and 
exports (see Figures 2.A1 and 2.A2). This observation is defined as jobless-growth in 
the literature. Many authors argued that the IMF stabilization program which was 
signed in 2000 and implemented through the post-2000 period was responsible for the 
jobless growth. They argued that due to virtually unregulated capital accounts and given 
the high real rates of interest prevalent in the Turkish financial markets, Turkey 
experienced massive inflows of short term financial capital. As a consequence, the 
domestic currency appreciated and Turkey suffered from a growing current account 
deficit. The appreciated currency stimulated imports together with a contraction of 
labour intensive, traditional export industries such as textiles, clothing, and food 
processing. This led to a contraction of formal jobs and increased informalisation of 
economic activities (Yeldan 2006; Telli, Voyvoda, and Yeldan 2007). The analysis of 
driving forces of the jobless growth in Turkey is, however, beyond the scope of this 
chapter.   
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2.3.3 The Turkish Education System and Composition of the Labour Force 
Before the reform in the compulsory education system which came into effect in 1997, 
the Turkish education system was organized as compulsory primary school (5  years), 
middle (or secondary) school (3 years), high school and vocational high school (3 
years), and university education (two to six years). With the reform in the education 
system, compulsory primary education was extended to 8 years and the middle school 
was abolished.9 
The second important development was the rapid increase in the number of universities. 
The establishment of new universities began with the second Five Year Development 
Program (FYDP hereafter) which was put in practice in 1968 (State Planning 
Organisation, 1967). In this program, it was planned to establish universities outside the 
three big cities (namely, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir) where most of the existing (7 out 
of 9) universities were located. According to this plan, each of the new universities 
were going to be considered as a separate project and extensive planning of their needs 
was going to be made for each of them particularly before their establishment. Over the 
following years, the number of universities increased gradually with the establishment 
of 20 universities between 1971 and 1991. However, in 1991 the number of universities 
increased suddenly as 24 new universities were established in one year. In that sense, it 
can be argued that the principle of extensive planning before the establishment of new 
universities was violated. For instance, according to the report on higher education, 
which is a part of the 9th FYDP and was published in 2006 (State Planning 
Organisation, 2006), the physical completion rate of the universities that were 
established 1991 was less than 50 per cent.   
                                                 
9 The Turkish education system was reformed again in 2012 and a more complex system known as the 
‘’4+4+4 system’’ has been adapted. 
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In accordance with the 2nd FYDP, a report by the State Planning Organisation, which 
was published in 1970 (State Planning Organisation, 1970), suggested that the new 
universities should be established in the cities which could serve as development 
centres and spread out the development inducing effect of the new universities. 
Accordingly, nearly all of the universities established after 1972 were outside the three 
big cities. There were no references to a university in each city in any of the programs 
or reports from before 2000’s; however the new universities became the subject of 
political campaigns starting from the 2000’s. With the “a university in each city” 
project the number of universities increased substantially in the post 2000 period. The 
fast increase in the establishment of the universities has been heavily criticised by many 
authors. Kaynar and Parlak (2005) argue that while the impact of the new universities 
on the cities has been exploited by the politicians, these universities were established 
without proper planning and before minimum physical requirements were met. Arap 
(2010) notes that some of the universities in this period were established by simply 
changing the name of the faculties which were originally a part of an old university 
located in neighbouring cities.  
As a result of the “a university in each city” policy and growing private sector 
participation, in 2011 the number of universities reached 165. As a consequence of 
these new universities, the number of university students also increased substantially 
(see Figures 2.A3 and 2.A4). For instance, from 1994 to 2011, the number of students 
in formal university education increased by more than 300 per cent and rose from 1.2 
million to 3.7 million (Turkish National Statistics Institute; TurkStat hereafter).  
The fast increase in the number of universities in Turkey has been accompanied by a 
rising difference between old and new universities in terms of equipment, funding and 
resources which can be expected to lead to differences in the quality of education. In 
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fact, Hatakenaka (2006) argued that the new universities which are not located in 
metropolitan centres find it difficult to recruit qualified staff because they are unwilling 
to relocate to these regions even though several measures were tried in the past to 
address these issues.10 She asserted that deeper structural changes were needed before 
any further expansion as the student/staff ratio for Turkey is one of the highest even 
among comparator developing countries. In addition, due to the central university 
entrance examination system, more successful students have the chance of studying 
with other successful students in the universities with better resources and this leads to 
further skill differences between university graduates.11  
Considering these two developments, it can be argued that the supply of educated 
labour continuously increased starting from the early 1990’s. In fact, Figures 2.A5, 
2.A6 and 2.A7 show that share of individuals with higher education in the labour force 
(employed and unemployed) increased. For example, according to the TurkStat web 
database, between 1988 and 2011 the share of individuals with university education in 
the labour force increased from 4 per cent to 21 per cent for women and 5 per cent to 15 
per cent for men. For the same period, the share of individuals with education less than 
high school in the labour force decreased for both men and women. Similar patterns are 
also observed in the composition of the employed and unemployed.  One crucial 
observation is that, for men, the share of university graduates among the unemployed 
has become even higher than the share of high school graduates since 2007. Based on 
these observations, a decrease in the educational premium can be expected: the 
increasing supply of labour with higher education is likely to decrease the upward 
                                                 
10 For instance, there was a requirement for professors to ‘serve’ in outer areas before being promoted.  
Today, there is a salary supplement to provide incentives for people to work in these universities. 
11 There are also teaching quality differences between high schools in Turkey. Apart from vocational high 
schools, there are 3 different types of public high schools in Turkey, namely science high schools, 
Anatolian high schools and general high schools which have different levels of selectiveness in their 
admissions. 
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pressure on the wages of university graduates while the decreasing share of workers 
with low levels of education moderates the downward pressure on the wages of those 
workers.  
2.4 Methodology  
2.4.1 Decomposition Method 
The literature on decomposition of wage inequality goes back to the seminal papers of 
Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). In their models they showed how to decompose the 
change in the mean of wages into two components; the effect of changes in the 
distribution of characteristics (changes in the distribution of human capital) and the 
effect of changes in the regression coefficients (changes in the market prices of human 
capital).  The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition can be shown as: 
itititit ubxy            (2) 
isisisis ubxy            (3) 
sststtst bxxbbxyy )()(         (4) 
Where 𝑦𝑖 is the log wage for individual i, ?̅? is the mean wage for the periods t and s, 𝑏 
is the vector of OLS estimated coefficients for the returns to human capital, 𝑥i is the 
vector of covariates representing the human capital characteristics, and 𝑢𝑖 is the 
regression residuals. The first term on the right hand side of equation (4) shows the 
changes the mean of wages due to the changes in regression coefficients (price effect) 
while the second term shows the change in the mean of wages due to the changes in 
covariates (composition effect).    
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Following their seminal work, many other models have been developed over the last 
two decades. One of the most popular models came from Juhn et al. (1993) (JMP 
hereafter). The JMP method became popular as, unlike Oaxaca-Blinder method, it takes 
into account the distribution of residuals with the inclusion of the residual imputation 
procedure. However, the main problem with this model is that it does not account for 
changes in the distribution of covariates. Although in their original work JMP formally 
allow for the distribution of residuals to be dependent on covariates, they did not 
explicitly explain how to implement it empirically.12  What they do, in their model, 
instead is to calculate the price effect as above (equation 4) and use their residual 
imputation method to account for the changes in the distribution of residuals and finally 
capture the effect of changes in characteristics as the part unexplained by the price and 
residual effect components. However, as mentioned in the previous section, error terms 
are not identically and independently distributed in Mincerian models. In other words, 
this type of modelling suffers from a heteroscedasticity problem. Therefore, the results 
of the JMP model can be misleading since this decomposition is efficient only in the 
case of homoscedastic residuals (Melly, 2005). 
This study will make use of a decomposition method developed by Lemieux (2002). 
This model unifies the residual imputation method by JMP and the re-weighting factor 
method by DiNardo et al. (1996). The model has several advantages compared to the 
other decomposition methods. First, it allows for the decomposition of changes in the 
entire distribution of wages rather than the decomposition of the change in the mean 
wages only.  In this model, it is possible to reveal the changes at different moments of 
the wage distribution. Second, unlike JMP it accounts for the distribution of covariates. 
                                                 
12 In their original paper JMP defined the residual of the distribution as 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹𝑡
−1(𝜂𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡) although many 
applications of the JMP decomposition defined 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹𝑡
−1(𝜂𝑖𝑡) where 𝜂𝑖𝑡 is the percentile of an individual 
residual in the residual distribution and 𝐹𝑡
−1 is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function. 
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Therefore, it also accounts for the problem of heteroskedasticity. Finally, it is also 
possible to decompose the changes in the residual distribution into the effect of the 
changes in unobservable characteristics and the effect of changes in returns to those 
characteristics. Therefore, it is possible to test the hypothesis of the human capital 
approach which asserts that a positive change in returns to observable skills exerts a 
positive impact on returns to unobservable skills.  
The first step of the Lemieux method is to estimate separate Mincerian wage 
regressions for each year: 
2010201020102010 iii ubxy          (5) 
2002200220022002 iii ubxy          (6) 
To compute the effect of changes in the prices of characteristics, following JMP, a 
counterfactual wage vector that would prevail in 2002 (the base year) if the price of 
human capital were the same as in 2010 is constructed. To get the counterfactual wage 
vector, the coefficients from the 2002 wage regression are replaced with the coefficients 
from 2010 such as13:  
2002201020022002 iii
a ubxy          (7) 
Once the counterfactual wages 2002
ay  are constructed, it is straightforward to obtain the 
share of the effect of changes in prices in the total change of the wage distribution by 
comparing any inequality measure (such as Gini, Theil index, variance or wage gaps) 
for 2002
ay  and empirical wages 2002y .     
                                                 
13 Similar to the Blinder-Oaxaca and JMP methods, the Lemieux method is also path dependent. In other 
words, the results of the decomposition are sensitive to the choice of the base year which is 2002 here. 
However, there is no ‘correct’ choice of base year as the choice of either year is equally valid a priori. 
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The second step of the method is to create the re-weighting factor which will be used 
to modify the original sample weights and calculate the effect of changes in the 
covariates. The idea of modifying the sample weights, which are used to calculate 
sample statistics representative of the population, was originally proposed by DiNardo 
et al. (1996). This method basically attaches a new counterfactual weight to each 
individual to keep the distribution of characteristics at their 2010 level and thereby it 
makes it possible to account for changes in covariates. Their idea is to pool the samples 
of the two periods and estimate a logit or probit model for the probability of being in the 
base year.14 Then the re-weighting factor is calculated by the propensity score which is 
the predicted probability that an individual in the pooled sample comes from the base 
year conditional on covariates: 
)2002Prob( 20022002 ii x|periodP         (8)   
  And the re-weighting factor is defined as 
2002
2002
2002
2002
1
1
P
P
P
P
i
i
i


          (9) 
Where P2002 is the unconditional probability that an observation is in year 2002 (the 
weighted share of the pooled sample that is in 2002). Finally the new sample weights 
are computed by multiplying the original sample weights (wi) with the re-weighting 
factor: 
ii
a
i ww 20022002                                      (10) 
Following the notation of Lemieux (2002), the counterfactual values of wages that will 
be generated by using the new sample weights are summarized in Table 2.1. The 
                                                 
14 Both the OLS regression and the logit model use the same set of covariates. 
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difference between the distributional statistics (e.g. Gini, Theil index) of 2002
ay  and 
2002y  (using the original sample weights 2002iw  from the 2002 data) gives the coefficient 
effect. This corresponds to the comparison of the distributions presented in the second 
and the first rows of the Table 2.1. On the other hand, the distribution statistics that are 
calculated by using 2002
ay  and the new sample weights aiw 2002  contain the covariates 
effect as well as the coefficient effect. Accordingly, the covariates effect is calculated as 
the difference between the distributional statistics that are obtained by using 2002
ay  with 
the original sample weights 2002iw  and with the new sample weights
a
iw 2002 . This 
corresponds to the comparison of the distributions presented in the fourth and the 
second rows of Table 2.1. 
The final stage of the decomposition is to calculate the effect of changes in the residuals 
on the change in the wage distribution between the two periods. As mentioned earlier, 
Lemieux (2002) uses the residual imputation method which is provided by JMP.  
With a strict human capital interpretation of wages, JMP argue that residual wage 
dispersion is mainly due to the imperfect measurement of human capital in standard 
datasets. Accordingly, assuming a stable distribution of unmeasured skills over time, 
changes in residual wage inequality must be the result of a change in the returns to these 
unmeasured skills.   
To summarize the residual imputation method, consider the following simple form of 
the model for wage residuals: 
2002200220022002 iii pu                    (11) 
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where  𝜂𝑖2002 is unmeasured human capital, 𝑝2002 is the return to unmeasured human 
capital and 𝜀𝑖2002 is a random error term not linked with skills. Then the variance of 
residuals can be calculated as: 
2
2002,
2
2002,
2
2002
2
2002    p                                                         (12) 
Where 𝜎𝜂,2002
2  = Var (𝜂𝑖2002) and 𝜎𝜀,2002
2  = Var (𝜀𝑖2002). In this model, with the 
assumption that the distribution of unmeasured skills is constant (𝜎𝜂,2002
2 = 𝜎𝜂,2010
2 =
𝜎𝜂
2), and 𝜎𝜀,2002
2  is zero or stable over time, changes in skill prices are the only source of 
any change in residual wage inequality.   
22
2010
2
2002
2
2010
2
2002 )(  pp                              (13) 
The main disadvantage of this form is that the residuals are assumed to be a linear 
function of unmeasured skills. To understand the effect changes in unmeasured human 
capital prices have on the wage distribution, JMP propose a more general setting in 
which a non-linear pricing scheme is applied: 
2002200220022002 )( iii pu                     (14) 
Where  𝑝2002(. ) is a monotonic and continuous function; and for simplicity 𝜀𝑖2002 is 
assumed to be zero.     
The JMP model, as given in equation (14), is more general compared to the form shown 
in equation (13) since it provides more flexibility by making it possible to generate any 
distribution of 𝑢𝑖2002 from an arbitrary distribution of skills 𝜂𝑖2002. For simplicity, 
assume that the 𝜂𝑖2002 follows a uniform distribution over the interval of [0, 1] since: 
)( 200220022002 ii uF ,                    (15) 
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Where 𝐹2002(.) is the cumulative distribution function of  𝑢𝑖2002. Combining equations 
(14) and (15) we get: 
),()( 2002
1
2002200220022002 iii Fpu 
                    (16) 
Where 𝜂𝑖2002 can be interpreted as the rank of observation i in the distribution of 
residuals while the non-linear skill pricing function 𝑝2002(. ) is the inverse cumulative 
distribution of 𝑢𝑖2002.    
By using the skill pricing function, the counterfactual wages (equation (7)) can be 
rewritten as 
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The decomposition is finalized by replacing the residuals in 2002 with the residuals that 
would prevail if the skill pricing function was 𝑝2010(. ) instead of 𝑝2002(. ) such as 
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Where 𝑢𝑖2002
𝑏 = 𝑝2010(𝜂𝑖2002) = 𝐹2010
−1 𝐹2002(𝑢𝑖2002) is the counterfactual residual for 
the observation i. 
The imputation method used to compute counterfactual residuals may seem a bit 
complicated. However, JMP suggest a simple procedure.  First, the rank 𝜂𝑖2002 =
𝐹2002(𝑢𝑖2002) is computed from the empirical residual distribution in 2002 and then the 
residual at the same rank in the residual distribution in period 2010 is picked.15   
                                                 
15 Unless the numbers of observations are equal in two periods, it is not possible to match residuals 
exactly. Lemieux (2002) suggested a simple solution to solve the problem. His idea is to discretize the 
distribution of residuals in k intervals which contain the same number of observations and replace the 
actual residuals by the average residual in each interval. In this analysis k is chosen as 500.   
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The obtained counterfactual wages now can be used to decompose the changes in wage 
inequality. Extending JMP, they can also be combined with counterfactual weights to 
control for the distribution of covariates. In addition, having the counterfactual wage 
vectors, it is possible to calculate any measure of inequality to see the effects of 
different factors on different parts of wage distribution. 
The last but not the least important feature of the decomposition method is that it is also 
possible to decompose the changes in wage residuals. Since sample weights are used to 
calculate indices that are representing the population, comparison of variances of 
residual wages using the original sample weights and counterfactual weights provides 
information about how much of the change in residual distribution is due to the change 
in covariates and the change in the skill pricing function.  
2.4.2 Selection Bias 
A selection bias problem occurs in many applications of econometrics and a well-
known example of it is observed in wage regression estimations. By definition, wage 
estimations are performed for the individuals who have reported their wages. Therefore, 
while estimating the returns to human capital, say schooling and labour market 
experience, selection bias may occur if some individuals who enrolled in schooling 
level do not work. The reason may be that these individuals who have relatively low 
levels of schooling will receive low wage offers which may be lower than their 
reservation wages. As a result, employment levels for these individuals will be low and 
selection bias problems will occur as one will only observe the wages of individuals 
with high levels of education and high wages. The important consequence of this 
problem is that simple OLS estimation of wages on human capital will be biased as the 
sample selection is not random and the sample is not representative of the whole 
population which is the subject of interest (Heckman, 1976, 1979). 
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According to TurkStat, nearly 30 per cent of working men were self-employed in the 
year 2000. This share decreased to 23 per cent in 2010. However, this considerable 
share of the self-employed is an indicator of non-random participation into the wage 
sector. The selection bias problem becomes even more crucial in wage estimations for 
women. Over the last 50 years, Turkey’s female labour participation has been 
decreasing (Goksel, 2012). According to the Global Gender Gap Report 2013 (World 
Economic Forum, 2013), the female labour force participation rate in Turkey is 30 per 
cent and this ratio puts Turkey in the 123rd place out of 136 countries. Another problem 
that may cause selection bias is that there is a substantial share of unpaid family 
workers who traditionally work in the agricultural sector and are recorded as employed 
in employment statistics. According to TurkStat, for the year 2002, 49 per cent of total 
female employment consists of unpaid workers. However, these individuals do not 
report any form of labour income and so they are automatically omitted from the 
sample. Based on these issues, the selection bias problem should be considered while 
estimating wage equations in the case of Turkey.  
Heckman (1979) proposed two estimation techniques to correct for the self-selection 
problem; one requires maximum likelihood (ML) estimation of a selection model 
assuming bivariate normality of the error terms in the wage and participation equations. 
The other one consist of two steps. In the first step of the process, a probit model is 
performed with the whole sample to estimate the inverse Mill ratio, λ, which is a 
monotone decreasing function of the probability of being in the subsample of 
participants. Then the predicted probabilities obtained from the probit model, λ, are 
included in the OLS (or GLS) estimation of the wage equation as an additional 
regressor in the second step. Due to its easy-to-implement feature this method has 
become the standard estimation procedure for empirical wage equations.     
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Due to the existence of unpaid family workers and the self-employed and the different 
characteristics of these individuals from those who simply do not participate in the work 
force, usage of a simple probit model in the first step of the correction process can be 
misleading. This is because, just like labour force participation, the decisions to be an 
unpaid family worker or to be self-employed are also not random. It is more accurate to 
account for the differences between these groups in the first step of the correction 
process.  
Dubin and McFadden (1984) proposed an alternative two step method to account for 
selection bias for the case where the number of choices is greater than two16. They 
suggested using a multinomial logit model for the first step of the correction process. 
Following their method, the whole sample of woman is grouped into three categories. 
Individual i is categorized as 𝑓𝑤𝑖 = 2 if working in the wage sector, 𝑓𝑤𝑖 = 1 if she is 
an unpaid family worker and 𝑓𝑤𝑖 = 0 if she is economically inactive (a non-
participant). Then, the probability of being in group j is obtained by estimating a 
multinomial logit model: 
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where the numerator is normalized to 1 for 𝑗 = 0, 𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃(𝑓𝑤𝑖 = 𝑗|𝑍𝑖) is the 
conditional probability of individual i being in group j, conditional on  𝑍𝑖, a vector of 
covariates and 𝛼𝑗 is a column vector of coefficients corresponding to the jth sector. 
                                                 
16 The Dubin and McFadden (1984) method is chosen over the alternative Lee (1983) method as the latter 
includes strong assumptions on the covariance between the residuals of the selection equation and the 
wage equation. Bourguignon et al. (2004) note that these assumptions are often violated in empirical 
applications, and using Monte-Carlo simulations they show that the Lee method performs worse relative 
to the Dubin and McFadden method.  
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Then the predicted probabilities from the multinomial logit model are used to construct 
a selection correction term, 𝜆𝑖𝑗, by using the following formula provided by Hill (1983); 
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The same model is applied to the case of men and the only difference is that the 𝑓𝑤𝑖 =
1 represents self-employment instead of unpaid-family work.   
In the second step of the model, augmented wage equations are estimated separately for 
men and women by including the sample selection correction term in the set of 
covariates as an additional regressor.  
ijijjjijij XY  )log( ,                   (21) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 are the wages of individuals in group j, 𝑋𝑖𝑗 is the vector of individual 
characteristics, 𝛽𝑗 is the estimated vector of returns to those characteristics in group j, 𝜃𝑗   
is the unknown coefficient related to the selection correction term and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is the 
independent residual term. The augmented wage equation estimation results, then, are 
used in the decomposition of the change in the wage distributions of men and women 
between 2002 and 2010.17 
Wooldridge (2010) notes that even if the selection equation and the wage equation have 
the identical regressors (i.e. Z=X), the coefficients in the augmented wage equation can 
be identified by the non-linearity of the selection correction term. However, he also 
                                                 
17When decomposing the wage differentials in the presence of selection bias, we need to make 
assumptions about the selection term (
ijj ). One option is to decompose the selection corrected wages, 
defined as ][)]log()[log( ijsjsijtjtijsijt YY   ; for details see Neuman and Oaxaca (2004).  
Another option, used in this chapter, is to treat the selection term as an additional explanatory variable; 
hence it is the change in the observed wage distributions which is decomposed.  
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notes that relying solely on non-linearity can introduce severe collinearity among the 
regressors in the regression of the augmented wage equation. For identification, one 
needs a situation where there is at least one element of Z which is excluded from X. In 
other words, there should be at least one variable that affects the labour market status 
but does not affect the wages. 18 
Considering this issue, three dummies are added to the covariates in the selection 
equation to capture the labour market status of other members of the household: 
presence of wage workers, presence of self-employed, and presence of unpaid family 
workers in the household. The justification for using the labour market status of other 
members of the household in the selection equation comes from the well documented 
evidence on the importance of social networks in determining the labour market 
outcomes. For instance, Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) argue that each individual 
is connected to others through a network (e.g., kinship, friendship, and 
acquaintanceship). He also argues that, when information about jobs arrives, 
individuals, who are unemployed and directly hear of a job, use the information to 
obtain a job. On the other hand, individuals who are already employed, depending on 
whether the job is more attractive than their current job, might take the job or else might 
pass information to one (or more) of their direct connections in the network. In 
accordance with this argument, it is possible that a wage worker (or self-employee) may 
share the information about a waged employment (or self-employment) opportunity 
with his or her household members who are unemployed or self-employed.  
In the selection equation for women, the presence of the grandmother in the household 
is also added to the regressors. The presence of other adults in the household can aid in 
                                                 
18 Due to the lack of information about tenure and membership of the social security system for the self-
employed, unpaid family workers, and economically inactive individuals, these variables are only included 
in the wage equations. 
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the labour force participation of women, by providing child care; however, it can also 
be detrimental, as other adults may be either considered as labour market substitutes for 
women or additional care responsibilities for women.  In this case a dummy for the 
presence of grandmother in the household can aid in labour force participation of 
women by providing child care, but at the same time can be a deterrent for labour force 
participation as an elderly relative in the household may be an additional care 
responsibility for the women. For instance, using US data, Ettner (1996) shows that 
caregiving responsibilities for elders is a significant detriment to labour force 
participation for women. In case of China, on the other hand, Maurer-Fazio et al. (2011) 
found that the presence of co-residence with elders had a positive effect on the labour 
force participation of women, especially married women. Similarly Marenzi and Pagani 
(2005) found that in Italy presence of elderly parents in the house can be beneficial for 
the labour force participation of women, especially those with pre-school children. 
2.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
2.5.1 Data 
The data sources are the two waves of the LFS which is conducted by TurkStat for the 
years 2002 and 2010. The first LFS was conducted in year 2000. However, to avoid the 
distortions in the Turkish labour market due to the economic crises which occurred in 
2000 and 2001, the 2002 LFS data is used in the analysis as the starting period.  At the 
time of the analysis, the last wave of the LFS that was available was 2010, which is 
used here.  The LFS has the largest sample from the Turkish labour force and contains 
information on both the workers’ demographic characteristics and the characteristics of 
their main job for each individual in the household.  For the analysis, two cross sections 
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of workers aged between 20 and 64 are created.19 Following that, individuals who are 
students, ill, disabled or retired are dropped from the sample. As the LFS does not 
provide any information on the wages that are earned from any additional jobs, 
individuals who have an extra job are dropped. Women who are self-employed and men 
who are unpaid family workers are also dropped from the sample (see Table 2A.1 for 
the percentage share of the omitted groups in the full sample). From the resulting 
sample, a new category, namely “economically inactive”, is created for the individuals 
who do not participate in the labour force and those who are unemployed. The selection 
equation estimations are performed with 78,040 and 132,894 female, 58,204 and 
104,650 male individuals for the years 2002 and 2010, respectively. The wage equation 
estimations are performed with 9,191 and 18,644 female workers and 32,226 and 
59,696 male workers for the years 2002 and 2010, respectively.20  
The educational qualifications of workers are grouped in 7 categories namely, illiterate, 
literate without formal education, primary, secondary, high school, vocational high 
school and university. In 1997, compulsory primary education in Turkey was increased 
from 5 to 8 years and so the “middle school” which corresponds to the 3 year education 
between primary and high school level was abolished. However, since there are still a 
substantial number of workers with 5 years of primary education, an additional category 
“secondary education” is created to aggregate the middle school and 8 year primary 
education categories. Both of these education levels correspond to the same years of 
                                                 
19 The reason for choosing this age band is that the decision to pursue higher education is endogenous as 
it depends on the returns to higher education. However individuals who are aged 20 or older are the ones 
who have already made their decisions.     
20 The reason for the higher number of observations in the 2010 data is that the TurkStat increased the 
sample size of the LFS gradually from 2002 to 2010 
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schooling (8 years) and theoretically these workers can be expected to have the same 
qualifications as the investment they make in human capital is equivalent.21  
The LFS contains information only on net monthly wages. This is not a big 
disadvantage since Tansel (2005) suggests that monthly wages convey fewer recording 
errors compared to annual wages. In order to get hourly wages, monthly wages are first 
divided by 4.3 and then divided by the usual hours of work per week. Finally, hourly 
wages are deflated by the consumer price index which is also provided by the TurkStat 
to obtain real hourly wages.       
2.5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.2A presents the descriptive statistics of the variables for each sample year for 
women.  Wage earning women are the most educated, with 40 per cent having a 
university education in 2010.  Unpaid family workers are the least educated, with a 
third of them having no formal education.  Between 2002 and 2010 there has been a 
shift in the distribution of education for the wage earners, with a fall in the wage earners 
with primary (high school) education by 6 percentage points (4 percentage points), and 
an increase in the university educated women by 8 percentage points.  Wage earning 
women are more likely to be heads of their household, and are more likely to come 
from households where other members of the household are also wage earners. The 
mean values of the variables that represent presence of children in the household are 
smaller for wage earning women. Women in unpaid work tend to come from rural 
households where other members of the household are self-employed. 
Table 2.2B presents the descriptive statistics of the variables for each sample year for 
men. Wage earning men are more educated relative to the other two groups 
                                                 
21 Years of schooling is the most popular proxy that is used for capturing educational qualifications in the 
literature.  
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(economically inactive and self-employed).  There has been a shift in the distribution of 
education between 2002 and 2010, towards university educated workers in the wage 
sector; the share of workers with primary education decreased by 8 percentage points 
while the share of workers with a university degree increased by 5 percentage points. 
There is not much difference in the mean values of the variables that represent presence 
of children in the household between self-employed men and wage earning men; for the 
economically inactive men on the other hand, the values of these variables are smaller. 
Self-employed men have a high proportion of other members of the household who do 
unpaid family work (possibly women in the family). 
Looking at the descriptive statistics presented in Tables 2.2A and 2.2B, it can be seen 
that the change in the compulsory education system and the increasing number of 
universities are associated with a substantial change in the educational composition of 
wage workers (and the workforce in general). The new education system, which 
abolished the primary school and made secondary education compulsory, reduced the 
number of workers with primary education only for both man and women. With the 
increasing accessibility22 of university education, the number of workers with a 
university degree increased for both genders. Based on these observations, it can be 
argued that the supply of educated labour increased between 2002 and 2010. 
The mean wages for both men and women have increased over time; with a higher 
increase in the mean wages of women. There has been a fall in the variance of wages 
for both men and women over time. The mean wage for men is higher than the mean 
wage for women in 2002 and this relationship reverses in 2010. This observation does 
                                                 
22 Before their abolishment in 2012, the tuition fees for university education in Turkey varied across 
different departments. For instance, the range of tuition fees in 2010 was 71-591 Turkish Liras per year 
(which corresponds to 47-394 US dollars with the exchange rate on January 1st 2010). Student loans were 
provided by the government and their interest rate was fixed to the wholesale price index.  
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not necessarily imply positive discrimination towards women. For instance, using the 
Structure of Earnings Survey 2006 conducted by the Turkish Statistical Institute, Kaya 
(2010) shows that on average women earn 2.5 percentage points more than men. She 
also argues that the higher average wage for women is a consequence of a composition 
effect as most of the female employees have a university degree while male employees 
mostly have only primary education. By exploiting a quantile decomposition method, 
she also shows that, while the composition effect had a narrowing effect on the gender 
wage gap (favouring women), the effect of differences in the returns to characteristics 
had an increasing effect on the gender wage gap (favouring men) showing that the 
human capital characteristics of women are rewarded less than the characteristics of 
their male counterparts. Considering Kaya’s (2010) findings, the reversal of relative 
wages between men and women between 2002 and 2010 can be explained by the higher 
increase in the share of university graduates amongst female wage workers. As noted 
above, the share of university graduates amongst female wage workers increased by 8 
percentage points while the size of the increase was 5 percentage points for males.   
2.6 Empirical Results  
The first step in the empirical investigation is to look at the multinomial logit model for 
labour market status. Tables 2.3A and 2.3B show the relative risk ratios (RRR) from the 
maximum likelihood estimation of the multinomial logit model for women and men, 
respectively.  The base category of the model is the group ‘economically inactive’ for 
both men and women.  The RRR tells us how the probability of choosing wage 
employment or unpaid family work (self-employment in the case of men) relative to 
being economically inactive changes if the independent variable increases by one unit.  
If the RRR is greater than 1, it means that the individual is more likely to be in wage 
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employment or unpaid family work (self-employment for men) and accordingly, if it is 
lower than 1, the individual is more likely to be economically inactive. 
Table 2.3A shows that for women, education at all levels increases the probability of 
being in wage employment. Having other members of the household in the wage sector, 
being head of the household, and (for the year 2002) having a grandmother in the 
household (this will potentially capture help available to women, within the household, 
for childcare and other household responsibilities) also increases the probability of 
being in wage employment. Presence of children in the household aged 5 or less, being 
married, and presence of self-employed members in the household all have a decreasing 
effect on being in wage employment. 
Table 2.3B shows that for men, education at all levels, presence of children in the 
household aged 5 or less, other members of the household in the wage sector, and being 
the head of the household increase the probability of being in wage employment. Living 
in a rural area, and the number of unpaid family workers in the household all increase 
the likelihood of being self-employed. 
An interesting result that can be drawn from Tables 2.3A and 2.3B is that for both men 
and women, the RRR’s are much smaller in 2010 than they were in 2002. This means 
that education does not increase the probability of being a wage worker (as opposed to 
being economically inactive) in 2010 as much as it did in 2002.    
To see the changes in the returns to these human capital characteristics, OLS 
regressions are estimated for each year and also for men and women.  The regression 
results (see Table 2.4) show that the coefficients for the education variables decreased 
from 2002 to 2010 for men and women.  The percentage decrease is more at the lower 
education levels than at higher education levels.  For example, while returns to 
50 
 
secondary education for women (men) decreased by 86 per cent (76 per cent) over time, 
considering 2002 as the base year, the returns to university education decreased by 43 
per cent (28 per cent).  The dramatic decreases in returns to education suggest that the 
market price adjustment mechanism gave a sharp response to the increase in the supply 
of educated labour by decreasing the returns to education. 
According to the wage regression results, compared to the base category “never 
married”, being married has a positive effect on wages. Also working in the formal 
sector (which is captured by membership of the social security system) has an 
increasing effect on wages. The coefficient for the selection term is positive for men 
and women and statistically significant in each year, which means that the unobservable 
factors that affect selection into wage employment are positively correlated with the 
unobservable factors that affect wages. 
The descriptive statistics and the regression results show that the composition of the 
human capital of wage earners and returns to the human capital changed significantly 
between these two years. However, it is not possible to reveal to what extent these 
changes were responsible for the changes in the wage distribution without decomposing 
the changes in wage inequality. Tables 2.5A and 2.5B present the decomposition results 
for women and men, respectively.  
The top two rows of Tables 2.5A and 2.5B give the measures of wage inequality for the 
two years.  Wage inequality is higher for women than men. Whichever measure is 
looked at, wage inequality decreased for both men and women over this period; the 
decrease is greater at the bottom part of the distribution (p50/p10) than at the top half of 
the distribution (p90/p50).  
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The decomposition results for both women and men (Tables 2.5A and 2.5B) suggest 
that the decreases in the returns to observed characteristics (the effect of coefficients; 
change in the betas), have a substantial share in the decreasing inequality in this period. 
The effect of this change in decreasing inequality is very high in both the upper and 
lower tails of the wage distributions of men and women. For women, the fall in the 
returns to the unmeasured characteristics (pricing function) has a considerable share at 
the top end of the distribution while the size of this effect is found to be very small at 
the lower tail of the distribution. The effect of pricing in the wage distribution of men is 
also negative and relatively high at the upper tail.  
The effect of changes in the composition of characteristics is negative and relatively 
small for women.  The change in characteristics (an increase in education being one of 
them), holding returns same, decreases wage inequality for women.  For men, the same 
holds true, with the exception of changes in inequality in the upper tail, where a change 
in characteristics, holding returns constant, leads to an increase in wage inequality. Part 
of the explanation for the differences in this finding for men and women could be due to 
the fact that the proportion of women with university education (who are most likely to 
be in the upper tail) working in the wage sector is much higher than the proportion of 
men in the wage sector with university education. A further increase in the supply of 
educated women dampens the returns to them, whereas for men it does not.23 
One important observation is that the effect of changes in the composition of human 
capital is moderate compared to the size of other effects. Considering the rapid increase 
in the educational level of wage earners, this result may seem surprising. However, as 
                                                 
23 Robinson (1976) presents a two sector model where he shows that there exists an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between wage inequality and the proportion of skilled labour; as the proportion of skilled 
labour increases, wage inequality first increases and then decreases.  The turning point of the relationship 
is an empirical question. 
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Naticchioni et al. (2008) noted, use of the partial equilibrium assumption that aggregate 
quantities of covariates do not affect market prices may cause misleading interpretations 
and this assumption is a major drawback of the wage inequality literature. The market 
price adjustment mechanism can play quite an important role in wage distributions and 
the small effect of changes in the human capital composition is most likely to be the 
result of market price adjustment to these changes. In other words, the price of human 
capital is determined by supply and demand jointly. If there is an increase in the supply 
of human capital, which is the case here, the market price of human capital decreases if 
such an increase is not balanced with an increase in the demand. Therefore, even if the 
effect of changes in the covariates is found to be very small here, increasing supply of 
human capital had a crucial role by triggering the market price adjustment mechanism.   
The last rows of Tables 2.5A and 2.5B present the residual change in the wage 
distribution which could not be explained by these three factors. Lemieux (2002) argued 
that when a random variable like 𝑦 is the sum of two random variables like 𝑥𝑏 and 𝑢, 
knowing the distributions of these two variables is generally not enough to characterize 
the marginal distribution of 𝑦. Generally, an infinite number of marginal distributions of 
𝑦 is compatible with given marginal distributions of 𝑥𝑏 and 𝑢.     
Looking at the last two columns of Tables 2.5A and 2.5B, the decomposition results 
indicate that the systematic part of the wage equation (the sum of the covariate and 
coefficient effects) could not explain around 40-50 per cent of the change in the Gini 
and Theil index for men. Although the size of this effect is smaller in the case of 
women, there is still a considerable part, around 25-30 per cent, which is explained by 
the skill pricing function of the unmeasured skills.  
Tables 2.6A and 2.6B present the decomposition of changes in wage residuals for 
women and men, respectively. The reported results show that the variance of residuals 
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decreased by around 50 per cent for both men and women. Also the residual wage gaps 
decreased in accordance with the decrease in variance. The changes in the composition 
of unmeasured skills had an inequality decreasing effect for men while it was inequality 
increasing for women. Nevertheless, in both cases, the magnitude of this effect is once 
again negligible. The skill pricing function also explained almost all of the variation in 
the change in the dispersion of the wage residuals. This is evidence that decreasing 
returns to human capital were accompanied by a decrease in the pricing function of 
unmeasured characteristics.   
2.7 Conclusion 
In this study, the relationship between the human capital composition of employment 
and wage inequality is investigated using data on the Turkish labour market. Using the 
decomposition methodology proposed by Lemieux (2002), it is found that the 
decreasing wage inequality observed in Turkey between 2002 and 2010 was mainly due 
to two factors: The decreasing between group inequality which is related to the 
decreasing coefficients for education and the decreasing within group inequality due to 
the decreasing skill pricing function of unmeasured skills. On the other hand, the role of 
the change in the distribution of the covariates is found to be negative and small.  
The results of the study show that the increasing supply of educated labour, which is 
attributed to the increase in the number of universities and the reform in the education 
system which increased the years of compulsory education, had a substantial effect on 
the wage distribution in Turkey between 2002 and 2010. As a result of the increase in 
supply, wage inequality decreased in both the top and the bottom half of the wage 
distribution. It is also found that the decrease in wage inequality was relatively low in 
the top half of the wage distribution. A potential explanation for the lower decrease in 
wage inequality in the top half of the distribution could be the SBTC effect which 
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possibly had a positive effect on the skill demand. However, the decreases in returns to 
education and the decreasing wage inequality indicate that the skill demand increasing 
effect of SBTC fell behind the effect of large increase in the supply of educated labour. 
The main limitation of the analysis is the lack of information in the data about the 
changes in skill demand. A possible strategy to understand the changes in skill demand 
could have been to look at the changes in the relative share of occupations with 
different skill requirements. Unfortunately, the LFS data includes only the one-digit-
level of International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO88) classification 
which has nine categories. Due to the one-digit-level classification, each of these 
categories contains a very wide range of occupations which makes it difficult to 
compare these categories in terms of skill requirements. Nevertheless, as summarised in 
Section 2.2, SBTC is found to have a positive effect on the skill demand in both 
developed and developing countries. Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect an increase 
in the skill demand in Turkey as well. However, as noted above, the effect of an 
increase in skill demand seems to be overwhelmed by the substantial increase in the 
supply of educated labour.  
2.8 Policy Implications  
Following the increase in the number of universities and reforms in the educational 
system, the supply of educated labour rapidly increased in Turkey. However, steep 
decreases in the returns to education and the increasing share of university graduates in 
unemployment suggest that the labour market could not accommodate this increasing 
supply. Accordingly, wage inequality decreased as a result of relatively low demand for 
the educated workers. As noted in Section 2.3.3, the share of university graduates 
among the male unemployed has become higher than that for high school graduates 
since 2008. Moreover, according to the TurkStat employment statistics (TurkStat web 
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database), the unemployment rate for university graduates which was around 6-8 per 
cent in 1990’s became 11 per cent in 2010. This indicates that a large number of 
university graduates are facing the problem of unemployment. This leads to inefficiency 
since skilled labour, which is a valuable resource, remains idle. To overcome the 
problem, policy makers could consider encouraging investments that create new 
employment opportunities and also R&D investments even though it should be 
acknowledged that such investments may lead to labour saving technologies.  
The results of the study indicate that the decreasing skill premium led to a substantial 
change in the skill pricing function of unmeasured characteristics. This is in accordance 
with the skill price theory of Lemieux (2002) who argued that the negative changes in 
the coefficients component exert a negative impact on the residual component along the 
wage distribution, providing a measure for unmeasured skills pricing. A substantial 
change in the skill pricing function can be interpreted as sign of high quality differences 
between universities.  This is not a surprising result since the new universities have 
encountered financial difficulties and a lack of facilities such as laboratories and 
buildings. For instance, Cukadar et al. (2011) argue that the new universities face 
problems regarding libraries in terms of physical space, as well as a lack of personal 
and academic resources. They also show that the budget that old universities possess is 
greater than the new universities. Unfortunately, this hypothesis is not testable since 
there is no information in the dataset about the universities that the individuals 
graduated from. However, there is evidence that the quality of education is decreasing 
in general. For instance, according to the Student Selection and Placement Centre 
(OSYM) higher education statistics, the number of students per teaching staff increased 
from 13.8 to 18.8 from 1984 to 2011. In fact, the establishment of new universities 
under the “a university in each city’’ project has been criticized by many authors (e.g. 
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Dortlemez, 1995; Kaynar and Parlak, 2005). It is argued that the scientific requirements 
and maintenance of minimum standards have been ignored as politicians used the 
stimulating effects of universities on local economies in their election campaigns. 
Decreasing quality of university education has two crucial economic outcomes; it 
reduces the productivity of the educated labour below its potential and causes an 
inefficient allocation of resources - resources which are quite limited in many 
developing countries. Therefore, in addition to issues regarding accessibility, 
policymakers should give importance also to the quality of education when decisions 
are made on education policies.  
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TABLES OF CHAPTER 2 
1Table 2.1: Counterfactual distributions 
Variable Weight Resulting Distribution 
𝒚𝒊𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟐 𝑤𝑖2002 Distribution at 2002 
𝒚𝒊𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟐
𝒂  𝑤𝑖2002 2002 distribution with 𝒃 of 2010 
𝒚𝒊𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟐 𝑤
𝑎
𝑖2002 2002 distribution with covariates of 2010 
𝒚𝒊𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟐
𝒂  𝑤𝑎𝑖2002 2002 distribution with covariates and 𝒃 of 2010 
Note: The base year is 2002. 𝑤𝑖2002 is the original sample weights from the year 2002. 𝑤
𝑎
𝑖2002 = 𝑤𝑖𝛹𝑖 is the 
counterfactual weights and 𝛹𝑖 is the re-weighting factor. 
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2Table 2.2A: Sample Averages for Women 
Note: standard errors for continuous variables in parenthesis.  Sample weights are used 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  2002   2010  
 E. 
inactive 
U. 
family 
worker 
Wage 
worker 
E. 
inactive 
U. 
family 
worker 
Wage 
worker 
Mean log real wages   5.38   5.65 
   (0.91)   (0.78) 
Education Dummies       
No formal education 0.22 0.33 0.04 0.25 0.32 0.06 
Primary school 0.58 0.63 0.28 0.47 0.55 0.22 
Secondary school 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.08 
High school 0.08 0.02 0.17 0.08 0.03 0.13 
Vocational  high school 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.11 
University 
 
0.02 0.00 0.32 0.04 0.01 0.40 
Tenure   - 19.55 6.42 - 15.27 5.07 
 - (0.15) (0.07) - (0.11) (0.05) 
Presence of children       
Age ≤ 4 years 0.33 0.31 0.18 0.33 0.27 0.18 
5 ≤ Age < 11 years 0.41 0.42 0.29 0.39 0.38 0.27 
11 ≤ Age < 15 years 0.22 0.28 0.17 0.21 0.25 0.16 
 
Other members of the household 
      
Presence of wage workers 0.50 0.12 0.64 0.57 0.21 0.64 
Presence of self-employed 0.21 0.93 0.10 0.16 0.87 0.10 
Presence of unpaid family workers 0.05 0.55 0.02 0.04 0.42 0.02 
 
Marital status dummy 
      
Never married 0.10 0.13 0.38 0.10 0.09 0.35 
Married  0.83 0.85 0.56 0.83 0.89 0.57 
Divorced  0.01 0.002 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.06 
Widowed  0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 
Age       
20-24 0.16 0.16 0.24 0.13 0.10 0.18 
25-34 0.32 0.26 0.43 0.30 0.23 0.42 
35-44 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.28 
45 and above 0.27 0.35 0.08 0.32 0.41 0.11 
Member of social security system - 0.01 0.73 - 0.06 0.77 
Head of household dummy 0.07 0.0003 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.10 
Grandmother  0.05 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.05 
Rural  0.30 0.92 0.18 0.23 0.86 0.13 
Observations 60,811 7,787 9,442 97,594 15,220 20,080 
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3 Table 2.2B: Sample Averages for Men 
  2002   2010  
 E.  
inactive 
Self-
employed 
Wage 
worker 
E.  
inactive 
Self-
employed 
Wage 
worker 
Mean log real wages   5.42   5.61 
   (0. 798)   (0. 672) 
Education Dummies       
No formal education 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.03 
Primary school 0.52 0.70 0.43 0.39 0.62 0.35 
Secondary school 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.16 
High school 0.14 0.06 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.12 
Vocational  high school 0.09 0.03 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.13 
University  0.08 0.02 0.15 0.11 0.04 0.20 
Tenure - 17.81 8.00 - 15.07 6.20 
 - (0.12) (0.04) - (0.08) (0.03) 
Presence of children       
Age ≤ 4 years 0.27 0.32 0.35 0.25 0.28 0.34 
5 ≤ Age < 11 years 0.35 0.43 0.42 0.33 0.39 0.38 
11 ≤ Age < 15 years 0.22 0.27 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.19 
       
Other members of the household       
Presence of wage workers 0.30 0.12 0.29 0.34 0.18 0.34 
Presence of self-employed 0.18 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.08 
Presence of unpaid family workers 0.06 0.48 0.03 0.04 0.44 0.03 
       
Marital status       
Never married 0.40 0.05 0.18 0.39 0.06 0.22 
Married  0.58 0.93 0.81 0.58 0.92 0.77 
Divorced  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Widowed  0.01 0.01 0.002 0.003 0.01 0.001 
Age       
20-24 0.30 0.03 0.12 0.22 0.02 0.11 
25-34 0.33 0.24 0.43 0.33 0.19 0.40 
35-44 0.20 0.29 0.29 0.21 0.29 0.30 
45 and above 0.17 0.43 0.15 0.23 0.49 0.18 
Member of social security system - 0.42 0.73 - 0.39 0.78 
Head of household dummy 0.50 0.89 0.76 0.51 0.85 0.71 
Rural  0.36 0.66 0.24 0.27 0.56 0.17 
Observations 11,426 14,007 32,771 17,704 23,869 63,077 
Note: standard errors for continuous variables in parenthesis. Sample weights are used.  
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4 Table 2.3A: Relative Risk Ratios (Women) 
 2002 2010 
VARIABLES Unpaid 
family 
worker 
Wage 
worker 
Unpaid 
family 
worker 
Wage 
worker 
Primary School 1.10** 1.74*** 1.30*** 1.56*** 
 (0.05) (0.11) (0.04) (0.06) 
Secondary school 0.68*** 3.01*** 1.20*** 2.42*** 
 (0.09) (0.23) (0.07) (0.11) 
High school 0.66*** 5.54*** 0.92 4.21*** 
 (0.08) (0.38) (0.08) (0.18) 
Vocational high school 0.69* 8.13*** 0.92 5.41*** 
 (0.13) (0.60) (0.09) (0.24) 
University  1.13 33.58*** 0.85 21.26*** 
 (0.26) (2.38) (0.10) (0.90) 
Presence of children 
in the household; 
    
Age≤4 0.69*** 0.52*** 0.65*** 0.46*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
5≤Age<11 0.97 0.81*** 0.98 0.76*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
11≤Age<15 0.88*** 0.99 0.92** 1.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Other members of the household;     
Presence of wage workers 0.72*** 2.08*** 0.82*** 1.63*** 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) 
Presence of self-employed 14.23*** 0.85*** 12.21*** 0.93** 
 (0.80) (0.05) (0.42) (0.03) 
Presence of unpaid family workers 4.91*** 0.74*** 4.88*** 0.64*** 
 (0.23) (0.08) (0.18) (0.05) 
Marital status;     
Married 1.31*** 0.36*** 1.70*** 0.43*** 
 (0.10) (0.02) (0.10) (0.01) 
Divorced 0.37*** 0.99 0.55*** 1.39*** 
 (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
Widowed 0.47*** 0.34*** 0.85 0.40*** 
 (0.08) (0.04) (0.11) (0.03) 
Age     
25-35 1.57*** 1.53*** 1.82*** 1.55*** 
 (0.11) (0.07) (0.11) (0.05) 
35-45 1.81*** 1.44*** 2.74*** 1.72*** 
 (0.14) (0.07) (0.17) (0.07) 
45-65 1.80*** 0.60*** 2.51*** 0.62*** 
 (0.14) (0.04) (0.16) (0.03) 
Head of household dummy 0.02*** 2.02*** 0.21*** 1.56*** 
 (0.01) (0.13) (0.03) (0.07) 
Grandmother  1.67*** 1.20*** 1.26*** 1.07 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) 
Rural  9.70*** 1.00 8.16*** 0.88*** 
 (0.41) (0.04) (0.24) (0.03) 
Constant 0.00*** 0.07*** 0.00*** 0.11*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Observations 7,787 9,442 15,220 20,080 
Robust standard deviations in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Base category: economically inactive 
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5 Table 2.3B: Relative Risk Ratios (Men) 
 2002 2010 
VARIABLES Self-
employed 
Wage 
worker 
Self-
employed 
Wage 
worker 
Primary School 1.35*** 2.10*** 1.19*** 1.58*** 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.06) (0.07) 
Secondary school 1.39*** 3.23*** 1.29*** 2.22*** 
 (0.11) (0.23) (0.08) (0.10) 
High school 1.19** 3.67*** 1.09 2.29*** 
 (0.10) (0.26) (0.07) (0.11) 
Vocational high school 0.90 4.27*** 1.15** 3.31*** 
 (0.08) (0.32) (0.08) (0.17) 
University  0.63*** 4.96*** 0.73*** 3.96*** 
 (0.06) (0.36) (0.05) (0.19) 
Presence of children 
in the household; 
    
Age≤4 0.99 0.96 1.00 1.02 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
5≤Age<11 0.90*** 0.93** 0.92*** 1.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
11≤Age<15 0.90** 0.95 0.92*** 0.96 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Other members of the household;     
Presence of wage workers 0.68*** 1.43*** 0.73*** 1.30*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
Presence of self-employed 0.17*** 0.83*** 0.35*** 0.99 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
Presence of unpaid family workers 23.91*** 1.06 25.43*** 1.35*** 
 (1.74) (0.08) (1.31) (0.07) 
Marital status;     
Married 2.19*** 2.06*** 2.29*** 2.02*** 
 (0.19) (0.10) (0.14) (0.08) 
Divorced 1.32 1.13 1.28** 1.01 
 (0.24) (0.15) (0.14) (0.08) 
Widowed 1.62** 0.96 2.42*** 1.05 
 (0.30) (0.18) (0.41) (0.18) 
Age     
25-35 2.33*** 1.62*** 2.72*** 1.46*** 
 (0.20) (0.07) (0.20) (0.05) 
35-45 2.85*** 1.35*** 3.69*** 1.20*** 
 (0.27) (0.07) (0.29) (0.05) 
45-65 3.03*** 0.75*** 4.00*** 0.62*** 
 (0.29) (0.04) (0.31) (0.03) 
Head of household dummy 2.71*** 2.53*** 2.39*** 2.13*** 
 (0.19) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) 
Rural 1.66*** 0.67*** 1.63*** 0.66*** 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
Constant 0.07*** 0.29*** 0.06*** 0.61*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) 
Observations 14,007 32,771 23,869 63,007 
Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Base category: economically inactive 
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6 Table 2.4: Wage Regression Estimations  
 Women Men 
Dependent Variable: Log real wages 2002 2010 2002 2010 
Education;     
Primary School 0.09* -0.06** 0.20*** 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
Secondary school 0.21*** 0.03 0.37*** 0.09*** 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
High school 0.48*** 0.14*** 0.54*** 0.21*** 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Vocational high school 0.46*** 0.12*** 0.59*** 0.20*** 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
University  0.96*** 0.55*** 1.09*** 0.78*** 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
Tenure  0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Tenure squared ( 10−3) -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Presence of children 
in the household; 
    
Age≤4 0.06*** 0.10*** -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
5≤Age<11 -0.02 0.02* -0.01* -0.02*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
11≤Age<15 -0.05** -0.04*** -0.02 -0.02*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Marital status dummies;     
Married  0.16*** 0.20*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Divorced  0.13*** 0.06*** -0.02 0.06*** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
Widowed  0.15*** 0.07** -0.19 0.11* 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.14) (0.06) 
Age 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 
25-35 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 
35-45 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
 0.32*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 
45-65 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 
Member of social security system 0.63*** 0.35*** 0.49*** 0.29*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Λ (selection term) 0.21*** 0.35*** 0.18*** 0.27*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Constant 4.26*** 5.02*** 4.27*** 4.93*** 
 (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) 
     
Observations 9,191 18,644 32,226 59,696 
R-squared 0.56 0.58 0.44 0.49 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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7 Table 2.5A: Decomposition of Changes in the Wage distribution for Women 
 p90/p10 p90/p50 p50/p10 Gini coefficient Theil index 
2002 1.507 1.216 1.239 0.096 0.015 
2010 1.371 1.199 1.143 0.074 0.009 
Total change -0.136 -0.017 -0.096 -0.021 -0.006 
% (-9.9) (-1.4) (-8.4) (-28.9) (-70.9) 
Effect of      
Coefficients -0.077 -0.006 -0.059 -0.010 -0.003 
 (-56.6) (-35.3) (-61.3) (-45.4) (-40.9) 
Pricing function -0.021 -0.015 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 
 (-15.4) (-88.2) (-1.5) (-24.6) (28.2) 
Covariates -0.018 -0.003 -0.012 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-13.2) (-17.6) (-12.1) (-7.3) (-7.2) 
Unexplained -0.020 0.007 -0.024 -0.005 -0.002 
 (-14.7) (41.2) (-25.0) (-22.7) (-23.7) 
Note: percentage shares of each effect in total change are shown in parentheses 
 
8 Table 2.5B: Decomposition of Changes in the Wage distribution for Men 
 p90/p10 p90/p50 p50/p10 Gini coefficient Theil index 
2002 1.422 1.206 1.179 0.081 0.011 
2010 1.331 1.188 1.120 0.064 0.007 
Total change -0.091 -0.018 -0.059 -0.017 -0.004 
% (-6.8) (-1.5) (-5.3) (-25.9) (-59.0) 
Effect of      
Coefficients -0.051 -0.016 -0.028 -0.008 -0.002 
 (-56.0) (-88.9) (-47.6) (-48.8) (-44.2) 
Pricing function -0.034 -0.014 -0.015 -0.007 -0.002 
 (-37.4) (-77.8) (-24.7) (-41.2) (-48.7) 
Covariates -0.017 0.001 -0.016 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-18.7) (5.6) (-27.8) (-14.6) (-17.5) 
Unexplained 0.011 0.011 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (12.1) (61.1) (-2.3) (4.6) (10.4) 
Note: percentage shares of each effect in total change are shown in parentheses 
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9 Table 2.6A: Decomposition of Changes in the Wage Residuals (Women) 
  Variance 90-10 90-50 50-10 
2002  0.363 1.350 0.681 0.669 
2010  0.236 1.122 0.562 0.560 
Total change  -0.127 -0.228 -0.119 -0.109 
%  (-53.7) (-20.3) (-21.2) (-19.4) 
Effect of      
Covariates  0.0057 0.019 0.014 0.005 
  (4.5) (8.3) (12.1) (4.2) 
Pricing function  -0.133 -0.247 -0.133 -0.113 
  (-104.5) (-108.3) (-112.1) (-104.2) 
Note: percentage shares of each effect in total change are shown in parentheses 
 
10 Table 2.6B: Decomposition of Changes in the Wage Residuals (Men) 
  Variance 90-10 90-50 50-10 
2002  0.331 1.340 0.686 0.654 
2010  0.212 1.113 0.571 0.543 
Total change  -0.119 -0.227 -0.115 -0.111 
%  (-56.0) (-20.4) (-20.2) (-20.5) 
Effect of      
Covariates  -0.008 -0.022 0.003 -0.025 
  (-6.7) (-9.6) (2.7) (-22.4) 
Pricing function  -0.111 -0.205 -0.119 -0.086 
  (-93.3) (-90.4) (-102.07) (-77.6) 
Note: percentage shares of each effect in total change are shown in parentheses 
 
2.9 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 
11 Table 2.A1: Exclusion Criteria for the sample 
 
2002 2010 
 Frequency % Frequency % 
Full Sample 300689  522171  
Dropped observations     
Age over 65 or less 20 135422  45 227112   43.5 
Students 3252      1.1 6190       1.2 
Disabled or ill 2838      0.9 10691     2 
Retired  10987    3.7 18426     3.5 
Has more than one job 1259      0.4 4747       0.9 
Employers (women) 288        0.1 570         0.1 
Self-employed (women) 2552      0.8 5835       1.1 
Employers (men) 5082     1.6 7032       1.3 
Unpaid family workers (men) 2765      0.9 4024       0.8 
Resulting sample for selection equation 136244  45.3 237,544  45.5 
  
 
 
 
Non-wage earners 94031    31.3 154387  29.6 
Reported extreme values of experience (inconsistent with age) 4           0.0 0    0.0 
Reported zero wage 792        0.3 4817      0.9 
Resulting  sample for wage equations  41,417   13.8 78,340   15.0 
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1 Figure 2.A1: GDP Growth Rate (1987=100) 
 
Source: TurkStat Web Database 
 
2 Figure 2.A2: Unemployment rate 
 
Source: TurkStat Web Database 
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3 Figure 2.A3: Number of universities by year 
 
Source: TurkStat Web Database 
 
 
4 Figure 2.A4: Number of University students by year 
 
Source: TurkStat Web Database 
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5 Figure 2.A5: Labour force by education 
 
Source: TurkStat Web Database 
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6 Figure 2.A6: Unemployment by education 
 
Source: TurkStat Web Database 
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7 Figure 2.A7: Employment by education 
 
Source: TurkStat Web Database 
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3 CHAPTER 3: FEMALE AUTONOMY, SOCIAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN TURKEY 
3.1 Introduction 
As a global epidemic, domestic violence undermines the equality, dignity and the 
fundamental freedoms of women. The ever-present threat of violence makes women 
suffer physically, psychologically, sexually and economically. It denies their rights of 
protection, making their own choices and voicing opinions.  The most pervasive form of 
violence against women is perpetrated by the intimate partner and takes place at home. 
This chapter investigates the relationship between intimate partner violence and 
women’s autonomy in the household to understand how intimate partner violence 
impairs women’s autonomy and how incidence of violence changes with the level of 
women’s autonomy.  
Over the past few decades, recognition of domestic violence and the importance of its 
consequences have globally increased. However, the domestic violence issue was not 
the centre of academic attention until the mid-1970’s. An interesting example is that 
until 1969, “The Journal of Marriage and the Family” did not have any papers with the 
word violence in its title (O'Brien 1971, cited Gelles, 1980 p.873). The studies on 
violence in the family were primarily focused on child abuse and the rare studies 
conducted on intimate partner violence portrayed wife-battering husbands and victims 
as people who suffer from personality disorders (Schultz, 1960; Snell et al., 1964).24 
Along with the growth of women’s movements in the US in the mid-1970’s, as Straus 
(1974) puts it, the domestic violence issue shifted from “selective inattention” to 
becoming a “high priority social issue”. The first examples of academic works on 
domestic violence were written in the second half of the 1970’s. One of the first major 
books on the topic of domestic violence against women was written by Martin (1976) 
                                                 
24See Gelles (1980) for a review of the domestic violence literature in the 1970’s. 
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who was also the organizer and chair of the National Organization for Women task 
force dealing with wife battering in the US. In the same period, with the spread of 
feminist ideas, early classics of feminist theory were written by Walker (1979) and 
Dobash and Dobash (1979).  
In 1980, for the first time, domestic violence against women was explicitly addressed in 
an official meeting of the United Nations (UN) in Copenhagen. In the final report of the 
1985 UN conference held in Nairobi, the governments were strongly advised to 
undertake an increase in the public awareness of violence against women as a societal 
problem (UN, 1985). The following decades witnessed increasing awareness of 
domestic violence with the help of emerging civil movements and the efforts of 
international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and United 
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). The feminist movement especially played a crucial 
role in increasing the recognition of the problem. A recent study by Htun and Weldon 
(2012) showed that it is the feminist mobilization in civil society that accounts for the 
variation in policy developments in different countries rather than the intra-legislative 
political phenomena such as leftist parties or women in government or economic factors 
like national wealth.  
Beside domestic violence, the other important concept at the centre of this study is 
female autonomy. Dyson and Moore (1983) define autonomy as the capacity to 
manipulate one’s personal environment and the technical, social and psychological 
abilities in order to obtain information and to use it as the basis for making decisions 
about one’s private concerns and those of one’s intimates. Empirically, it is found that 
higher levels of female autonomy within the household lead to lower levels of fertility, 
child mortality and better levels of health status for the household members (Jejeebhoy, 
1999; Kishor and Johnson, 2004; Presser and Sen, 2000).  
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In this chapter, using data from Turkey, the relationship between domestic violence and 
female autonomy in the household is analysed. The key findings of the study suggest 
that, consistent with the arguments of feminist theory on domestic violence, violence 
has a significant and decreasing effect on female autonomy and the incidence of 
violence decreases with the level of female autonomy. It is also found that domestic 
violence is an increasing function of the strength of social norms of a husband on 
traditional gender roles.  
This study makes several contributions to the existing literature. It is the first study that 
estimates the two way relationship between domestic violence and female autonomy at 
the same time. Second, due to the unique property of the dataset, to the author’s 
knowledge it will be the first study that analyses the effect of social norms on domestic 
violence at the individual level. Finally, to the author’s knowledge it is the first 
extensive analyses of female autonomy in Turkey. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the background information and 
discussed the implications of female autonomy together with the measurement methods. 
Section 3 presents the definition, magnitude and consequences of domestic violence. 
Section 4 summarizes the existing theoretical and empirical literature on female 
autonomy and domestic violence, followed by Section 5 which describes the data and 
provides descriptive statistics. Section 6 outlines the estimation method. Sections 7 and 
8 respectively present the estimation results and conclude the chapter. 
3.2 Female autonomy  
Autonomy is defined as the capacity to manipulate one’s personal environment and 
ability to make decisions about one’s private concerns and those of one’s intimates. 
Female autonomy, in particular, is an important concept as empirically it has been 
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found that higher female autonomy provides better outcomes for the household 
members, especially for the children. For instance, using the data from Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Ethiopia, and South Africa, Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000) show that 
while husbands tend to spend money on tobacco and luxury consumption goods, 
women, when they have the control of assets, spend more on children’s education, 
health and clothing.  Similarly, Arulampalam et al. (2015) show that maternal autonomy 
has a positive impact on the long term nutritional status of children in rural India. In 
accordance with these findings, Mason (1987) and Eswaran (2002) argue that the 
empowerment of women may lead to lower fertility rates as women face higher costs of 
children than men. In fact, Gudbrandsen (2013) shows that, in Nepal, the families where 
wives have high levels of autonomy have fewer children relative to other families. 
A fundamental assumption in economics is that individuals make their choices by 
comparing the costs and benefits of all the alternative options available to them. 
Arulampalam et al. (2012) argue that autonomy can help women to make the best use of 
economic opportunities. However, lack of female autonomy prevents women from 
exercising their preferences regardless of the evaluation that they make of alternative 
options. Studies that analyse the wage determination model of women almost always 
take into account the self-selection of women into the labour force (Chzhen and 
Mumford, 2010; Buchinsky, 1998). In these models, it is assumed that women prefer to 
participate in the labour force if the utility of participation is higher than the utility of 
non-participation (i.e. if the wage offer is higher than the women’s reservation wage); 
this assumption however may be incorrect, at least in the case of Turkey.  According to 
the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) for the year 2005, apart from factors such 
as household responsibilities and education, around 24 per cent of women in Turkey do 
not work or look for a job because their husbands or elders prevent them from doing so 
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(see Table 3.A1 in the appendix). This means that a considerable number of women in 
Turkey cannot work even if they would choose to do so. In that sense, lack of autonomy 
of women within the household may lower their labour force participation. This 
observation is quite crucial considering the fact that female labour force participation in 
Turkey has decreased from 35 per cent to 25 per cent from 1988 to 2006 (Dayioglu and 
Kirdar, 2010). 
Although there is a large body of studies looking at the effects of female autonomy on 
various outcomes, the ways in which female autonomy is measured in these studies are 
very inconsistent. In the early examples of the literature, education, employment, and 
asset ownership have been used as the proxy measures for female autonomy (Bradley 
and Khor, 1993; Mason 1986). However, Malhotra and Mather (1997) argue that these 
measures can be considered as indicators of access to resources and they do not indicate 
the control over resources. They further argue that even if these variables can possibly 
serve as good proxies, the pathway between female autonomy and these proxies should 
be established rather than simply assumed.  
Another way to measure female autonomy is to use women’s ability to make decisions 
as an indicator. In most of the studies that used this method, indicators are created by 
using women’s responses to questions about their having a say on specific decisions. 
After assigning a value to the answer for each question (indicator), the index scores for 
female autonomy are created by taking the average of the values of the indicators (see, 
for example, Eswaran and Malhotra, 2011). Yet, this method is also argued to be 
potentially problematic. Arulampalam et al. (2012) argue that not all questions that are 
asked to women are equally persuasive as indicators of women’s autonomy because not 
all have the same consequential significance on women’s lives. Kabeer (1999) also 
notes that in most societies, the decision making responsibilities are often segregated in 
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accordance with gender roles in the household. Therefore, the measure of female 
autonomy can be problematic if one uses the average value of indicator variables 
(which are categorical variables in most cases) as this method assigns equal weight to 
each indicator and assumes that they contain an equal amount of information on female 
autonomy.  
In this chapter, Item Response Theory (IRT) is used to measure female autonomy. 
Female autonomy is treated as a latent variable as its true value is not observable. IRT 
allows female autonomy (as a latent variable) to affect different indicators in different 
ways as reflected by the factor loadings. The factor loadings are determined by the data 
instead of assigning equal weights to each of the indicators. In this method, it is also 
possible to model measurement error in indicator variables. Further details on Item 
Response Theory are discussed in Section 3.6. 
3.3 Domestic Violence 
3.3.1 Definition 
As domestic violence has become a globally recognised problem, the definition of the 
concept has started to be the subject of debate. While there is no widely accepted 
definition of domestic violence, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence against Women (UN, 1993) defines violence against women as “any act of 
gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or 
psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life”. Although 
there are arguments supporting the inclusion of poverty and unequal access to health 
and education, some authors like Heise et al. (1994) emphasize the importance of a 
limited definition in maintaining the descriptive power of the term. The Declaration 
provides detailed definitions of physical, sexual, psychological and economic abuse and 
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recognizes violence as a crucial social mechanism that forces women into a subordinate 
position relative to men. The Declaration also points out that although violence against 
women can be perpetrated by the general community or by the state, the most common 
form of violence against women is committed by the husband or an intimate male 
partner (WHO, 1997).    
3.3.2 Magnitude and Consequences of Domestic Violence 
Due to the intimate nature of domestic violence, many of the incidents remain 
unreported. For example, Greenfeld et al. (1998) estimated that only about half of 
domestic violence incidents in the US are reported to the police. Therefore the police 
force and the justice department records are likely to underestimate the magnitude of 
the problem. Accordingly, most of the academic analyses are based on regional or 
countrywide surveys (see Kapoor, 2000). Even though these surveys can potentially 
provide better information, measurement issues still exist due to the differences in 
sampling techniques and the way domestic violence is defined in these surveys. For 
instance, using the 2006 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) for Cambodia, Eng et 
al. (2010) show that 22 per cent of ever-married women reported that they experienced 
physical violence at least once since the age of 15. They capture the incidence of 
violence by using the detailed information about the type of violence that is perpetrated 
by the husband such as pushing, hitting, and kicking. However, in many datasets, there 
is no detailed information about the type of violence. Hence, incidence of violence is 
mostly captured by one single question. For example, Koenig et al. (2003) used 1994 
DHS data for Bangladesh and showed that 42 per cent of married women experienced 
domestic violence by their husbands. In the survey that they used, domestic violence 
was captured by the question of “Do you encounter the problem of physical beating 
from your husband or from his family?” The authors acknowledged that the use of a 
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single question to capture violence can be problematic as it lacks the specificity 
concerning which particular actions constitute physical violence, leaving the 
interpretation largely up to the individual respondent.25  
Apart from the differences between the specificity of the questions, another 
measurement issue arises from the differences between the time periods that the 
questions cover. In some cases, such as the studies mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph, the questions ask about whether they have ever experienced violence (or 
experience since marriage), and in other cases questions ask about the experience of 
violence over one year immediately preceding the survey date (see, for example 
Eswaran and Malhotra, 2011). As a result of the differences between these country 
specific surveys, it is not possible to compare the statistics on domestic violence by 
looking at the studies based on these surveys.26   
Nevertheless, a recent WHO report on violence against women documented the severity 
of the problem on a global scale (WHO, 2013). According to this report, 35 per cent of 
women worldwide have experienced either physical and/or sexual forms of intimate 
partner violence or non-partner sexual violence. Almost 30 per cent of all women who 
have been in a relationship have suffered physical and/or sexual violence by their 
intimate partner and this ratio goes up to almost 40 per cent in the regions such as South 
Asia and Latin America.  
Obviously, the most crucial consequence of violence against women is the violation of 
the most fundamental human rights. However, this is not the only cost. The Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) (Buvinic et al., 1999) carried out a study in six 
                                                 
25 Analysis in this chapter will also have similar problems, as domestic violence is captured using a single 
question; this is discussed further in Section 3.5. 
26 Most of the studies on domestic violence use the DHS surveys. However, the DHS surveys also differ 
from country to country in terms of how domestic violence is captured. For instance, the DHS surveys on 
Turkey do not have any information on domestic violence at all.  
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Latin American countries – Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela 
– taking a more holistic look at the socio-economic costs of domestic violence. For 
analytical purposes, the IDB study divided the costs of domestic and social violence 
into four categories using the following framework. 
Direct costs: these include the value of goods and services used in treating or 
preventing violence such as psychological counselling and medical treatment of 
victims, housing and shelters for women and their children, and costs imposed on police 
services and the criminal justice system on capturing and punishing the abusers. For 
instance, Greaves (1995) analysed the case of Canada and found that the total direct 
cost of violence against women exceeds one billion Canadian dollars. According to 
research conducted by the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control (2003), the 
estimated cost of intimate partner violence in the US is around 4.1 billion dollar per 
year. 
Non-monetary costs: these include the health hazards that do not necessarily require a 
demand for medical services, but nevertheless heavily affect the victims by way of 
increased morbidity and mortality through homicide and suicide, increased dependence 
on drugs and alcohol and other depressive disorders. Lozano (1999) estimated that rape 
and intimate partner violence against women were the third most important causes of 
the disability-adjusted life years lost in Mexico City after diabetes and prenatal 
conditions, but ahead of auto accidents, congenital anomalies, rheumatoid and osteo-
arthritis, cardiovascular disease, stroke and pneumonia. Heise et al. (1994) estimated 
that more than nine million disability-adjusted years of life are lost each year worldwide 
as a result of rape and family violence, more than that from all types of cancer and more 
than twice that lost by women in motor vehicle accidents.  
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Social multiplier effects: the costs that include the inter-generational impact of 
violence on children, decreasing social capital, reduced quality of life and participation 
in democratic processes. These effects are not easy to quantify by their nature. 
However, there are some empirical studies documenting these effects. For instance, 
Straus et al. (1980) noted that the rate of partner violence was substantially higher for 
men who observed domestic violence in childhood as compared to the men who had not 
witnessed such violence. 
Economic multiplier effects: these include the reduced participation of women in the 
labour force and increased absenteeism at work, and lower productivity and earnings for 
women compared to men. These effects in turn are argued to lead to lower levels of 
savings and investments at the macro level.  For the US, Stanley (1992) reported that 30 
per cent of abused women lost their jobs as a direct result of the abuse. Greaves (1995) 
reported that, in Canada, 34 per cent of battered women and 11 per cent of sexual 
assault victims were not able to work on the following day of the assault. He also 
estimated that the value of lost earnings was more than 7 million Canadian dollars per 
year. Staggs and Riger (2005) analysed the effect of intimate partner violence on 
women’s employment using data from Illinois and concluded that violence has a 
negative effect on the stability of the women’s employment.  
3.4 Literature Review 
3.4.1 Theories of Domestic Violence 
Starting with the pioneering work of Becker (1965, 1973, 1981), economists have 
analysed family relations and resource allocation within the household, using a utility 
maximising framework. The early examples of this literature were based on cooperative 
models which assume a household to be a single unit. According to the cooperative 
models, the household acts like one economic agent which, given a budget constraint, 
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tries to maximize a single utility function that is based on a common set of preferences. 
However, as Rode (2011) notes, since the 1980’s, the cooperative model of the 
household came under attack on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Firstly, it was 
argued that the cooperative models do not take into account the intra-household 
inequality, the possibility of individual household members having different and may be 
even conflicting preferences, and having different levels of access to resources. 
Secondly, empirical evidence did not support the key predictions of the cooperative 
household modelling (see Lundberg et al., 1997). Accordingly, recent studies by 
economists are based on non-cooperative models in which the individual preferences of 
the household members matter.  
Tauchen et al. (1991) present a non-cooperative bargaining model for the determinants 
of domestic violence. In their model, they assume that a relationship must provide each 
individual with a level of utility that is at least as great as the utility that the individual 
would obtain were the relationship to dissolve. Physical violence is both a source of 
satisfaction (such as relief of frustration) and an instrument for controlling wife’s 
behaviour. The authors assert that the husband may resort to violence towards his 
partner as well as possibly transfer income to her. In that sense, men “purchase” 
violence from women with income transfers until a threat point level of utility that must 
be maintained for woman. According to their model, if the victim's reservation utility 
constraint is binding, violence is solely a source of direct gratification; an increase in 
the husband’s income increases violence and redistributes welfare towards him leaving 
no benefit for the wife; similarly, increases in the victim's income can be generally 
expected to decrease violence. On the other hand, if both individuals gain from the 
relationship, then violence can be an instrument to obtain desired behaviours as well as 
a source of direct gratification. Tauchen et al. (1991) empirically tested their model 
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using the data from California. Their results showed that for the low income couples in 
which both the male and female work, increases in the husband's income increase 
violence while increases in the wife's income have a negative, but generally 
insignificant effect on violence. For high income couples in which the husband provides 
a bigger share of the family income, an increase in the income of either member 
decreases the violence. Their results also show that in high income families in which the 
wife provides most of the income, increases in her income serve to increase violence. 
Farmer and Thiefenthaler (1997) also model the determinants of violence within a non-
cooperative game setting. In their model, each spouse, with independent preferences 
and threat points, maximizes his/her utility given the behaviour and the threat point of 
the other. The wife's threat point determines the level of violence she will tolerate for a 
given transfer from husband. With the increases in her income (and consumption), the 
marginal utility she receives from an additional unit of consumption declines. 
Accordingly, the man's ability to "purchase" violence from her decreases and the 
violence decreases. They also argued that anything that increases the wife's utility 
outside of the marriage, such as the availability of shelters or extended family resources, 
will increase her threat point and the probability that she will leave. Therefore, presence 
of these alternatives lowers the levels of violence if she stays. 
While studies by Tauchen et al. (1991) and Farmer and Thiefenthaler (1997) suggest 
that women’s income has a protective effect from domestic violence, there is also a 
body of empirical research whose results do not support this argument. For instance, 
Jejeebhoy (1998) analysed the determinants of domestic violence in Uttar Pradesh and 
Tamil Nadu in India with a logistic regression (where domestic violence is a binary 
dependent variable). His results show that wage earning women do not enjoy the 
protective effect of income, as the coefficients for wage employment were insignificant 
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in both settings. Schuler et al. (1998) show that, in rural Bangladesh, the incidence of 
violence was higher for the women who contributed to family income than for those 
who do not make any contribution. Vyas and Watts (2009) investigate the published 
data on domestic violence from 11 countries to analyse the effect of women’s 
involvement in income generating activities on domestic violence. They find a negative 
association in five cases and a positive association in six cases. 
A possible explanation for these inconsistent results is provided by Aizer (2010). She 
argues that most previous studies of the relationship between women’s income and 
domestic violence fail to establish a causal relationship by failing to account for the 
potential reverse causality. Moreover, she asserts that even the studies that account for 
endogeneity focus largely on a woman’s own actual wage. She suggests that, in a 
household bargaining model, the woman’s relative wage matters and potential, not 
actual, wages determine the bargaining power and the level of violence. To overcome 
the endogeneity of individual wages, she looks at the demand for female and male 
labour and captures the wage gap by the relative wage growth in industries in which 
men and women are traditionally concentrated. Finally, using administrative data for 
California, she finds that decreases in the wage gap reduce violence against women. 
Gibson-Davis et al. (2005) also highlight the inconsistent results of the studies that 
analyse the effect of women’s employment on domestic violence. They argue that this 
inconsistency is due to the potential reverse causality between women’s employment 
and domestic violence. Using the data from the Minnesota Family Investment Program, 
they analysed this relationship with a two stage least square method. In the Minnesota 
Family Investment Program, women were randomly assigned into two groups; and 
while one group was provided with only financial incentives, the other group received 
both financial incentives and was subject to employment mandates. They use random 
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assignment status as an instrument to predict employment, and other economic 
variables, which are then included in a second-stage model predicting domestic abuse. 
Their results show that maternal employment decreases subsequent reports of domestic 
abuse.  
Panda and Agarwal (2005) criticized the studies which only focus on the effect of 
employment status of women. They asserted that to examine the effect of the economic 
status of women, one should go beyond the employment status and consider the effect 
of women’s property status since having land or a house can act as a tangible exit-
option for women while employment status is subject to the unpredictability of the 
labour market. Using a household survey from Kerala in India they found a negative 
and significant relationship between the property status of women and experience of 
domestic violence. 
Beside economics, various disciplines have proposed theories explaining domestic 
violence. For example, evolutionary psychologists argue that because the paternity of 
children was never certain in the evolutionary past, natural selection would have 
favoured proprietary behaviour by males with regard to sexual access to their mates. 
Spousal violence, in this view, stems from the insecurity and jealousy that males feel 
when their partners are exposed to the possibility of sexual encounters with other males 
(Wilson and Daly, 1993). Biological Theory explains violent behaviour by the changes 
in brain development due to trauma. Researchers in this group link the trauma of early 
exposure to chronic violence to changes in a child’s brain functioning that lead to 
violent behaviour as an adult (Perry, 1997). Framed around the sociological perspective 
of social exchange theory, resource theory asserts that the family is a power system and 
that men with low levels of economic resources (earnings, social status, and educational 
attainment) may use violence as an alternative form of resource to control their partners. 
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This theory sees violence as an additional resource that men can use to maintain 
dominance within the family and suggests a correlation between poverty and intimate 
partner violence (Goode, 1971). 
In his seminal paper, Heise (1998) provides a broad conceptual model for the 
determinants of domestic violence. In this model, he presents domestic violence as a 
function of contextual and community-level factors, household and individual-level 
factors, women’s status and autonomy and interrelated effects of these factors. 
Household and individual-level factors include socioeconomic status, intergenerational 
exposure to violence, life cycle factors such as age and risk behaviours such as alcohol 
and substance abuse. Contextual and community-level factors, closely related to 
feminist arguments, include social norms on domestic violence and gender inequality. 
Heise argues that these factors not only have a direct effect on domestic violence but 
also have an indirect effect through their influence on female autonomy. 
A large and growing body of literature has investigated the relationship between 
domestic violence and household and individual level factors outlined in Heise’s 
framework. Kim and Cho (1992), in the case of Korea, found a decreasing risk of 
violence with the age of partners. Jejeebhoy and Cook (1997) provided evidence that 
violence is negatively related to the women’s age at marriage. Family related factors 
such as the number of living children, especially sons, (Schuler et al., 1996) and support 
from women’s natal family (Rao, 1997) are found to have a decreasing effect on 
domestic violence. Supporting the Biological theory, which emphasises the role of 
intergenerational transmission of violence, Straus and Gelles (1990) and Martin et al. 
(2002) show that experiencing or witnessing domestic violence in childhood has an 
increasing effect on the probability of resorting to violence or being a victim of it as an 
adult. There are also some studies documenting the link between violence and risk 
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behaviours such as substance and/or alcohol abuse that are noted in Heise’s framework 
(Koenig et al., 2003; Rao, 1997). 
Feminist theory further asserts that intimate partner violence originates from 
inequalities within the marriage. It strengthens male power and control and increases 
female subordination. Although there are different approaches to conducting research 
on intimate partner violence, most studies look at power imbalances that cause and 
perpetuate domestic violence against women. It is argued that these imbalances exist in 
patriarchal societies where structural factors hinder equal participation of women in the 
social, economic and political systems and they are reproduced when men exercise their 
power and control over women (Yllo 1994).  Dobash and Dobash (1979) assert that 
patriarchy is fostered by the economic and social system and it contributes to domestic 
violence. They argue that the patriarchal system has defined the husband as the 
dominant, strong, authoritarian, aggressive and rational provider for the family, while 
the wife is traditionally accepted to be dependent, passive, submissive and soft. 
Therefore, typically, violence against women is explained in terms of a power struggle 
and it is argued that in a patriarchal society, men, with all the power, must resort to 
violence when their position of dominance is threatened. In that sense, it is argued that 
domestic violence is a consequence of patriarchy, and part of a systematic attempt to 
maintain male dominance in the home and in the society (Knickmeyer et al. 2004). 
Both feminist theory and Heise (1998) emphasise the importance of social norms when 
analysing domestic violence and female autonomy. According to these arguments, 
patriarchy and conservative attitudes on gender equality lead to stronger social norms 
on traditional gender roles. Stronger social norms, in turn, lead to higher levels of 
domestic violence against women. Therefore, strength of the social norms is argued to 
be a key determinant of domestic violence. 
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3.4.2 Female autonomy and Domestic violence –the causality issue 
With the growing recognition of the importance of female autonomy and awareness of 
the domestic violence problem, numerous studies have attempted to explain the link 
between these two concepts. The majority of the studies on this relationship focus on 
one direction of this link: the effect of female autonomy on domestic violence. 
However, the empirical studies do not provide consistent results; some studies find 
decreasing levels of domestic violence with higher female autonomy while others, in 
contrast, document a higher risk of violence with increasing female autonomy. 
Lamichhane et al (2011), in the case of Nepal, found that low autonomy of women 
significantly increases the odds of experiencing violence among married women. In the 
example of India, Jejeebhoy and Cook (1997) found lower levels of domestic violence 
when women have a greater control over the resources. On the other hand, Hindin and 
Adair (2002), using data from the Philippines, found that risk of violence was the 
highest when the major decisions related to the household were dominated by the 
women.27 Menon and Johnson (2007) also provided evidence that women with higher 
autonomy in South India experience higher levels of violence. 
These conflicting results can be found even amongst the studies focusing on the same 
country. For instance, the impact of micro saving and credit programs in Bangladesh on 
the level of domestic violence has been the subject of many studies. Some studies 
argued that membership to the microcredit systems was associated with lower levels of 
domestic violence; these programs not only increased the contribution of women to 
household income but also facilitated visibility and public exposure of women (Schuler 
et al., 1996; Kabeer 2001). In contrast, Rahman (1999) found that while only one-fifth 
                                                 
27 Alternative scenarios were the husband’s domination in decision making or joint decision making.  
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of the women saw a decrease in the violence, 70 per cent of the women reported an 
increase in violence from the time their membership in the program began. 
Koenig et al. (2003), using data from two rural areas in Bangladesh, found that in the 
culturally more conservative area Sirajgonj, where the social norms related to the status 
of women are more traditional and rigid and social mobility of women is more 
restricted, higher individual-level women’s autonomy and short-term membership in 
savings and credit groups were both associated with significantly higher risk of 
violence. However, in the less culturally conservative area Jessore, individual-level 
women’s status indicators were unrelated to the risk of violence, but the community-
level measures of women’s status were associated with significantly lower risk of 
violence.28  
The major problem that is common across these studies is that none of the studies 
consider possible reverse causality and only focus on one direction of this relationship; 
ignoring the potential reverse effect of violence on female autonomy. As summarised in 
the previous section, feminist theory defines domestic violence as a means that is used 
by the husband to control women and strengthen their subordination. In that sense, it is 
argued that domestic violence hinders female autonomy. Indeed this argument was 
empirically tested by Eswaran and Malhotra (2011) using the National Family Health 
Survey data of India. Their paper makes an important contribution to the literature for 
two reasons: it is the first study that uses a household bargaining model to analyse the 
relationship between domestic violence and female autonomy; also it is the first study 
that acknowledges the endogeneity problem due to the potential two-way relationship 
                                                 
28 In order to capture individual level women’s status, Koenig et al. (2003) used variables such as 
women’s freedom to talk to strangers, freedom to seek medical care, freedom to possess any cash. To 
capture the community level women’s status, they used percentage of married women in a community 
with any formal education, percentage of married women in a community belonging to a savings and 
credit group, and the mean value of the individual level women’s status in each community.   
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between these two variables. In their household bargaining model, they choose a non-
cooperative model due to the problems with the cooperative models (summarised in the 
previous subsection).  
They designed their model in a way that domestic violence is a means to ensuring that 
the victim allocates resources more in line with the preferences of the abuser which is 
similar to previous household bargaining models. However, unlike the previous 
examples, domestic violence does not arise from a taste for violence (in fact the 
husband’s utility decreases with the violence that he inflicts because this leads to 
strained relations, and loss of intimacy). The Eswaran and Malhotra model also takes 
into account that if a husband acquires more liberal views this may affect his decision to 
commit violence. In their model, female autonomy, which is captured by her decision 
making ability, among other things such as her education and income, is determined by 
the domestic violence that she confronts. Then main difference between the Eswaran 
and Malhotra model and the pervious household bargaining models is that they argue 
that factors that increase the reservation utility of women such as education and income 
cause an increase in the risk of violence instead of a decrease which is suggested by the 
previous models.    
Based on the design of their model, they underline the potential reverse causality 
between domestic violence and female autonomy, and argue that such reverse causality 
can cause endogeneity problems in simple regression estimations. To overcome this 
endogeneity problem, they exploit a two stage least squares regression model and use 
the height index, calculated by the deviation of the woman’s height from the mean 
value of height of women for the region that she belongs to, as an instrument for 
domestic violence. They assert that a husband is more likely to engage in spousal 
violence if he feels he can physically overpower his wife. They defend their choice of 
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instrument by arguing that the height of a woman is determined prior to marriage and is 
likely to be exogenous. They also note that their height index is a more appropriate 
indicator than the actual height of wife since the average height of women varies 
significantly across different states in India.  
The results of their analysis show that domestic violence has a highly significant and 
negative effect on the autonomy of the women in the household. Although Eswaran and 
Malhotra argue that higher female autonomy increases the domestic violence that the 
women face, they do not empirically test this argument in their analysis. Instead, they 
used women’s employment status in the first stage of their 2SLS estimation where the 
determinants of domestic violence are estimated. They find a positive effect of women’s 
employment on domestic violence. However, they do not take into account the potential 
endogenity of employment status which is noted by Gibson-Davis et al. (2005).  
Eng et al. (2010) used Structural Equation Modelling (SEM hereafter) to analyse the 
determinants of domestic violence in Cambodia focusing on the effect of the husband’s 
control and spousal discussion on emotional and physical violence.29 They captured the 
latent husband’s control variable using indicators such as “Husband jealous if talking 
with other men,” “Husband accuses her of unfaithfulness,” and “Husband does not 
permit her to meet her female friends”. They defined the spousal discussion as an 
opportunity for women to voice their opinion and engage in discussion and created a 
latent variable for the frequency of discussion between the spouses regarding daily life 
topics such as home, money, community happenings, and work. Their results showed 
that husband’s control has a positive effect on both physical and emotional violence. 
The spousal discussion variable, on the other hand, has a positive effect only on 
emotional violence. Conceptually, spousal discussion, even the husband’s control to 
                                                 
29 This chapter also uses SEM. The details of the model are discussed in section 3.6.  
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some extent, is similar to female autonomy. However, their study seems to ignore the 
potential reverse causality and so the effect of violence on female autonomy. 
3.4.3 Domestic violence in Turkey 
The first nationwide research on domestic violence in Turkey was conducted in the 
Causes and Consequences of Domestic Violence Report (Turkish Prime Ministry, 
1995). An interesting finding of this study was the mismatch between the responses of 
wives and husbands regarding the incidence of violence: while 34 per cent of men 
reported that, in the case of a disagreement with their partners they resort to physical 
violence, only 29 per cent of women reported that they were exposed to violence. A 
more recent survey, namely, Domestic Violence against Women in Turkey (The 
General Directorate on the Status and Problems of Women, 2008, GDSPW hereafter), 
reveals the magnitude of this problem in Turkey. According to the survey results, 40 per 
cent of women in Turkey were exposed to physical violence from their partners in their 
life time; 10 per cent were subject to violence in the last 12 months. Moreover, 15 per 
cent of women were sexually abused at least once in their life time. Using the data from 
this survey, Yüksel-Kaptanoğlu et al. (2012) analysed the determinants of domestic 
violence in Turkey. Their results show that the level of violence was much higher when 
one or both of the partners was/were exposed to violence in childhood. Women who 
had support of family and friends were less likely to experience violence. A surprising 
result of their study is that women’s ownership of property and their ability to raise 
money were not significantly associated with partner violence. Altinay and Arat (2009) 
conducted a survey with 1,520 women and they found similar results as Yüksel-
Kaptanoğlu et al. (2012) in terms of the magnitude of domestic violence and factors that 
affect violence. In addition, they compared the results of their research with the results 
of Causes and Consequences of Domestic Violence Report (Turkish Prime Ministry, 
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1995) and concluded that the magnitude of violence had not changed between the mid-
1990’s and mid-2000’s.  
Kocacik et al. (2007) conducted a study that covers four cities in Turkey namely, Sivas, 
Adiyaman, Denizli and Kirklareli in order to explore the determinants of domestic 
violence which is captured by acts such as battering, sexual abuse and wounding. Using 
the Heise framework, they included individual and social factors in a logistic regression 
in which a dummy variable representing domestic violence was the dependent variable. 
In terms of the effects of the individual characteristics of women such as income and 
education on violence, they found consistent results with the previous studies. The 
significant contribution of their study is that they also analysed the effect of household 
decision making and the husband’s control over the wife’s behaviours on domestic 
violence. Their results showed that the risk of violence was lower when the decisions 
are collectively made by husband and wife. Nevertheless, their study suffers from three 
major shortcomings. First, the cities in which the surveys were conducted do not 
provide a nationally representative sample as admitted by the authors. Second, they 
ignore the potential reverse causality between domestic violence and the decision 
making process. Finally, it is arguably not convincing to use only one question, “who 
makes the decisions in the household” to capture the wife’s bargaining power or her 
autonomy. This is because, as Ballon (2011) and the results which will be presented 
below show, not all the decisions made by wife (or collectively made with husband) 
serve as a good indicator of the autonomy of the wife.  
3.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This study will make use of the 2006 Household Structure Survey (HSS hereafter). This 
survey is the product of joint research by TurkStat and the General Directorate of 
Family and Social Studies on the household structure of Turkish families and provides a 
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nationally representative sample. 48,235 individuals above the age of 18 were 
interviewed from 11,854 households. The questions in the survey are grouped into two 
categories. The first category contains questions related to socio-economic factors, such 
as: age, marital status, household size, income level, education. The second group of 
questions are related to perceptions such as opinions on marriage and roles and duties of 
family members in the household. In total, this survey provides numerous questions 
about the household structure, perceptions and habits of Turkish families. One of the 
important properties of the dataset is that interviews are conducted separately with each 
member of the household to assure that the answers are not heard by the other 
household members. The individuals who are single, divorced or widowed are dropped 
from the sample. Then, only the heads of households and their partners are kept as some 
of the key variables such as the female autonomy indicators (which will be explained 
below) are relevant to them only. Finally, couples are omitted if either of the partners 
did not respond to the survey. The final sample that is used in the estimation consists of 
6,435 couples (see Table 3.A2 for the exclusion criteria for the sample). 
The three main variables that will be used in the analyses are: domestic violence, female 
autonomy, and social norms. To capture domestic violence, answers to the question of 
“what is your partner/husband’s reaction if you cannot agree on an issue?’’ will be used. 
Participants are asked to choose between (not exclusively) 5 options: does not do 
anything, sulks, leaves the home, shouts, resorts to physical violence.  
Table 3.1 provides the responses from both husbands and wives about their and their 
partner’s reaction together with the frequency of these reactions. In almost all of the 
scenarios, the answers given by partners closely match each other especially the one for 
physical violence occurring “Never”. Table 3.1 shows that, around 92 per cent of the 
women report no violence in the 12 months previous to the interview which means in 
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around 8 per cent of the marriages violence occurred at least once in the previous 12 
months. Using the women’s answers to this question, a dummy variable that represents 
domestic violence which takes the value of 1 if the woman reports that she was 
physically assaulted even once within the last 12 months and 0 otherwise, is created. To 
check for robustness of the variable, an alternative dummy variable which takes the 
value of 1 if the wife reports experience of violence or the husband admits resorting to 
violence is also created. The values of the original violence variable and the alternative 
variable were very similar showing that the responses of husbands and wives match.  
Table 3.2, column 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the sample. More than half of 
the women in the sample are between 25 and 44 years old. While the majority of the 
women were between 18-25 years old when they got married, almost 30 per cent of 
women reported that they were younger than 18 when they got married.30 Like the 
women in the sample, more than half of the men are between 25 and 44 years old. 
However, marriage before the age of 18 is not as common among men as it is in the 
case of women. The HSS includes a categorical variable providing income bands. As 
most of the women in the sample report having zero or low levels of income, a dummy 
variable to represent women who have a positive income is created. According to Table 
3.2, only 20 per cent of the women in the sample reported having an income. This is 
consistent with the low level of female labour force participation in Turkey. 
Furthermore, only 17 per cent of women reported that they have any form of asset 
ownership (such as house, land, automobile, or other). The majority of men in the 
sample reported having an income. 25 per cent of the women do not have any form of 
formal education and nearly half of them attended only primary education.  
                                                 
30 Since 2001, the legal minimum age to enter into a marriage in Turkey is 17 although this requires 
parental consent if a participant is younger than 18. Before the year 2001, with the consent of parents, 
women were allowed to marry at the age of 15 and men were allowed to marry at the age of 17. 
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The analyses also look at variables relating to the family setup, namely arranged 
marriage and bride price. Arranged marriage is a type of marital union in which partners 
are chosen by the family or other elders in the family. In the HSS, women are asked to 
report if the marriage was an arranged one and furthermore, they are asked if the 
arranged marriage was with or against their will. The arranged marriage category is 
created only for those whose marriage was against their will. Even after considering this 
difference, 33 per cent of women in the sample stay in this category. Bride price can be 
defined as the amount of money, property or wealth paid by the groom or his family to 
the parents of the bride in return for the consent of marriage.31 In around 16 per cent of 
the marriages, bride money is reported to have been paid.  
Table 3.2, column 2 shows the prevalence of violence against women by the 
characteristics of women and men. Although it is not possible to find a clear-cut 
relationship between age and violence, the incidence of violence is slightly higher at 
higher ages for both men and women. Lower levels of violence are observed in the 
marriages that start at early ages. The incidence of violence for the women who have an 
income or for those who have asset ownership is lower. The incidence of violence gets 
smaller at the higher levels of husband’s income. Similarly, the incidence of violence 
decreases with the education level of men and women. Table 3.2 also shows that, on 
average, the incidence of violence is higher in arranged marriages and the marriages in 
which the bride price is paid.  
Female autonomy is captured by the questions asking who in the household makes the 
final decision regarding the following: choice of house type, choice of house setup, 
issues about children, shopping, relations with relatives, relations with neighbours and 
issues about holiday and entertainment. For each question participants can choose 
                                                 
31See Anderson (2007) for further details on bride price and its differences from dowry.  
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between ‘husband alone’, ‘wife and husband together’ and ‘wife alone’. In some studies 
in the female autonomy literature, for example Eswaran and Malhotra (2011), a 
woman’s individual decision making is accepted as an indicator of autonomy. However 
the questions that are asked to women in these studies are related to individual 
behaviours such as buying jewellery or if she can access health care for herself. On the 
other hand, Koenig et al. (2003) used the woman having a say on family decision 
making as an indicator of autonomy. As the questions in the HSS are related to issues 
that are relevant to the whole household, the indicator variables will take the value of 0 
if the man makes the final decision individually (for women this will be response 
‘husband’) and 1 otherwise (for women this collapses the two categories ‘wife’ and 
‘wife and husband together’). As a robustness check an alternative specification of the 
female autonomy indicator variables in which each indicator takes three different values 
for “wife alone”, “husband alone” and “wife and husband together” is also used. The 
results were qualitatively the same. 
Table 3.3 shows the responses given by the women about the decision making process 
in the household. Based on the table, the husband’s dominance is highest for decisions 
on choice of house, shopping and entertainment and holiday which are all related to 
household finances. Compared to these three decisions, women have more say on house 
setup and children related issues (only asked to couples who have any children) which 
are traditionally accepted as the responsibility of women in the household.  
As noted in Section 3, social norms are argued to be a key determinant of domestic 
violence. To capture the effect of social norms, the social norms of the husband variable 
which represents his perception of traditional gender roles, is created. The indicators for 
this variable will be created using the husband’s agreement with the following 
statements; “Having a male child increases the prestige of the wife”, “Not doing 
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housework is a sole reason for divorce”, “The best age of marriage for women is 
between 15-19”, “Continuation of the family is guaranteed only by a son”, “It is 
appropriate for close relatives (first cousins) to marry” and “It is not appropriate for 
women to work”.32 
Table 3.4 provides the mean values of the dummy variables that are used as the 
indicators of the husband’s social norms. A considerable number of husbands value 
sons more than daughters; 33 per cent believe that having a male child increases the 
prestige of the wife and, for 43 per cent, continuation of the family is guaranteed only 
by a son. Around 18 per cent of husbands agree that husbands can divorce if the women 
do not do the housework. One interesting observation is that even though the legal 
minimum marriage age is 18, 16 per cent of the men assert that the best age of marriage 
for women is from 15 to 19. Around 13 per cent of the men in the sample reported that 
they approve of the marriage between close relatives (defined as first cousins in the 
HSS). The respondents are also asked the reason of their approval of marriage between 
close relatives. Further analysis of the data showed that the main reasons of their 
approval were better knowledge of the family roots (37 per cent), having more things in 
common (28 per cent) and protection of traditions (15 per cent).  
As noted in Section 3, around 24 per cent of women in Turkey do not work or look for a 
job since their husbands or elders prevent them from doing so. Consistent with this 
observation, 23 per cent of husbands agree that working is not appropriate for women. 
Further investigation of the data shows that, among those who agree with this statement, 
61 per cent assert that the main duty of women is to take care of children at home and 
                                                 
32 Using the same data, Goksel (2012) exploited some of these questions to capture social norms in a 
different setting where she analysed the effect of conservativeness on labour force participation of 
women. Her findings suggest a significant negative effect of conservativeness on female labour force 
participation. 
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14 per cent argue that it is against tradition. Table 3.4 also presents the mean values of 
the dummy variables that are created using the answers given by the wives. For all six 
indicators the magnitude of the mean values is smaller for women. The values of 
indicators regarding women doing housework, women’s increasing prestige with having 
a male child, and close relative marriage are quite close to each other. On the other 
hand, the indicators regarding the continuation of family with a male child and 
employment of women have much greater mean values for men than women.33  
3.6 Methodology 
To analyse the relationship between domestic violence and female autonomy in the 
household, an Item Response Theory (IRT hereafter) model will be applied. IRT 
models are a member of SEM family in which the observed (indicator) variables are 
discrete and the latent variables are assumed to be continuous. In that sense, IRT 
models can be considered as factor models for non-continuous (including binary) 
indicators. SEM is used in many applications of economics, sociology, environment, 
psychology and health related studies. For example, Roth et al. (1989) used SEM to 
understand the relationship between exercise, fitness, stress, hardiness (resiliency) and 
illness. Grandjean et al. (1997) used SEM to analyse the effect of in-utero 
methylmercury exposure on neurodevelopment. Savage et al. (2013) used SEM to 
analyse the new class structure in UK. There are two main benefits of choosing SEM 
over the standard multiple regression technique. First, it allows for the measurement 
error related to the indicator variables. For instance, in this study social norm and 
female autonomy variables are assumed to be latent variables as their true values are 
unobservable. However, there are some indicators of these variables which include a 
                                                 
33 A t-test is performed in order to see if the mean values of the indicator variables are significantly 
different for men and women. The results of the test suggest a significant difference at the 1 per cent 
level. 
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measurement error component in their absolute values. Using SEM, it is possible to 
separate the variation in indicator variables into two components: measurement error in 
the indicator and the variation due to the change in the latent variables. Second, in the 
multiple regression technique, in order to estimate the coefficients associated with a 
reverse causality relationship between two variables, one needs to run two separate 
regressions for each direction of the relationship. SEM, on the other hand, allows 
association between latent variables in a single model specification.  
The conventional way of model presentation in SEM is to use path diagrams. Path 
diagrams contain two components, namely a structural model, which shows the causal 
hypothesis between the variables of interest, and measurement models which show the 
relationship between latent variables and indicators of these variables. Figure 3.1 shows 
the path diagram of the measurement model (the dashed rectangles) and the structural 
model (the solid rectangle). Latent variables, in this study social norm and female 
autonomy, are shown as ellipses. The exogenous observed variables are presented by 
dashed rectangles and domestic violence - the endogenous observed variable- is 
represented by a solid rectangle. The single headed arrows represent hypothesized 
direct effects of one variable on another. Two headed arrows represent the covariance 
between the variables. ε(.)’s are the error terms corresponding to the relevant variables 
and in the measurement models, they represent measurement errors in the indicator 
variables. 
Model specification 
The model specification that is used in the empirical analysis of the chapter is designed 
in accordance with the literature especially with the household bargaining model of 
Eswaran and Malhotra (2011) and the feminist theory of domestic violence. As 
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explained in Section 3, feminist theory argues that the patriarchal system has defined 
the husband as the dominant, strong, authoritarian, aggressive and rational provider for 
the family, while the wife traditionally is accepted to be dependent, passive, submissive 
and soft. In the line with this argument, Eswaran and Malhotra (2011) also assert that 
husbands with more liberal views can see wife beating as being more reprehensible. 
Based on these arguments, the structural model is designed in a way that the social 
norms of the husband have a direct effect on the violence. In other words, a husband 
with strong social norms can be expected to resort to violence more than one with 
relatively weak norms.  
Feminist theory, also asserts that men resort to violence to sustain their dominant 
position. This argument has two implications: violence can affect the level of female 
autonomy in the household and the level of female autonomy can affect the incidence of 
violence. It means that there is a potential endogeneity problem. Eswaran and Malhotra 
(2011) used a two-stage instrumental variable model in their study to deal with 
endogeneity, which is a common way to solve this problem. Nevertheless, their analysis 
suffers from measurement error as they simply take the average of binary indicator 
variables to capture female autonomy. In order to allow for endogeneity and 
measurement error problems at the same time, a non-recursive version of SEM is used 
here. A non-recursive model can be defined as a SEM model in which two variables in 
the structural model have a feedback loop between them (Kline, 2011). As can be seen 
from Figure 3.1, the causality between violence and female autonomy is represented by 
a direct feedback loop showing the bilateral relationship between violence and female 
autonomy. Also, the disturbances of female autonomy and violence are allowed to be 
correlated to account for the unobservable variables that affect both female autonomy 
and domestic violence. 
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Finally, there are two sets of observable variables represented by the dashed rectangles. 
The first set of observable variables (XFA) has an effect only on female autonomy. This 
set contains: age, age at marriage, education level and income status of the wife; 
arranged marriage and the number of male and female children. The second set of 
observable variables (XSN) affects the social norms of the husband, it consists of age, 
age at marriage, education level and income of husband.  
Structural Model: 
The structural part of the model defines a linear relationship between the latent 
variables and the fixed covariates. In matrix form, 
  XB          (1) 
Where, ),,(
SNFAV    is the vector of dependent variables including violence V , 
female autonomy 
FA , and the husband’s social norms SN ;   is the vector of 
constants; X is the vector of covariates affecting the latent variables; B and  are the 
matrices of coefficients to be estimated and   is the vector of independent and 
identically distributed error terms corresponding to the relevant dependent variables. 
The coefficient matrices in (1) are: 
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Female autonomy and the husband’s social norms are assumed to be continuous latent 
variables. As it can be seen from Figure 3.1 and the matrix representation above, there 
is a reciprocal relationship between the continuous latent female autonomy variable and 
the violence variables. As Maddala (1983, pp. 117-118) notes, a reciprocal relationship 
between a continuous and a binary variable is logically inconsistent and it is not 
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possible to perform estimations with standard maximum likelihood methods. To 
overcome this problem, the weighted least squares means and variance adjusted 
(WLSMV) methodology proposed by Muthén et al. (1997) is adopted. In this 
methodology, instead of the observed value of the binary violence variable, the 
underlying continuous response variable (
V ) behind the observed violence variable 
acts as the predictor.34  
Measurement Model: 
For a formal representation, assume that i , a binary variable that represents the 
incidence of violence for the individual i, is an indicator of the event that some 
underlying unobserved continuous variable, say V
i , exceeds a certain threshold 
(without loss of generality, it can be taken as zero) such that,  






00
01
V
i
V
i
i
if
if


  i= 1....N       (2) 
The underlying response variable is defined by a linear in parameters specification 
(suppressing i);   
V
SNFA
V
V   '13
'
12
 and V ~ ),0(
2N     (3) 
Then, the marginal probability of a positive response is given by 
)(1)0Pr()1Pr( '13
'
12
'
13
'
12
SNFA
VV
SNFA
V    (4) 
where )(  is the standard normal cumulative distribution. 
By definition, the latent variables 
FA and SN  are not observed. Instead, there are m 
number of indicators assumed to measure female autonomy and the husband’s social 
                                                 
34  In contrast, with maximum likelihood methods it is the observed binary variable itself that is the 
predictor. The inconsistency stems from the fact that in maximum likelihood methods each direction of 
the relationship between female autonomy and domestic violence refers to a different regression: a linear 
regression when the female autonomy is the dependent variable and a logit regression when the binary 
domestic violence is the dependent variable.  
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norms. Let q
jZ  be the measure of 
q , where q=(FA, SN) and j=(1, ...,mq). Accordingly, 
the measurement equations for the latent variables are given as: 
q
j
qq
jj
q
j uZ   '          (5) 
In SEM terminology, 
j  are defined as the thresholds, the coefficients 
q
j are referred 
to as the factor loadings and they represent the information of the latent variables that is 
contained in the indicators. The disturbance terms q
ju represent the measurement errors 
of the indicator variables. 
Model identification and assumptions: 
For the identification of the model, there are four requirements:  
1) mq ≥ 2,  a minimum of two measures for each latent variable.35  
2) The location of the latent variables should be defined. Therefore, the location of the 
latent variables are centered by setting constants in the structural model to zero, ( 0 ). 
3) 11 
q , the factor loadings are identified up to a scale, so the factor loading of one of 
the measures is normalised to 1.  
4) Cov( FAu , SNu )=0, the measurement errors in one measurement model are 
uncorrelated with the measurement errors in the other measurement model.  
The requirements that are noted above are standard for any IRT model applications. As 
the model in this study specifies a reciprocal relationship due to the potential reverse 
causality between violence and female autonomy, three additional assumptions are 
made:  
                                                 
35 SEM allows usage of more observations as one does not need to drop observations which have missing 
values for some variables. For instance, couples without children have missing values for the female 
autonomy indicator related to the decisions regarding the children. As long as there are at least two 
indicators, one can identify the latent variable. 
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5) 0) , ( Cov FAV  , the error terms of the reciprocal variables are correlated. As 
Schaubroeck (1990) notes, much of the error in predicting a reciprocally related 
variable (say
FA  ) will be due to its corresponding variable ( V ). Because FA  also 
causes 
V in turn, the errors in predicting FA will become part of the estimator of V . 
Schaubroeck also argues that failure to estimate this correlation may bias the analysis 
and the extent of the bias increases with the size of the correlation. 
6) There should be at least one exogenous variable that affects one of the endogenous 
variables in the reciprocal relationship but does not affect the other (exclusion criteria). 
The model in this study satisfies this requirement as in its specification, as it can be seen 
in the path diagram (see figure 3.1) while the husband’s social norms variable only 
affects violence, the individual characteristics of the wife and arranged marriage, bride 
price variables affect only female autonomy.  
7) Any changes in the system underlying the feedback relationship between female 
autonomy and domestic violence have already manifested their effects and therefore the 
system is in a steady state.  
3.7 Results 
Table 3.5 shows the results of the measurement models for female autonomy and the 
social norm latent variables. The estimated parameters show the strength of the 
relationship between the latent variable and the observed indicator (item) variable. 
More precisely, they show the discriminatory power of items between the individuals 
with similar scores on the latent variable. All of the parameter estimates in the 
measurement models are statistically significant and positive which means the female 
autonomy and the husband’s social norm latent variables have a positive and significant 
effect on their indicators. 
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As the latent variables and the underlying continuous response behind the indicator 
variables do not have a unit of measure, one can use the standardised estimates of 
coefficients to interpret the effect of latent variables on their indicators. The 
standardised coefficients show the mean change in indicators (in standard deviation 
units) for a 1 standard deviation change in the latent variables. According to the results 
of the measurement model, women having a say on choice of entertainment/holiday, 
relationships with the relatives and neighbours, in other words people outside the 
household, are the best indicators of female autonomy in the household. On the other 
hand, having a say on the house setup, is the weakest among the indicators of the 
female autonomy. This result is not surprising since house setup, or housework, is 
traditionally accepted as the duty of women. In terms of husband’s social norms, 
indicators showing husbands’ agreement on “having a male child increases the prestige 
of the wife” and “continuation of the family is guaranteed only by a son” have greater 
factor loadings. This means that superiority attached to a male child (or may be male as 
gender in general) by the husbands seems to be the strongest indicator of social norms 
of husbands.  
Table 3.6 presents the results of the structural model. The female autonomy in the 
household is found to be positively and significantly affected by the wife’s education. 
The coefficients of the age and age at marriage on female autonomy are positive: 
however, they are statistically insignificant. Having a personal income has an increasing 
effect on female autonomy. The positive coefficient for asset ownership is consistent 
with the arguments of Panda and Agarwal (2005) who assert that property ownership 
increases the bargaining power of women by acting as a tangible exit-option from the 
marriage. However, the coefficient for this variable fails to attain statistical 
significance. As noted by Malhotra and Mather (1997) access to assets does not 
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necessarily mean that women have control over these resources. Accordingly, the 
insignificant coefficient for asset ownership can be due to the women’s lack of control 
over these assets. Arranged marriage and bride price has a negative effect on female 
autonomy. This is not a surprising result since the women who are forced to enter into a 
marriage are less likely to have a say on decision making processes within the 
household. Considering the results of the measurement model of the husband’s social 
norms, which show the importance given to male child by husbands, two separate 
variables to control for the number of male and female children are included. The 
estimated coefficients for these variables are the same in terms of both size and 
magnitude, indicating a negative effect of having children on female autonomy.  
The strength of the husband’s social norms is found to be negatively related to the 
socio-economic status. The effect of education is negative and strongly significant. 
Similarly, the level of income has a negative effect on the husband’s social norms. The 
effect of age is negative. The age at marriage is not significantly related to social norms.  
Table 3.6 also reports the relationship between key variables of interest. First, domestic 
violence has a negative effect on female autonomy. This finding is evidence suggesting 
that women who are victims of domestic violence have less autonomy since, in the 
decision making process, they are forced to be in line with the preferences of the abuser. 
This result is consistent with the results of Eswaran and Malhotra (2011) who proposed 
a non-cooperative model of spousal violence in which women are, in the presence of 
violence, forced to allocate the resources in accordance with the husbands’ choice. 
Second, female autonomy has a significant and negative effect on domestic violence. In 
other words, the incidence of violence is less likely to occur once the autonomy of 
women, which is promoted by the income and the education they possess and reflected 
by their presence in decision making process, gains acceptance. This result is in 
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accordance with the feminist theory on violence which asserts that intimate violence 
stems from the inequalities within the household and it is used by husbands to maintain 
subordination of women. In this sense, husbands’ resort to violence becomes less likely 
in the absence of these inequalities and male dominance. 
Finally, confirming the importance of conservatism, the strength of the husband’s social 
norms on traditional gender roles positively affects the risk of violence. This result 
supports Heise (1998) who argues that adherence to rigid gender roles increases 
likelihood of violence against women. Koenig et al. (2003) find supporting results for 
this argument at the community level. In contrast to the existing literature this chapter 
examines the effect of social norms on violence at the individual level. This study 
contributes to the literature as its key findings support the literature on the relationship 
between domestic violence, female autonomy and social norms. More importantly, it 
makes a contribution to the literature since the model used in this study allows analysis 
of the relationship between these three concepts in a single framework that accounts for 
the potential reverse causality, and so endogeneity, between domestic violence and 
female autonomy.36 
3.7.1 Robustness check- Alternative specification using the wife’s social norms 
The results of the model suggest that the strength of the husband’s social norms 
positively affect violence and are negatively affected by education. As mentioned in 
                                                 
36 As noted in the methodology section, exclusion criteria which are necessary to deal with endogeneity 
require at least one variable that affects domestic violence but does not affect female autonomy. In that 
sense, the husband’s social norms act as an instrument for domestic violence. Since it is not possible to 
do traditional tests on validity of instruments in structural equation modelling, an alternative specification 
was estimated, where the husband’s social norms were allowed to have a direct effect on both female 
autonomy and domestic violence, and the husband’s characteristics such as education and income level 
were allowed to affect domestic violence directly to be able to identify and estimate the model. However, 
it was found that the effect of the husband’s characteristics on domestic violence was insignificant; and 
the effect of the husband’s social norms on female autonomy was also found to be insignificant 
Additionally, many other variables such as financial stress, alcohol usage and family support were also 
considered but their effect on violence was found to be insignificant so they could not be used as 
instruments. 
107 
 
Section 3.4.1, Heise (1998) argues that social norms affect domestic violence also 
indirectly through its effect on female autonomy. Including an additional path from the 
husband’s social norms to female autonomy in Figure 3.1 would cause identification 
problems in the model (see assumption 6 in section 3.6). In order to overcome this 
problem and to see how female autonomy is affected by women’s own social norms, an 
alternative model specification which includes the social norms of the wife is 
estimated.37 By doing so, the effect of education and income on women’s social norms 
is also analysed.  
Figure 3.2 presents the path diagram of the alternative model specification. The same 
indicators of social norms are used for the husband and wife to test if the indicators 
show a different pattern for men and women. Finally, all the covariates that affect 
female autonomy are also allowed to affect wife’s social norms.  
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 provide the measurement model of the wife’s social norms latent 
variable and the estimation results of the structural model of the alternative 
specification, respectively.38 Looking at the results of the measurement model in Table 
3.7, it can be seen that most of the factor loadings have greater values for women than 
men. In other words, these indicators contain more information on the strength of the 
social norms for women than they do for men. It is also seen that the superiority that is 
attached to a male child is once again the strongest indicator of social norms. One 
important observation is that the factor loading regarding the employment of women is 
much greater for women than it is for men. In that sense, being against women’s 
                                                 
37 A strong correlation between the husband’s and wife’s social norms can cause further endogeneity 
problems. However, the results of the model show that the correlation between these two latent variables 
is very low with the value of 0.05 (for comparison the correlation between female autonomy and wife’s 
social norms is 0.32). Also as noted in footnote 30 above, the values of indicators of social norms are 
significantly different for men and women. 
38 We do not report the results of the measurement models of female autonomy and the husband’s social 
norms and the effect of covariates on the husband’s social norms. This is due to very small changes in 
these estimation results which leave the results qualitatively the same.  
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employment is a very informative indicator of women’s acceptance of traditional 
gender roles.  
The structural model results in Table 3.8 show that, compared to the main model, while 
their sign and significance level remain the same, there is an increase in the magnitudes 
of the effects of female autonomy and husband’s social norms on violence. As 
expected, the wife’s social norms have a negative and significant effect on her 
autonomy in the household. A possible explanation can be that a woman who 
internalises the traditional social norms and accepts the subordination will be less likely 
to participate in decision making processes than a woman with more egalitarian 
attitudes. The main difference between the alternative specification (Table 3.8) and the 
main model (Table 3.6) is that the effects of variables such as education, income, bride 
money, number of children on female autonomy lose their statistical significance in the 
alternative specification. On the other hand, these variables have a significant effect on 
wife’s social norms. Similar to the case of men, while education, having an income, and 
age have a negative effect on the wife’s social norms, the effects of arranged marriage, 
bride money and the number of children are positive and highly significant. One 
conclusion that can be drawn from the differences between the main model and the 
alternative specification is that education and having an income indirectly affect the 
level of the wife’s autonomy through her social norms. Once the level of wife’s social 
norms is controlled for, there is not an observed direct effect of these variables on 
female autonomy.     
3.8 Conclusion  
This study makes three important methodological contributions to the existing literature 
on domestic violence and female autonomy. First, it analyses the two-way relationship 
between female autonomy and domestic violence within the same model. Second, 
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exploiting the advantages of SEM it accounts for potential endogeneity and 
measurement error problems and finally, it tests the importance of social norms at the 
individual level.  
The results of the study provide many suggestions for policy makers. For example, 
education and income not only weaken the strength of traditional social norms for both 
men and women but also promote a higher level of female autonomy. Therefore, policy 
makers should consider focusing on education, particularly promoting the educational 
attainment of women. According to the Global Gender Gap Report 2013, the female 
labour force participation rate in Turkey is 30 per cent and this ratio puts Turkey in the 
123rd place out of 136 countries. As mentioned in Section 3, around 24 per cent of 
women who do not participate in the labour force report that they do not have autonomy 
on their participation decision. Therefore, policies targeting new employment 
opportunities for women should be accompanied by campaigns promoting female 
autonomy in cooperation with the civil movements and organisations that support 
empowerment of women’s socioeconomic status. Finally, the results of the analyses 
show that women who do not have any source of income and have a low level of 
education suffer oppression in the household which in turn makes them the most 
vulnerable group to domestic violence.   
There are some potential limitations of the study, which should be acknowledged. The 
first limitation is the cross-sectional nature of the data. As Kaplan et al. (2001) note, a 
cross-sectional design of a model with a feedback loop gives only a snapshot of an on-
going dynamic process. In that sense, the model used in this study, controlling for 
husband’s social norms, analyses the effect of female autonomy on violence by 
comparing the incidence of violence for women with different levels of autonomy. 
Therefore it is not possible to analyse the effect of female autonomy on violence over 
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time for the same women. In other words, the change in incidence of violence due to the 
increasing autonomy of an individual woman can only be analysed with panel data 
which is not available here. For instance, Koenig et al. (2003) argue that “more 
autonomous women, at least initially, are likely to violate established norms concerning 
gender roles and call into question the larger family’s honor and prestige and, as a 
consequence, to incur a higher risk of domestic violence … it is only after women’s 
individual and collective empowerment and autonomy gain acceptance and become 
commonplace that reductions in the risks of domestic violence are likely to be 
observed” (p.285). Therefore, the positive effect that is found in this study should be 
interpreted as the effect of female autonomy on domestic violence after the change in 
female autonomy fully manifests its effect.  
Second, although the SEM model accounts for measurement errors in the indicators of 
the latent variables, the incidence of violence is likely to be underreported by the 
respondents given the intimate nature of the subject. Also, the question of “what is your 
partner/husband’s reaction if you cannot agree on an issue?’’ may not be the best 
question to capture incidence of violence as domestic violence can also occur in the 
absence of a disagreement since a husband can resort to violence due to psychological 
problems or substance abuse. Moreover, the dataset only contains information about 
physical violence. However, violence can take a sexual or an emotional form as well. It 
should also be noted that the type of physical abuse is not specifically addressed in the 
question that captures domestic violence. This leaves the interpretation of what violence 
is entirely to women. It is possible that some women may in fact simply identify 
physical violence only when a severe injury occurs. Additionally, the dataset provides 
information about violence that occurred only in the last 12 months. For example, 
Domestic Violence against Women in Turkey (GDSPW, 2008) documents that around 
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40 per cent of women in Turkey suffered from physical violence and around 15 per cent 
were sexually assaulted in their life time. Finally, the dataset does not contain any 
information on exposure to violence in childhood so it is not possible to test the 
intergenerational transmission of violence. 
Despite these limitations, the findings of the chapter make an important contribution to 
the literature on domestic violence and female autonomy in Turkey.  The rigorous 
analysis is based on looking at the two way relationship between the two concepts; and 
the findings suggest presence of significant reverse causality where domestic violence 
has a negative effect on female autonomy, but an increase in female autonomy helps to 
decrease the incidence of domestic violence.  This study also establishes, for the first 
time, the importance of social norms at the individual level, when analysing the 
relationship between domestic violence and female autonomy.  The empirical strategy 
that is adopted in the analysis and the findings presented here will hopefully serve to 
stimulate further research in this area especially for the case of Turkey. 
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TABLES OF CHAPTER 3 
12 Table 3.1: “What is your and your spouse’s reaction if you cannot solve a problem by talking?’’(Per cent) 
  Men Women 
 Your Reaction Your Reaction 
 Usually Sometimes Rarely Never Usually Sometimes Rarely Never 
Shout 27.0 38.6 11.7 22.4 15.9 32.3 12.8 38.7 
Sulk 5.4 19.5 11.3 63.6 10.2 27.9 11.8 49.9 
Leave the House 1.9 4.7 4.0 89.2 0.9 2.1 2.5 94.3 
Keep Silent 22.4 34.3 13 30.1 41.7 29.1 8.5 20.5 
Physical Violence 0.5 3.1 4.0 92.2 0.2 0.5 1.4 97.7 
         
 Wife’s Reaction Husband’s Reaction 
 Usually Sometimes Rarely Never Usually Sometimes Rarely Never 
Shout 13.7 27.9 12.2 46.1 29.8 35.6 10.5 23.9 
Sulk 8.5 25.9 11 54.4 6.5 18.5 10.3 64.5 
Leave the House 0.5 1.9 2.1 95.3 1.6 3.6 3.8 90.8 
Keep Silent 39.1 31.5 8.2 21.0 22.4 33.3 13.3 30.9 
Physical Violence 0.2 0.7 1.5 97.4 0.9 3.0 3.6 92.2 
Note: Sample weights are used. 
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13 Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables 
 Mean value of the  
dummy variable 
Mean value of violence dummy 
variable 
Wife’s age   
18-24 0.07 0.07*** 
25-34 0.29 0.05*** 
35-44 0.26 0.07*** 
45-54 0.20 0.07*** 
55-64 0.11 0.08*** 
65+ 0.07 0.07*** 
Wife's age at marriage   
<18 0.28 0.03*** 
18-24 0.62 0.07*** 
25-29 0.08 0.07*** 
>30 0.01 0.09* 
Husband’s age   
18-24 0.01 0.06** 
25-34 0.23 0.06*** 
35-44 0.29 0.06*** 
45-54 0.22 0.09*** 
55-64 0.13 0.08*** 
65+ 0.11 0.08*** 
Husband's age at marriage   
<18 0.06 0.06*** 
18-24 0.58 0.06*** 
25-29 0.29 0.08*** 
>30 0.07 0.07*** 
Does wife have an income   
No   0.08*** 
Yes  0.20 0.06*** 
Wife's asset  ownership   
No   0.08*** 
Yes  0.17 0.06*** 
Husband's monthly income 1   
No income 0.06 0.12*** 
Less than 400  0.18 0.10*** 
    401 - 600 0.32 0.08*** 
    601 - 800 0.20 0.06*** 
    801 - 1 200  0.16 0.05*** 
    1 201 - 2 500  0.07 0.03*** 
    More than 2 501  0.02 0.05* 
Wife's education   
No formal education 0.24 0.10*** 
Primary 0.53 0.07*** 
Secondary 0.07 0.07*** 
High school or above 0.16 0.04*** 
Husband's education   
No formal education 0.09 0.12*** 
Primary 0.52 0.08*** 
Secondary 0.12 0.07*** 
High school or above 0.28 0.05*** 
Arranged marriage   
No  0.06*** 
Yes 0.33 0.10*** 
Bride price   
No  0.06*** 
Yes 0.16 0.12*** 
Number of daughters 2 1.33 (0.02)  
Number of sons 2 1.43 (0.02)  
Observations 6,435  
Note: Sample weights are used. 1) In terms of Turkish Liras. 2) Number of daughters and sons enters the analysis as 
continuous variables. Standard deviations are given in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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14 Table 3.3: Mean Values of Dummy Variables for Female Autonomy Indicators 
“Who makes the final decisions on following issues?” 
  Husband Husband-Wife Wife 
Choice of House  0.29 0.61 0.11 
House Setup  0.12 0.46 0.42 
Children Related Issues  0.14 0.68 0.13 
Shopping  0.19 0.65 0.16 
Relationship With Relatives  0.16 0.76 0.08 
Relationship With Neighbours  0.14 0.72 0.14 
Entertainment and Holiday  0.17 0.78 0.05 
Note: Sample weights are used. 
 
15 Table 3.4: Mean Values of Dummy Variables for Social Norm Indicators 
“Do you agree with following statements?” 
 Husband Wife 
Having a male child increases the prestige of the wife 0.33 0.30 
Not doing housework is a sole reason for divorce 0.18 0.16 
The best age of marriage for women is between 15-19 0.16 0.11 
Continuation of the family is guaranteed only by a son 0.43 0.35 
It is appropriate for close relatives (first cousins) to marry 0.13 0.12 
It is not appropriate for women to work 0.23 0.11 
Note: Sample weights are used. 
 
 
16 Table 3.5: Estimation Results of the Measurement Model 
Notes: Sample weights are used. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Coefficient Std. 
Err 
Standardised 
coefficient 
R-square 
Latent variable: Female Autonomy (FA)     
Choice of House 1.00 Na 0.83 0.70 
House Setup 0.96*** 0.01 0.80 0.64 
Children Related Issues 1.04*** 0.01 0.87 0.75 
Shopping 1.04*** 0.01 0.87 0.75 
Relationship With Relatives 1.19*** 0.01 0.98 0.96 
Relationship With Neighbours 1.15*** 0.01 0.95 0.90 
Entertainment and Holiday 1.13*** 0.01 0.94 0.87 
     
Latent Variable: Husband's Social Norm (SN)     
Having a male child increases the prestige of the wife 1.00 Na 0.58 0.34 
Not doing housework is a sole reason for divorce 0.48*** 0.07 0.28 0.08 
The best age of marriage for women is between 15-19 0.60*** 0.07 0.35 0.12 
Continuation of the family is guaranteed only by a son 0.87*** 0.09 0.51 0.25 
It is appropriate for close relatives (first cousins) to marry 0.60*** 0.08 0.35 0.12 
It is not appropriate for women to work 0.63*** 0.08 0.37 0.13 
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17 Table 3.6: Estimation Results of the Structural Model 
 Coefficient Std. Err Standardised 
coefficient 
    
Dependent Variable: Violence     
Female Autonomy -0.79*** 0.00 -0.67 
Husband's Social Norms 0.16* 0.09 0.09 
    
Dependent Variable: Female Autonomy    
Violence -0.77*** 0.16 -0.91 
Education level 1    
Primary 0.06* 0.03 0.03 
Secondary 0.06 0.04 0.03 
High school or above 0.12* 0.07 0.05 
Age 2    
25-34 0.00 0.03 0.00 
35-44 0.04 0.04 0.02 
45-54 0.04 0.05 0.02 
55-64 0.03 0.05 0.01 
65+ 0.02 0.06 0.01 
Age at Marriage 3    
18-24 0.00 0.01 0.00 
25-29 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 
>30 0.00 0.05 0.00 
Economic status and family variables    
Having income 0.05* 0.03 0.02 
Wife's asset  ownership 0.03 0.02 0.01 
Arranged marriage -0.06* 0.03 -0.03 
Bride price -0.05* 0.03 -0.02 
Number of daughters -0.03* 0.01 -0.04 
Number of sons -0.03* 0.01 -0.04 
    
Dependent Variable: Husband’s Social Norms     
Education level 1    
Primary -0.19*** 0.05 -0.16 
Secondary -0.29*** 0.07 -0.16 
High school or above -0.37*** 0.07 -0.28 
Age 2    
25-34 -0.24* 0.14 -0.17 
35-44 -0.18 0.15 -0.14 
45-54 -0.31* 0.16 -0.22 
55-64 -0.37** 0.18 -0.22 
65+ -0.43** 0.19 -0.23 
Age at marriage 3    
18-24 0.03 0.06 0.03 
25-29 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 
>30 0.05 0.09 0.02 
Income Level  4    
Income Less than 400  -0.05 0.07 -0.03 
401 - 600 TL -0.19*** 0.06 -0.15 
601 - 800 TL -0.14** 0.07 -0.09 
801 - 1 200 TL -0.27*** 0.07 -0.17 
1 201 - 2 500 TL -0.29*** 0.09 -0.13 
More than 2 501 TL -0.28** 0.14 -0.06 
    
Disturbance Covariance (Female Autonomy, Violence) 0.94*** 0.10  
Notes: N=6435, RMSEA=0.015; CFI=0.984. Sample weights are used. Base categories: (1) no formal education, (2) 
age 18-24, (3) marriage before the age of 18, (4) no income. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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18 Table 3.7: Estimation Results of the Measurement Model of Wife’s Social Norms 
 Coefficient Std. Err Standardised 
coefficient 
R-square 
Latent Variable: Wife's Social Norm (SN)     
Having a male child increases the prestige of the wife 1.00 Na 0.66 0.44 
Not doing housework is a sole reason for divorce 0.35*** 0.05 0.24 0.06 
The best age of marriage for women is between 15-19 0.82*** 0.07 0.56 0.31 
Continuation of the family is guaranteed only by a son 0.92*** 0.06 0.62 0.38 
It is appropriate for close relatives (first cousins) to marry 0.62*** 0.06 0.43 0.18 
It is not appropriate for women to work 0.87*** 0.07 0.60 0.35 
Notes: Sample weights are used. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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19 Table 3.8: Estimation Results of the Structural Model of Alternative Specification 
 Coefficient  Std. Err Standardised 
coefficient 
    
Dependent Variable: Violence     
Female Autonomy -0. 84*** 0.14 -0.71 
Husband's Social Norms 0. 14* 0.08 0.08 
    
Dependent Variable: Female Autonomy    
Violence -0.77** 0.16 -0.91 
Wife’s Social Norms -0.10** 0.04 -0.08 
Education level    
Primary 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Secondary 0.01 0.02 0.01 
High school or above 0.04 0.03 0.02 
Age    
25-34 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 
35-44 0.01 0.03 0.01 
45-54 0.02 0.04 0.01 
55-64 0.01 0.04 0.00 
65+ 0.01 0.05 0.00 
Age at Marriage    
18-24 0.00 0.01 0.00 
25-29 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 
>30 0.01 0.05 0.00 
Economic status and family variables    
Having income 0.03 0.02 0.01 
Wife's asset  ownership 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Arranged marriage -0.04* 0.02 -0.02 
Bride price -0.02 0.02 -0.01 
Number of daughters -0.01 0.01 -0.02 
Number of sons -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
    
Dependent Variable: Wife’s Social Norms     
Education level    
Primary -0.27*** 0.04 -0.18 
Secondary -0.42*** 0.07 -0.14 
High school or above -0.68*** 0.07 -0.35 
Age    
25-34 -0.19*** 0.07 -0.12 
35-44 -0.25*** 0.09 -0.15 
45-54 -0.17* 0.10 -0.10 
55-64 -0.17 0.12 -0.10 
65+ -0.20 0.13 -0.07 
Age at marriage    
18-24 0.02 0.03 0.03 
25-29 0.09 0.07 0.03 
>30 0.09 0.15 0.01 
Economic status and family variables    
Having income -0.13*** 0.04 -0.07 
Wife's asset  ownership -0.01 0.04 -0.01 
Arranged marriage 0.14*** 0.03 -0.09 
Bride price 0.17*** 0.04 -0.09 
Number of daughters 0.07*** 0.01 -0.12 
Number of sons 0.14*** 0.01 -0.21 
    
Disturbance Covariance (Female Autonomy, Violence) 0.94*** 0.09  
Notes: N=6435, RMSEA=0.03; CFI=0.91. Base categories are the same as Table 3.6. Sample weights are used.  
***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
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8 Figure 3.1: Path Diagram of the Model 
 
Notes: The measurement models are the dashed rectangles; the structural model is the solid rectangle. Latent variables are shown as ellipses. The exogenous observed variables (X’s) are 
presented by dashed rectangles and the endogenous observed variable is represented by a solid rectangle. The single headed arrows represent the hypothesized direct effect of one 
variable on another. Two headed arrows represent the covariance between the variables. ε(.)’s are the error terms corresponding the relevant variables and in the measurement models, 
they represent measurement errors in the indicator variables. 
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9 Figure 3.2: Path Diagram of the Alternative Model Specification 
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3.9 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
20 Table 3.A1: Main reasons why women are not currently participating in the labour force (Turkey) 
Reason Per cent N 
Takes care of children or household 29.74 1616 
Husband or elder does not want 24.77 1346 
No need for working 11.12 604 
Sick or handicapped 11.67 634 
No talent/education 4.56 248 
Continues education 6.73 343 
Other 11.41 643 
Total 100 5434 
Source: Based on author’s calculations using Demographic and Health Survey 2005 datasets. 
 
21 Table 3.A2: Exclusion criteria for the sample 
 N 
Full sample 48235 
Dropped observations  
Single, divorced, widowed 30367 
Individuals who are not head of household or his/her spouse 1446 
Individuals how or whose partner did not respond the survey 3552 
Resulting sample  12,870 
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4 CHAPTER 4: HETEROGENEITY IN INFORMAL SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 
IN THE TURKISH LABOUR MARKET 
4.1 Introduction  
One of the common features of labour markets in developing countries is the 
considerable size of the informal sector employment. According to the Global 
Employment Trends Report (ILO, 2013), between 40-50 per cent workers in countries 
in the Latin American and Caribbean region are employed in the informal sector, while 
this share is between 15-30 per cent in Central and South-Eastern Europe (non-EU) 
countries. Beside its substantial volume, it is also observed that the informal sector is 
persistent in the developing world. According to the same report, between 2000 and 
2010, the share of workers in informal employment declined in only 26 out of 49 
countries for which estimates are available.  
Traditionally, the informal sector has been seen as inferior compared to the formal 
sector in terms of wages, security and protection from exploitation regarding labour 
standards. For instance, as the informal sector is free of regulation, wage offers can be 
below the minimum wage level, the standards regarding age, length and time of 
working hours can be ignored, and workers may have to work in risky environments 
with unsafe equipment. Moreover, employment benefits such as social security and 
compensation do not apply to informal employment due to its unrecorded nature (Losby 
et al., 2002). 
There are several questions that need to be addressed in order to understand the nature 
of the informal sector and to provide meaningful policy prescriptions. Such questions 
include: What determines the sector of employment? Is the sector of employment a 
matter of choice or is it a result of entry barriers between the sectors? If workers in the 
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informal sector had the same characteristics as those in the formal sector, would they 
earn the same wages?  
The traditional segmented market theory asserts that the informal sector is nothing but a 
safety net for those excluded from the formal economy (Ferman et al., 1987). 
According to Stiglitz (1976), and Dickens and Lang (1985), involvement in the 
informal sector is not a voluntary decision, instead it is a survival strategy for people 
who are rationed out from the overly regulated formal sector. Due to the entry barriers 
that exist between these two sectors, informal sector workers earn less than those who 
have the same characteristics but work in the formal sector (Magnac, 1991). The 
neoclassical comparative market view, on the other hand, argues that informal 
employment can be the desirable option based on people’s rational evaluation of the 
relative costs and benefits of entering the formal system (De Soto, 1989). In that sense, 
given their characteristics, people may voluntarily choose informal employment if they 
think that they have a comparative advantage in the informal sector (Maloney, 1999).  
The most recent hypotheses combine these two alternative hypotheses by suggesting 
that the informal sector has a more complex structure that represents features of both 
segmentation and competitiveness. Fields (2005) and Maloney (2004) argue that the 
different segments of the informal sector exhibit different properties. They assert that, 
in the “upper-tier” segment, or the “voluntary” segment as Maloney (2004) puts it, 
given their individual characteristics, workers voluntarily choose the informal sector 
expecting relatively high earnings. On the other hand, the “lower-tier” or the 
“involuntary” segment is seen as the last resort of employment by the workers who are 
rationed out from the formal sector. 
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This chapter investigates the heterogeneity of the informal sector by looking at data 
from the Turkish labour market in which informal workers constitute more than 40 per 
cent of total employment. To do so, differences between the informal and formal sector 
wages are decomposed along the entire distribution. A decomposition procedure, which 
not only allows correction of the potential self-selection problem in wage estimations, 
but which also decomposes the informal/formal sector wage gap at any quantile of 
interest, is used. Using this method, the wage differentials between these two sectors are 
decomposed into two factors, namely, the characteristic effect and the coefficient effect. 
The characteristic effect is the share of the wage gap that is explained by the differences 
between the characteristics of formal and informal sector workers. The coefficient 
effect is the share of wage gap that is related to the differences in returns to those 
characteristics. The advantage of this method is that it allows decomposition of wages 
at any quantile. So it is possible to analyse the heterogeneity of the informal sector, 
which is not possible with a simple mean-wage decomposition. 
In the context of the formal/informal sector wage gap, a relatively strong coefficient 
effect is an indicator of market segmentation as it shows that workers in the informal 
sector earn less even after controlling for differences in their characteristics. In contrast, 
if the characteristic effect is stronger, it means that the wage gap is mainly due to 
differences between human capital endowments, not because the two sectors have 
different wage determination processes. In this case, the informal labour market for 
relatively unskilled workers may be seen as integrated with the formal sector and entry 
to the informal sector is not an involuntary choice induced by a segmented market 
(Maloney, 1999; Carneiro and Henley, 2002).  
The results of the study suggest a heterogeneous structure for the informal sector in 
Turkey in which the lower tier consists of workers who involuntarily participate in the 
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informal sector and the higher tier includes the workers who voluntarily choose to be in 
the informal sector. It is also found that the wage gap between the formal and the 
informal sectors is higher and the segmentation at the bottom end of the wage 
distribution is more spread out (i.e. observed in a wider range of quantiles) for females 
than it is for males. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review 
and discusses the empirical evidence from other developing countries as well as Turkey. 
Section 3 outlines the estimation method and section 4 describes the data used in this 
chapter. Section 5 presents the wage regression estimations and decomposition results. 
Section 6 concludes. 
4.2 Literature review 
The substantial size of informal employment in developing economies and its 
persistence has drawn a lot of attention from academics and policy-makers. 
Accordingly, a considerable amount of empirical evidence about the structure of 
informal employment is provided in the existing literature.39  
Several studies have documented the evidence that supports the segmented market 
theory. Knight and Song (2005) argue that the Chinese labour market consist of two 
segments: the urban-born workers employed in the state and collective formal sector, 
and the rural workers and rural to urban migrants employed in the informal sector. They 
assert that this segmentation is maintained by the residence restriction which limits the 
rights of the migrants in the cities providing protection for the urban workers. Hofmeyr 
(2002) analyses the labour market in South Africa and finds evidence of a segmented 
market. He asserts that the segmentation in South Africa is due to powerful trade 
                                                 
39 See Ruffer and Knight (2007) for a survey of the empirical literature. 
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unions; while the unionised formal segment has been able to protect its wages, in the 
non-unionised segment wages have declined with the fast growing workforce and slow 
creation of employment. Gindling (1991), accounting for the potential selection bias 
due to the non-random selection into formal and informal sector employment, examines 
the labour market in Costa Rica. His results also suggest segmentation between formal 
and informal workers in the private sector.  
There is also a body of literature that supports the competitive market theory. For 
instance, Pratap and Quintin (2006) test segmentation in the Argentinian labour market. 
Using standard OLS estimation, they find an earnings premium for the formal sector 
workers. However, once they use a propensity score matching technique to address self-
selection into sectors, the earning premium disappears. Magnac (1991) uses 
multivariate probit and tobit techniques in an extended Roy model framework to 
analyse the Colombian labour market. His results suggest a competitive structure for the 
Colombian labour market. Carneiro and Henley (2002) used selection corrected wage 
equations to examine the informal sector in Brazil and concluded that, consistent with 
selection into the informal sector being a rational choice, informal sector workers 
appear to have a comparative earnings advantage in their selected sector.  
Most of the empirical literature that tests the segmented or competitive market theories, 
some of which is summarised above, assumes a homogeneous informal sector. 
Accordingly, these studies mainly focus on the wage differences between the mean 
wages of the formal and informal sectors. However, as noted previously, most recent 
theories suggest a more complex structure for the informal sector (Maloney, 2004; 
Fields, 2005). According to these arguments, upper tier workers can voluntarily choose 
informal employment because, given their characteristics, they may think they are better 
off in the informal sector. On the other hand, lower tier workers may involuntarily end 
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up in the informal sector to avoid unemployment. Recent empirical evidence suggests 
that voluntary and involuntary employment can co-exist in the informal sector.       
Bargain and Kwenda (2010) analyse the labour markets in Brazil, Mexico and South 
Africa by using fixed effect quantile regressions. For South Africa, their results show a 
substantial earnings penalty for informal sector workers along the wage distribution, 
suggesting segmentation. On the other hand, in Brazil and particularly in Mexico, the 
informal sector is found to be heterogeneous as the upper tier segment of self-
employment is found to be the most rewarding type of employment in terms of wages, 
dominating both formal and informal waged employment. Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto 
(2002) use selection corrected quantile regressions to analyse the Brazilian labour 
market.40 They find that, while the earnings gap at the high quantiles is completely 
explained by the differences in characteristics, at low quantiles the differences in returns 
to characteristics explain a considerable share of the gap. Accordingly, they conclude 
that informal employment is voluntary at the top end and involuntary at the bottom end 
of the earnings distribution. Using a finite mixture model, Gunther and Launov (2006) 
analyse the informal sector in the Ivory Coast. Their results show the existence of both 
segmented and competitive employment in the informal sector. 
4.2.1 Review of the literature on Turkey 
This chapter focuses on the Turkish labour market in which informal employment 
constitutes a substantial share of the total employment. The size of informal 
employment in Turkey has been quite high compared to the neighbouring European and 
Middle Eastern countries (ILO, 2013). Although there has been a decreasing trend 
between 2000 and 2010, the share of informal sector workers in total employment in 
                                                 
40 This chapter uses a methodology similar to the Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2002). The details of the 
methodology will be explained in Section 4.   
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Turkey is still around 40 per cent, which is close to the values for the Latin American 
countries where the highest informality rates in the world are observed. The first 
empirical analyses on the informal sector in the Turkish labour market comes from 
Tansel’s (1999, 2000) work. Tansel (1999), using the 1994 Turkish Household 
Expenditure Survey, analyses earning gaps between the formal and informal sectors by 
estimating selection corrected wage equations for each group. Her results show a 
substantial difference between the wages of these groups for both men and women. 
Tansel (2000), then, extends her previous work by including the self-employed in the 
analysis. Using a similar methodology, she finds that while male formal sector wage 
workers earn more than their informal sector and self-employed counterparts, the wages 
of women are similar across sectors.   
Taymaz (2009), using the Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the year 2006, estimates 
Mincerian wage equations and accounts for selection bias using a multinomial logit 
model. In the multinomial model for selection, six types of jobs available for an 
individual are assumed: formal sector jobs in manufacturing, formal sector jobs in 
services, informal sector jobs in manufacturing, informal sector jobs in services, 
entrepreneur (employer) and self-employed. If an individual stays at home they are 
classified as economically inactive. Supporting the assertions of segmented market 
theory, his results show that, with the exception of female workers in the manufacturing 
sector, there is a significant wage gap between informal and formal sector workers even 
after controlling for selection and individual characteristics. 
Baskaya and Hulagu (2011) use five waves of the LFS for 2005-2009 and analyse the 
differences in wages of formal and informal sector workers. They first estimate a simple 
Mincerian wage regression including a dummy variable for the formal sector. Then, 
they go beyond simple mean wage estimation and use a propensity score matching 
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technique to control for the potential selection bias due to self-selection into the formal 
or the informal sector. Accordingly, they estimate a probit model for selection in which 
the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes value 1 to represent formal sector 
employment, and 0 otherwise. Their results show that, even though both models provide 
evidence that there is a wage gap between these sectors, propensity score matching 
models suggest that the wage gap between the formal and informal sectors is higher for 
females than it is for males.  
Tansel and Kan (2012) use data from the longitudinal Income and Living Conditions 
Survey for the period of 2006-2009 to analyse the structure of informal employment in 
Turkey. They estimate both OLS and quantile wage equations to examine the 
informal/formal wage gap at the mean and along on the entire earnings distribution for 
both men and women separately. In their analysis, they include formal salaried, 
informal salaried, formal self-employed and informal self-employed workers. They also 
estimate a fixed effect model in order to help to overcome the potential self-selection 
into formal and informal sector. Their results suggest that there is an overall wage 
penalty for informal sector workers. However, this penalty disappears at the top end of 
the wage distribution, suggesting heterogeneity in the structure of the informal sector. 
Although they account for the selection bias in the fixed effects estimation, their 
quantile regression analysis still has the potential selection bias problem due to self-
selection into formal and informal sector employment. 
This study contributes to the previous literature in two ways: First, similar to Tansel and 
Kan (2012), it analyses the informal/formal sector wage gap using quantile regression 
analyses. However, this study corrects for the potential selection bias, resulting from 
non-random selection into the formal and the informal sector, by estimating a semi-
parametric selection equation (Buchinsky, 1998). Second, unlike the previous studies 
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which focus on the value of the coefficient of the informal sector dummies in wage 
regressions, this study decomposes the differences in the wage distributions between the 
two sectors into the effects of differences in characteristics and the differences in 
returns to those characteristics. Finally, the study examines the relative shares of these 
effects at different points of the wage distribution to understand whether the Turkish 
labour market has a competitive or a segmented structure.  
4.3 Methodology 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the wage gap between the formal and the informal 
sector workers. To do so, the quantile decomposition methodology is used. This 
methodology allows the decomposition of wage differentials between the two groups 
across all quantiles of the wage distributions, not just the difference between the mean 
wages of each group. Additionally, unlike Juhn et al. (1993) and traditional Oaxaca 
(1973) and Blinder (1973) decompositions which assume independent and normally 
distributed error terms, the quantile regression method takes the heterogeneity of 
workers along the distribution into account. A potential selection bias problem in wage 
estimations that may result due to non-random selection into the formal or the informal 
sector is also considered.41 In order to overcome this problem, a procedure that 
combines the selection corrected quantile regression method of Buchinsky (1998) and 
the quantile decomposition method of Melly (2006) is exploited.42 
                                                 
41 A potential selection bias can also occur due to self-selection into employment. However, the analysis 
in this chapter does not control for this type of self-selection due to the nature of semi-parametric 
estimation of selection equation in which the dependent variable has to be a binary variable. The details 
of the semi-parametric estimation is explained below. 
42 The idea of combining the Buchinsky (1998) method and the quantile decomposition technique was 
originally proposed by Albrecht et al. (2009). However, Albrecht et al. use the Machado and Mata (2006) 
decomposition method instead of that of Melly (2006). The motivation for the choice of the Melly (2006) 
method is explained below. 
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The Melly (2006) decomposition method consists of three steps (the description below 
drawsheavily from the Melly paper). In the first step, the conditional quantile functions 
for wages are estimated for each specific quantile, )1,0( ,  
)()|( '1|  XXF XY 
   (1)    
where )|(
1
| XF XY 

 is the θth quantile of the log wage distribution Y conditional on a set 
of covariates X, and  (θ) is the vector of coefficients to be estimated in the 
corresponding quantile θ. In the quantile regression setting, the coefficients from the 
wage regressions represent the returns to the characteristics at the quantiles of interest. 
Koenker and Bassett (1978) show that  (θ) can be estimated separately for each 
quantile by, 
 

))(1()(
1
minarg)(ˆ XbYXbY
Nb
     (2) 
Where 1 )(  is the control function. By definition, an infinite number of quantile 
regressions can be estimated along the wage distribution. However, estimation of the 
whole quantile regression becomes computationally demanding, and time consuming, 
as the number of observations increase. Melly (2006) suggests estimating a specific 
number of quantile regressions which are uniformly distributed over the wage 
distribution. He noted that the asymptotic results will still be valid if the quantile 
regression coefficients are estimated along a grid of quantiles. Accordingly, the 
coefficients that are estimated at a given point ˆ (θj) are presumed to stay unchanged 
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from θj-1 to θj for j=1,…,J. The outcome of this procedure is a vector ˆ  which contains 
a finite number of quantile regression coefficients ˆ (θ1),…, ˆ (θj),…, ˆ (θJ).43   
In the second step of the method, the conditional quantiles of wages are turned into 
estimates of unconditional quantiles of wages. This is done by integrating the 
conditional wage distribution over the whole range of the distribution of covariates 
included in the quantile regressions. This procedure, replaces each quantile estimate 
)|(1| XF XY 

by its consistent estimate )(ˆ jiX  . Formally, the θ
th quantile of wages,
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The first two steps of the method are applied separately to the wages of both the formal 
and the informal sector workers which provides ))(,(ˆ 
for
forXQ

and ))(,(ˆ infinf 

XQ
respectively. The final stage of the method is to decompose the wage gap between the 
formal and the informal sector into the characteristics effect and the coefficient effect. 
To do so, one needs to simulate the whole counterfactual distribution. The 
counterfactual distribution represents the distribution that would have prevailed in the 
informal sector if the returns to the characteristics in the informal sector were equal to 
the returns in the formal sector. The counterfactual wages ))((ˆ
'
inf 
forXQ

are created 
by re-estimating equation (3) using the covariates of the informal sector workers and 
estimated coefficients from the formal sector.    
                                                 
43 When deciding on the number of quantiles, at which to estimate the coefficients, there is a trade-off 
between computation time and precision. The estimation of conditional distribution will be more precise, 
the higher the number of quantile regressions estimated. In this chapter, initial results were estimated with 
10 quantile regressions. Then, considering the precision issue, 100 quantile regressions from θ=0.01 to 
θ=0.99 were estimated. The results that are presented in the chapter are from 100 quantile regressions. 
Also, 1000 bootstrap iterations were performed to obtain the standard errors.  The computation time 
increases with both the number of observations and the number of bootstrap iterations.  
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Once the counterfactual wage distribution is generated, the wage gap between the two 
sectors at quantile θ can be decomposed into two effects such that: 
 
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 (4) 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (4) gives the effect of the characteristic 
at quantile θ. It is basically the gap between the wage distribution in the formal sector 
and the counterfactual wage distribution, i.e. the wage distribution that would have 
prevailed in the informal sector if the returns to characteristics had been the same as in 
the informal sector. The second term on the right hand side of equation (4) captures the 
effect of the coefficients and it is the difference between the counterfactual wage 
distribution and the wage distribution in the informal sector. 
The Melly (2006) procedure has two important advantages over the Machado and Mata 
(2005) procedure. First, as Albrecht et al. (2003) note, by estimating coefficients for a 
grid of θ’s, it eliminates the sampling error that is inherent in the Machado and Mata 
approach which samples θ’s from a standard uniform distribution. Second, it reduces 
the computation time significantly as, unlike the Machado and Mata procedure, it does 
not rely on simulations. Melly (2006) also shows that if the number of simulations in 
the Machado-Mata procedure goes to infinity the procedures are numerically identical.  
If selection into the informal sector was random, the procedure that is summarised so 
far would be appropriate to decompose the wage gap between the two sectors. 
However, it has been shown in many applications, such as Marcouiller et al. (1997) and 
Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2002), that there is a selection bias issue arising from the 
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self-selection into the formal or the informal sector. To obtain unbiased estimators in 
wage regressions, Buchinksy (1998) suggests adding a correction term to the quantile 
wage equations.44      
In order to construct the correction term, d, an indicator variable for each worker i is 
defined such that 




 formal:0
informal:1
id          (4) 
Further, an index variable, g, is assumed which is an underlying continuous response 
variable behind the indicator variable d: 



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i
i
id               (5) 
The underlying response variable can be interpreted as the utility that individual i gets 
when he or she chooses to be in the informal sector. If the utility of being in the 
informal sector for a worker is greater than the level of utility obtained from working in 
the formal sector (without losing generality, this level can be assumed to be zero), then 
the worker choses to be in the informal sector, and the formal sector otherwise. The 
equation for the index variable is given as: 
,' iii zg             (6) 
Where z is the realisation of Z, the stochastic vector of characteristics that determine 
the probability of worker i being in the informal sector; γ is the vector of coefficients to 
be estimated; and   is the vector of error. Similar to the standard Heckman procedure, 
Z must contain one variable that is not included in X, the vector of characteristics in the 
                                                 
44 The idea of adding a selection term to the quantile wage regression is similar to the Heckman selection 
procedure. The difference of this methodology is in the way the selection term is estimated, which will be 
explained below.   
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wage equation.45 In the standard Heckman procedure, equation (6) is estimated by using 
a probit model in which errors are assumed to be normally distributed. While such a 
methodology fits well with mean wage gap analyses, decomposing wage gaps at 
different quantiles along the earnings distribution demands an alternative methodology 
which does not require normality assumption for the distribution of errors in the 
selection equation (Buchinsky, 1998). Therefore, as a first step, the coefficient vector γ 
in equation (6) is estimated by the semi-parametric least squares (SLS hereafter) 
method of Ichimura (1993): 
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is the nonparametric kernel density estimate of id , with kernel density function κ(·) and 
its bandwidth h. 46  
The probability of participating in the informal sector is thus given by  
)()1( 'ii zdP           (9) 
where 'iz  is the single index with an unknown functional form Ψ. In the second step, 
the single index (as a correction term) is introduced in the wage equations such that 
)()()|( ''1 |   zxZF
for
forZY for
                 (10)    
and  
                                                 
45 As noted in the second chapter of the thesis, the coefficients in the wage equations can be identified 
from the non-linearity of the selection term. However, to avoid potential multi-collinearity problems, an 
exclusion restriction is applied to the analysis in this chapter. One additional restriction of the single 
index estimation is that at least one of the excluded variables has to be continuous. The choice of 
excluded variables is discussed in the next section.  
46 The single index estimation is not a part of the bootstrap iterations that are performed for the quantile 
estimations. See Buchinsky (1998) for statistical properties of the estimator in detail. 
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The form of single index, Ψ, is unknown. Therefore, the true value of the term )( ' z
is not known. To solve this problem, Buchinsky (1998) suggests a power series 
approximation to the term by using the predicted values of index 
'z , from equation (6). 
With the inclusion of the power series approximation, equations (10) and (11) can be 
rewritten as 
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where   and   are the location and scaling parameters that are obtained from the 
probit regression of indicator variable d  on the predicted values of index, 
'z ; where 
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
  denotes the usual (Heckman’s) inverse Mill’s ratio; K is the number of 
power series expansions47; and )( k  is the coefficient of the k
th power series at the θth 
quantile in the augmented wage regression. The advantage of using the single index 
method compared to the traditional Heckman (1979) approach is that it does not assume 
normality for the distribution of the errors. Moreover, it is more quantile specific as  ’s 
vary with each value of θ. As Buchinsky notes, the SLS estimate is consistent, and 
independent of the distribution of errors, while the probit estimate is the efficient 
estimate under normally distributed errors.  
In equations (12) and (13), when k=1, the term whose coefficient is )(1 

will be equal 
to one. Therefore, it is not possible to identify the first series expansion separately from 
                                                 
47  K=3 is chosen for the power expansion as a collinearity problem occurred with the inclusion of higher 
power series. 
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the constant term in the wage regression. To identify the constant term for the wage 
regressions, the identification at infinity method proposed by Andrews and Schafgans 
(1998) is applied. Accordingly, a sub-sample of workers whose probability of working 
in the informal sector is arbitrarily close to one is chosen and this sub-sample is used to 
estimate the constant term without adjusting for selection.  
4.4 Data and descriptive statistics 
The data used in the analysis is from the LFS which is conducted by TurkStat; the 
estimations are performed for women and men separately to determine the level of the 
wage gap between the formal and the informal sectors for each gender. Also, the 
analyses are repeated with both 2002 and 2010 data to explore the change in the wage 
gap between these two years. The first LFS was conducted in year the 2000.  However, 
to avoid the distortions in the Turkish labour market due to the economic crises which 
occurred in 2000 and 2001, the 2002 LFS data is used in the analysis as the starting 
period.  At the time of the analysis the last wave of LFS that was available was 2010, 
which is used here. The LFS has the largest sample of the Turkish labour force and 
contains information on both the workers’ demographic characteristics and the 
characteristics of their main job; the information is available for each individual in the 
household.  For the analysis, two cross sections of employees aged between 20 and 64 
are used.48 
According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) classification, there are two 
definitions of labour market informality. The first definition, which is referred to as the 
productivity view, focuses on informality by looking at the characteristics of the 
enterprises, such as the firm size. In this approach, informal employment is captured by 
                                                 
48 The reason of choosing this age band is that decision to pursue higher education is endogenous as it 
depends on the returns to higher education. However, individuals who are at the age of 20 or older are 
likely to have already made their educational decisions. 
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employment in the small scale firms which are not registered under specific norms of 
national legislation. The second definition, which is referred to as the legalistic view or 
the protectionist view, defines informal employees as the individuals who are employed 
by the formal or the informal enterprises but are not subject to the national labour 
legislation, income taxation, social protection or entitlement to certain employment 
benefits such as advance notice of dismissal and severance pay (for details, see 
Hussmanns, 2004). 
In this chapter to capture the informality of employment, the protectionist definition of 
informality is used, i.e. the lack of social security protection. In the studies on 
informality in the Turkish labour market, this is the definition that is commonly chosen. 
Taymaz (2009) notes that this choice can be justified by two reasons: first, the 
definition of informality based on the firm size is arbitrary in practice. Second, most of 
the enterprises in Turkey are registered but they report their business revenue and 
employment only partially. The LFS contains information on membership of the social 
security system. Accordingly, using this information a dummy variable is created that 
takes the value of 1 if the individual is not registered for the social security system and 
hence classified as in the informal sector, and 0 otherwise.  
All employers in Turkey are legally obligated to register their employees for the social 
security system. The membership of the social security system has implications for both 
employers and employees. For instance, several deductions are made from the earnings 
of the registered employees such as, the income tax, stamp tax, contribution to the 
social security system and to the unemployment benefit fund. A study on the Turkish 
labour market by Korkmaz (2001) shows that around 26 per cent of the gross earnings 
of a minimum wage worker is deducted for the taxes and contributions. The employers 
who register their employees are also subject to contributions to the social security 
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system and to the unemployment benefit fund. Moreover, the employers are obligated 
to pay severance pay and maintain certain standards (such as providing health and 
safety services) which increases with the number of employees.  
The LFS contains information on self-reported after-tax monthly wages. Therefore, it 
does not require any adjustments for taxation. In order to get hourly wages, monthly 
wages are first divided by 4.3 and then divided by usual hours of work per week 
reported by the interviewee.  Finally, hourly wages are deflated by the consumer price 
index which is also provided by the TurkStat to obtain real hourly wages.49 Analyses 
are performed with 31,596 (34,946) male workers, and 9,170 (18,598) female workers 
for the year 2002 (2010). The actual size of the 2010 male sample after the exclusion 
criteria noted above was 58,243. However, the computation of the semi-parametric 
estimation becomes very time consuming with a large number of observations. 
Considering this computational restriction, a random 60 per cent from the 2010 male 
sample (after exclusion criteria) is selected to perform the analysis. The comparison of 
the full sample and the selected sample is shown in Table 4.1.50 
Following the work of Mincer (1974), human capital is represented by education and 
age. In the LFS, the educational qualifications of workers are grouped into six 
categories, namely, no formal education, primary, secondary, high school, vocational 
high school and university which correspond to 0, 5, 8, 11, 11, and 15 years of 
schooling, respectively. However, due to the very small proportions in the first two 
                                                 
49 The labour market status of the individuals in the LFS is categorised into 4 categories: employee, self-
employed, employer, and unpaid family worker. As the dataset does not provide their wages, employer, 
unpaid family workers and self-employed individuals are dropped from the sample. The share of the self-
employed in total employment is around 25 per cent for men and 13 per cent for women in both 2002 and 
2010 datasets. Also the individuals who hold more than one job are dropped from the sample due to the 
lack of information about their earnings from the second job. The exclusion criteria of the sample can be 
found in Table 4.A1 in the appendix.  
50 With the randomly selected 60 per cent sample it took around a week to estimate the selection 
equation. 
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categories at the higher quantiles of the wage distribution of formal sector workers, a 
dummy variable is created to represent workers with less than secondary school 
education by combining the first two categories of no formal education and primary 
education. Tenure is obtained by using the question of “year that you started your latest 
job/occupation”. Control variables such as, age, marital status, presence of children in 
the household, rural residence and being the head of the household are also included to 
the wage regressions as explanatory variables.  
In the selection equation, education, marital status, age, firm size, and the number of 
children are included as determinants of the informal sector employment. As noted in 
the previous section, to identify the coefficients in the wage regressions, exclusion 
restrictions are applied in the analysis. Two variables namely, presence of a formal 
sector employee in the household and mean years of education of the household adults 
(excluding the respondent), are included in the selection equation. The theoretical 
justification for the use of the presence of a formal sector worker in the household 
variable comes from the literature on social networks. As summarised in the second 
chapter, Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) argue that each individual is connected to 
others through a network (e.g., kinship, friendship, and acquaintanceship). He also 
argues that, when information about jobs arrives, individuals, who are unemployed and 
directly hear of a job, use the information to obtain a job. On the other hand, individuals 
who are already employed, depending on whether the job is more attractive than their 
current job, might take the job or else might pass information to one (or more) of their 
direct connections in the network. In that sense, it is possible that a formal sector 
worker may share the information about a formal sector employment opportunity with 
his or her household members who are employed in the informal sector.  
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As noted above, Korkmaz (2001) shows that a great amount of the earnings of a formal 
sector worker is deducted from her or his wages for taxes and for contributions to the 
social security system. In that sense, the household income can be argued to affect the 
decision of participating in the formal sector. For instance, if the total household income 
level is high, an individual may choose to work in the formal sector in order to enjoy 
the benefits of membership to social security system. On the other hand, if the total 
household income level is low, an individual may decide to stay in the informal sector 
to avoid the substantial deductions from his or her wages. Unfortunately, the LFS does 
not provide any information about the earnings of employers, self-employed. Therefore, 
it is not possible to calculate and include household income in the selection equation. In 
order to solve this problem, mean years of education of the household adults (excluding 
the respondent) is used as a proxy for the household income.  
Table 4.1 provides the mean values of the variables that are included in the wage and 
selection equations.  According to the table, in 2002, 25 per cent of male and female 
workers were employed in the informal sector. By 2010, the size of the informal sector 
reduced by 6 percentage points for both genders. Similar to the findings of Tansel and 
Kan (2012) who used Income and Living Conditions Survey for the year 2006, 
descriptive analysis show that, on average, regardless of gender, formal sector workers 
earn around three times more than the informal sector workers.51 However, this 
observation on its own is not strong evidence that the labour market in Turkey has a 
segmented structure. In order to understand the structure of the informal sector, one has 
to consider the wage gap at the different parts of the wage distribution and take into 
account the characteristics effect of the workers in each sector and the returns to these 
characteristics. 
                                                 
51 Baskaya and Hulagu (2011) also find a similar result using the LFS data for the 2005-2009 period. 
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The gap between the mean wages of the formal and the informal sector workers 
decreased between 2002 and 2010 for both men and women. A possible explanation for 
the decreasing wage gap between the two sectors could be the decreasing share of 
informal employment in total employment between 2002 and 2010. A lower number of 
workers in the informal sector can decrease the competition for the jobs in the informal 
sector. This in turn can reduce the downward pressure on the wages of the informal 
sector workers. Similarly, a larger number of workers in the formal sector will increase 
the competition for the jobs in the formal sector which can potentially decrease upward 
pressure on formal sector wages.    
While the average wages for women, relative to men, is lower in the informal sector, in 
the formal sector women on average earn more than men. Also, the mean value of the 
wages has increased over time for both men and women across the two sectors. As 
noted in the second chapter of the thesis, Kaya (2010) shows that in the Turkish labour 
market, on average, women earn 2.5 percentage points more than men. She also argues 
that the higher average wages for women is a consequence of a composition effect, as 
most of the female employees have a university degree while male employees mostly 
have only primary education. Accordingly, a possible explanation for the higher wages 
for women in the formal sector can be that women who work in the formal sector are 
more educated than men who work in the formal sector.  
Looking at the mean values of the dummies that represent worker characteristics for 
both years and genders, it can be seen that, formal sector workers are more educated. 
Around half of the female formal sector workers are university graduates and the 
majority of female informal sector workers have less than secondary education. 
Although the share of male university graduates is relatively high in the formal sector, 
men with less than secondary education still form the highest share of workers in the 
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formal waged employment. One important observation is that from 2002 to 2010, 
employees as a whole became more educated. For instance, the share of male workers 
with a university degree increased by 2 and 6 percentage points in the informal and the 
formal sector respectively, and similar increases are also observed for females by 2 and 
8 percentage points, respectively. This change is most likely to be the result of the rapid 
increase in the number of universities in the country.52 
Table 4.1 also shows that, for both genders, the vast majority of workers in each sector 
are married and the share of married workers in the formal employment is greater than 
the share of married workers in the informal employment. Due to their very small share, 
divorced and widowed male workers are dropped from the male dataset and the analysis 
of the male sample is performed with only married and never married workers (see 
Table 4.A1 for the share of omitted observations). It can also be seen that, compared to 
the informal sector, a greater share of male formal sector workers report themselves as 
the head of household, while for females there is no difference across the two sectors.  
The share of rural residents is lower in the formal sector for each gender and year. The 
mean value of the dummy variable that represents the presence of at least one formal 
sector worker in the household (excluding the respondent) is higher for the formal 
sector workers. Also, the mean value of years of education of household adults 
(excluding the respondent) is higher for the formal sector workers. Finally, as expected, 
a substantial share of informal sector workers are employed in the firms in which there 
are less than 10 workers while around half of the formal sector workers are employed in 
firms that employ more than 50 workers. When the full and the random 60 per cent of 
                                                 
52 In 1991, there were only 29 universities in Turkey. In 1992, 24 new universities were established in 
one year. With the “a university in each city” policy and growing private sector participation, the number 
of universities reached 165 by 2011. As a consequence of these new universities, the number of 
university students also increased substantially; for instance, from 1994 to 2011, the number of students 
in formal university education rose from 1.2 million to 3.7 million (TurkStat web database), a more than 
300 per cent increase.       
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the 2010 male sample are compared, it can be seen that the distribution of 
characteristics in random 60 per cent sample is almost the same as of full sample. 
Therefore, there is no loss of any information due to the size restriction for this sample. 
4.5 Results  
4.5.1 Selection Equation 
As mentioned in the previous section, the semi-parametric single index estimation 
methodology of Ichimura (1993) is used in the selection equation. The advantage of this 
methodology is that it does not require the normality assumptions for residuals. As 
Buchinsky (1998) suggests, a Hausman test under the null hypothesis of normally 
distributed residuals is performed. If the test result fails to reject the null hypothesis, 
one should use the probit estimates to create the inverse Mill’s ratio. The results of the 
Hausman test presented in Table 4.2 reject the null hypothesis at the 1 per cent 
significance level. Therefore, the single index estimation results are used in the analysis.  
In order to create the selection term to be used in the wage regressions, the selection 
equation should include at least one variable that is not included in the wage equation. 
Therefore, the mean years of education of the household adults and a dummy variable 
that represents the presence of a formal sector worker in the household are used for 
identification.53 Education, marital status, age, presence of children, firm size and a 
dummy representing if the individual is the head of household are also included in the 
selection equation.  
                                                 
53 Similar to the instrumental variables case, the literature on selection models has slowly advanced to 
develop tests for the validity of the exclusion variables. For example, very recently, Huber and Mellace 
(2014) provided a test for the assumption that exclusion variables are not related to the error term in the 
main equation of the selection model. However, this test can only be used if the excluded variable is a 
discrete variable. It is not possible to perform this test in the analysis done here because, as Buchinsky 
(1998) notes, at least one of the excluded variables has to be continuous.  
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According to Table 4.2, education has a negative and significant effect on the 
probability of being in the informal sector.  Also the education of other household 
adults has a negative effect. The presence of a household member who is employed in 
the formal sector decreases the probability of being in the informal sector. Marriage has 
opposite effects for males and females; a negative coefficient for males and a positive 
coefficient for females. So, married women are more likely to work in the informal 
sector, whereas married men are more likely to work in the formal sector. Being the 
head of household has a negative effect for both genders. This is not a surprising result 
if it is assumed that the majority of heads of household are also the main income 
providers for the household. In the Turkish social security system the spouse and 
children (daughters until marriage, and sons until the age of 18, or 25 if they continue 
higher education) benefit from the employee’s social security coverage. Therefore, the 
head of household may prefer to work (if possible) in the formal sector to be able to 
provide free health coverage for the household members. Presence of children, 
especially young ones, in the household increases the probability of being in the 
informal sector. This may be due to preference towards flexible working hours in the 
informal sector in order to be able to take care of children. 
 The coefficients of the dummy variables that represent the firm size categories are 
negative as expected. It is reasonable to expect bigger firms to be in the formal sector. 
Accordingly, workers who are employed in the bigger firms are more likely to be 
registered with the social security system. Also, registration with the social security 
system is legally mandatory for all firms and the bigger firms are more likely to be 
detected if they do not register their employees in the system.  
Looking at the coefficients of the age categories, it is observed that, compared to the 
base age group 20-25, the probability of being in the informal sector is higher for the 
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oldest age group of 45 and above. On the other hand, the age groups 25-35 and 35-45 
are less likely to be in the informal sector. Based on these findings, one can argue that 
there is a U-shaped relationship between age and the probability of being in the 
informal sector in which young and old people are more likely to be in the informal 
sector compared to the middle age groups. Similar results are found for the Turkish 
labour market by Taymaz (2009) who argued that workers tend to move to the formal 
sector over time, but after a certain age (the late 40s and early 50s), they tend to have 
informal jobs possible for their secondary activities. A possible explanation for this 
observation is that older workers who receive retirement earnings from their previous 
formal employment may choose to work in informal sector after their retirement to keep 
their retirement earnings secure.54  
4.5.2 Wage Regressions 
Female sample 
Table 4.3A and Table 4.3B show the wage regression results for the 2002 female 
sample with and without the selection correction respectively.55 Looking at the results 
for the formal sector; education and tenure have a positive effect on the wages of 
women. The effect of education increases towards the high end of the wage distribution. 
On the other hand, the returns to tenure are relatively high at the lower quantiles. The 
differences between the results with and without selection correction are that the 
magnitudes of the education and tenure coefficients (i.e. returns) get smaller with the 
inclusion of the correction term.56  
                                                 
54 Turkish labour Law requires reductions in the retirement earnings if a retired individual goes back to 
employment. 
55 The interpretation of the results in the rest of the chapter are based on the selection corrected results. 
The difference between the results with and without selection correction are noted where necessary.  
56 The decrease in returns to education with the control for self-selection is a well-documented finding in 
the literature. One example for the US can be found in Dahl (2002). 
146 
 
The coefficients for the age group dummies are positive and mostly significant. While 
there is no consistent pattern across the genders and years with respect to the age 
dummies, broadly what does appears is the following: workers in the ‘45 and over’ 
category are more likely to be in the informal sector (other than females in 2010); 
returns for the ‘45 and over’ workers (both females and males) tend to higher in the 
informal sector (except the 90th percentile) consistently, especially once we control for 
selection.  Marriage has a positive effect on the wages of the female formal sector 
workers at each quantile. The inclusion of the correction term decreases the size of the 
coefficient for this variable in the lower half of the wage distribution and increases it at 
the 90th quantile. Being the head of the household has a positive effect on wages and the 
size of this effect is smaller after the inclusion of the selection term.  
The coefficient for the dummy variable that represents rural residence is mostly 
insignificant except at the 10th and 90th quantiles where it has a moderate size and a 
negative sign. A potential underlying reason for the insignificant coefficient for this 
variable is that most of the formal sector workers in rural areas are likely to be public 
sector workers for whom the wages are insensitive to the area of residence as they are 
set by the central government.  
Finally, the coefficient of the correction term is negative and significant at each quantile 
(the squared term coefficient is positive). The negative effect indicates that women in 
the formal sector receive lower earnings than one would expect based on their 
observable characteristics. As noted above, Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2002) used the 
same methodology to analyse the structure of informal sector employment in Brazil. 
Similar to the results of this study, they also found a negative coefficient for the 
selection term at each quantile in the formal sector wage regressions. They argued that 
this may be an indication that these workers choose to be in the formal sector because 
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they benefit from the safety of other forms of legal compensation, such as advanced 
notification of termination or the employer's social security contributions. They asserted 
that such an interpretation is consistent with the increasing probability of informal 
sector employment at older ages (they also found a U-shaped relation between age and 
probability of informal sector employment) as older workers may choose informal 
sector employment after securing retirement benefits in the formal sector. 
The wage regression results for the female informal sector workers are quite different 
from those for formal sector workers particularly for education and tenure. The 
coefficient for high school education becomes significant only after the 50th   quantile. 
For vocational high school education the coefficients are not significant at any quantile. 
The coefficient for university education is insignificant at the bottom end of the 
informal sector wage distribution and this is most likely due to the very low number of 
university graduates at this level of the wage distribution. The coefficient of the tenure 
variable is insignificant at the median, negative and significant at lower quantiles, and 
positive and significant at higher quantiles. Education and tenure do not have positive 
contributions to the wages of the female informal sector workers at lower quantiles in 
contrast to the formal sector wages where these two characteristics have a positive and 
significant effect. However, without the selection correction the coefficients for the 
educational categories are significant at the lower quantiles.  
Looking at the coefficients of the age categories, it can be seen that the coefficient for 
‘45 and over’ is greater than the other age category coefficients except at the 90th 
quantile. The effect of marriage is quite different for informal sector wages; a negative 
effect at the 10th quantile and a positive effect at the top quantiles, and no significant 
effect at median wages. The coefficient for the rural residence dummy is negative and 
significant at every quantile. Finally, the effect of the selection term is positive and 
148 
 
significant at the lower end and at the median of the wage distribution. This means the 
individuals who are at the bottom half of the wage distribution receive higher earnings 
than one would expect based on their observable characteristics. 
Tables 4.4A and 4.4B show the wage regression results estimated using the 2010 data 
for females. Looking at the coefficients of the education and tenure variables for formal 
sector workers, there is no difference between the 2002 and 2010 results in terms of 
sign and significance. The sizes of the education coefficients get larger at the 90th 
quantile and get smaller on the rest of the distribution. Returns to tenure increase from 
2002 to 2010. Except for at the 10th and 25th quantiles, the ‘45 and over’ age group still 
has the biggest coefficient among the age groups. Similar to the 2002 results, marriage 
and being the head of household have a positive effect on the wages of female formal 
sector workers while the effect of rural residence is insignificant. The coefficients of the 
correction terms are negative and significant similar to the results for the 2002 female 
sample.        
Focusing on the informal sector wage estimations, it can be seen that the coefficients for 
university education become significant only after the 75th quantile. Interestingly, the 
coefficient of high school education is negative and significant at the bottom half of the 
distribution and becomes significant and positive at the 90th quantile. So, once again, it 
is found that education does not seem to have a positive contribution to the wages of 
female informal sector workers at the lower half of the distribution. The tenure variable, 
on the other hand, has a positive and significant coefficient at both the low and high end 
of the distribution. The age group coefficients are insignificant below the median and, 
once again, the ‘45 and over’ age group has the biggest coefficient except at the 90th 
quantile. The signs of the marriage dummy variable coefficients are the same as those in 
2002, but they are insignificant at the lower tail. The coefficients for being the head of 
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household and the rural residence dummies are qualitatively the same as the 2002 
estimation. The first term of the selection term power expansion is positive and 
significant until the 75th quantile where it becomes negative afterwards. The negative 
effect at higher quantiles shows that women in the high-wage informal sector earn less 
than what would be expected considering their observable characteristics. These 
workers may choose the informal sector for the non-wage benefits such as flexible 
working hours.  
Male sample     
Tables 4.5A and 4.5B show the wage estimation results for the 2002 male sample with 
and without correction results, respectively. As expected, the coefficients of the 
education level dummies and tenure are all significant and positive in the formal sector 
wage estimation. The age category coefficients are significant and positive at each 
quantile among which the “45 and over” age group has the largest coefficient. 
Interestingly, marriage has a negative effect on the wages of males in the formal sector, 
which is in contrast to the results for females. Similar to the female sample results, 
being head of the household increases the male formal sector wages and rural residence 
has no significant effect except at the bottom end of the distribution where it has a 
negative effect. The selection term has significant and negative coefficients at each 
quantile.  
The wage estimation results for the informal sector are quite different from those for the 
formal sector in terms of significance and the sign of the coefficients. For the 
educational levels, only the coefficient of the university degree is significant at all 
quantiles. The coefficients for the other education groups are insignificant at quantiles 
below the median. Tenure has a positive and significant effect on wages except at the 
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10th quantile, where it is insignificant. The age group coefficients are significant only at 
the top half of the distribution. While marriage does not have a significant effect, rural 
residence has a decreasing effect on wages. The coefficient for the head of the 
household dummy is positive but significant except at the 75th quantile. The coefficient 
of the first selection term is positive and significant at the bottom half of the wage 
distribution while it is insignificant at the top half of the distribution.  
Similar to the results of the wage estimation for the informal sector female workers, the 
inclusion of the selection term makes a great difference to the coefficients of the 
characteristics, particularly for the educational level coefficients. The reward for having 
a higher level of education seems to disappear at the bottom half of the informal sector 
wage distribution when corrected for selection bias.   
Tables 4.6A and 4.6B present the wage regression results estimated by using the 2010 
male sample. The coefficients of the education and tenure variables in the formal sector 
wage estimations are qualitatively similar to the 2002 results. One notable change is 
that, compared to the 2002 results, returns to a university degree are lower at the bottom 
half and higher at the top half of the distribution. As noted above, a similar change is 
observed between the 2002 and 2010 wage estimations of female formal sector workers. 
This is an indicator of an increase in inequality between university graduates. The 
number of universities in Turkey has increased dramatically over the last two decades. 
Therefore, a possible explanation for this result can be the increasing difference in the 
quality of education between the old universities and the new universities that are noted 
to be lacking adequate teaching staff and equipment (Tansel, 2012). The size of the 
tenure coefficient is smaller than the 2002 results at all quantiles. The coefficients of the 
age groups, marriage and the head of household dummy variables are also similar to the 
2002 results in terms of sign and significance. The rural residence dummy has a positive 
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and significant coefficient above the median of the distribution yet the size of the 
coefficient is very small. Once again the coefficients of the selection terms are negative 
and significant along the distribution of formal sector wages.  
Looking at the regression results of the informal sector wages for the year 2010, the 
same differences between the results with and without the sample selection correction 
can be found. Once the selection terms are introduced to the model, the coefficients of 
the educational categories lose their significance. Tenure has a positive effect on the 
informal sector wages, but it is significant only at the bottom end of the distribution. 
The age group dummies have positive and significant coefficients. While marriage has a 
positive and significant effect at the 50th and 75th quantiles, the coefficient of the head 
of the household dummy is significant and positive at the 90th quantile. Rural residence 
has a negative effect on the informal sector wages which is consistent with the 2002 
results. The coefficient of the selection term is similar to the 2002 result; positive and 
significant at the bottom of the wage distribution.  
4.5.3 Decomposition results 
The segmented market theory, as noted in Section 1, suggests that due to strong entry 
barriers between the formal and informal sectors, workers with the same characteristics 
may have different earnings as some of them involuntarily end up in the informal sector 
where the returns to characteristics are lower. An observed wage gap between formal 
and informal sector wages does not necessarily prove the existence of a segmented 
market. In order to understand the structure of the Turkish labour market, the observed 
wage gap between the formal and informal sector wages is decomposed into two 
components: the effect of characteristics and the effect of coefficients (returns to 
characteristics). The magnitude of the coefficient effect is quite crucial because it 
reveals the effect of the difference between the returns to worker characteristics (such as 
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education) after controlling for the differences in the distribution of these characteristics 
between the formal and the informal sectors. In that sense, if the segmented market 
theory holds, the coefficient effect should explain a substantial part of the wage gap 
between the workers in the formal and the informal sectors. However, if the wage gap 
between these sectors is mainly explained by the characteristic effect, it means that the 
informal sector workers earn less simply because they are less skilled than formal sector 
workers.  
Figure 4.1 presents the decomposition results of the informal/formal sector wage gap 
for the 2002 and 2010 female samples. In Figure 4.1, the decomposition results without 
the selection term are also provided to be able to see the effect of selection into the 
sectors. Looking at the wage gap between the formal and informal sectors in 2002 at 
different quantiles, it can be seen that the wage gap is highest at the bottom end of the 
distribution where it approaches 2 log wage points. Then, the value of the gap decreases 
until the 30th quantile, increases very slowly until the 80th quantile and decreases after 
this point until its lowest value of 0.8 at the top end of the distribution. Comparing the 
values of the wage gap in 2002 and 2010, a general decrease in the wage gap between 
formal and informal sector wages across the quantiles is observed. The highest decrease 
in the gap is observed between the 5th and the 15th quantiles where the size of the 
decrease is around 0.4 log wage points. On the other hand, there is only a minor 
difference between these two years after the 90th quantile. 
The decomposition results for the 2002 female sample show that, while the 
characteristic effect explains the majority of the wage gap at higher quantiles, the 
coefficient effect explains a greater share at the bottom of the wage distribution. The 
sizes of these effects equalise below the median at around the 35th quantile. However, 
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when the selection term is removed from the analysis, the shares of the effect equalise 
at the median level. Moving to the 2010 female sample results, a similar pattern in 
terms of the share of the effects is seen at the bottom and top parts of the distribution. 
The main difference between the results for the two years is that in 2010 the 
equalisation level, the 20th quantile, is much lower than in 2002. Even though the 
difference is not as visible as it is in 2002, it is found that the equalisation occurs at a 
higher point of the distribution when the selection term is not included in the analysis.      
Figure 4.2 presents the decomposition results for the male sample for 2002 and 2010. 
Comparing the 2002 female and male sample results, it is observed that the wage gap 
between the two sectors is lower for males than females. The highest wage gap in the 
2002 male data (which occurs at the bottom and the top end of the distribution) is 1 log 
wage points which is half of the highest gap in the 2002 female data (which occurs at 
the bottom end). At the median, the level of the wage gap for males is 0.3 log wage 
points (around 30 per cent) lower than it is for females. Similar to the case of females, a 
decrease in the wage gap between formal and informal sector male workers from 2002 
to 2010 is observed. At the median, the wage gap in 2002 is 0.25 log wage points higher 
than the 2010 value, which corresponds to around a 32 per cent decrease between these 
two years. 
Comparing the results with and without the correction for 2002, a major difference in 
the relative shares of coefficient and characteristic effects is observed. Before the 
correction for selection, the coefficient effect explains a greater share of the wage gap 
along the distribution (particularly at the bottom end) and the equalisation occurs at the 
top end of the distribution. On the other hand, results with the correction are closer to 
those for the 2002 female sample and the equalisation point is at a much lower level (at 
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the 10th quantile). The characteristics effect explains most of the total wage differential 
above this point. 
The 2010 male sample results also show a similar pattern with a greater share of the 
coefficient effect at the bottom of the distribution and a greater effect of characteristics 
at the top end. Once again, the size of the wage gap for the male sample is smaller than 
for the 2010 female sample. Also, the difference between results with and without 
correction is similar to the results for the female samples and the 2002 male sample; the 
equalisation level is lower in the results with correction.  
The results of the study show that the coefficient effect explains a greater share of the 
wage gap between the formal and the informal sectors at the bottom of the wage 
distributions for males and females. In contrast, the characteristic effect dominates the 
wage gap at the higher quantiles. Therefore, the results are inconsistent with the 
segmented market theory and the competitive market theory which assume a 
homogeneous structure for the informal sector. However, they support the “upper tier” 
and “lower tier” hypothesis that suggests a heterogeneous structure for the informal 
sector (Fields, 2005; Maloney, 2004). The higher share of the coefficient effect in the 
total wage gap is an indicator of segregation at the bottom of the wage distribution. 
Therefore, informal sector employment may not be a voluntary choice at the lower tier. 
In the upper tier, there is an indication of a competitive market as the wage gap is 
mostly explained by the differences between the characteristics of formal and informal 
sector workers, rather than differences between the remuneration of these 
characteristics. In that sense, given their characteristics, participation in the informal 
sector at the top end of the distribution is likely to be a voluntary choice of the workers. 
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The results of the analyses are consistent with the findings of Tansel and Kan (2012) 
who also find a heterogeneous structure in the informal sector. However, the results 
found in this thesis show that taking selection into account substantially changes the 
results of the wage regressions and where in the wage distribution the segmentation 
between the formal and informal sector occurs. It is found that returns to higher levels 
of education, especially at the lower quantiles, disappear in the informal sector once the 
selection term is introduced in the wage estimation. It is also found that the 
decomposition results overestimate the spread of segmentation over the higher quantiles 
when the selection term is omitted. On the other hand, when the correction term is 
included, it is seen that the spread of segmentation, particularly for males, is much 
narrower. The results of the study are also consistent with the findings of Baskaya and 
Hulagu (2011), who document a higher formal-informal wage gap for females than for 
males. In this study, it is also shown that the gap for females is not only higher at the 
mean wages, but also at all quantiles of the wage distribution. In that sense, this 
research contributes to the previous literature by providing a more detailed analysis of 
segmentation in the Turkish labour market.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This study analyses the wage gap between formal and informal sector workers to see 
whether there is segmentation between these two sectors in the Turkish labour market. 
To do so, a quantile regression decomposition procedure is performed on LFS data for 
the years 2002 and 2010. The results of the study suggest a heterogeneous structure for 
the informal sector in Turkey in which the lower tier consists of workers who 
involuntarily participate in the informal sector and the higher tier includes workers who 
voluntarily choose to be in the informal sector. It is also found that the wage gap 
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between the two sectors is higher and the segmentation is more spread out along the 
wage distribution for females than it is for males.  
The main limitation of the analysis is that, since there is no data on their earnings, the 
self-employed are not included in the estimation. Yet, it is not expected that this 
exclusion will affect the generality of the results (especially for females since the share 
of self-employed is very low in total female employment) as the findings of the study 
are consistent with previous works on the Turkish labour market, such as Tansel and 
Kan (2012), which included the self-employed in their analysis.   
The findings of the chapter provide useful information on informal sector employment 
in Turkey for policy makers. For instance, the results of the analysis show that informal 
sector workers who are at the bottom of the wage distribution involuntarily participate 
in the informal sector. Due to the unregulated nature of informal employment, these 
workers do not enjoy the protection from exploitation such as wages below the 
minimum wage, working in risky environments, and working with unsafe equipment. 
Moreover, these individuals do not have employment benefits such as health insurance. 
To eliminate such problems, policy makers should consider more efficient ways to 
detect the firms which avoid registering their employees. On the other hand, it is also 
found that some of the workers in the informal sector voluntarily choose to be in the 
informal sector. Therefore, before formulating a policy which targets elimination of 
informality, it is important to understand the motivations of these individuals. For 
instance, the results of the selection equation show that individuals, women in 
particular, who have children (especially those who have young children) are more 
likely to be in the informal sector. A possible explanation is that these individuals may 
choose to work in the informal sector to avoid the rigid working hours in the formal 
sector in order to spare more time to take care of their children. Accordingly, policy 
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makers could focus on increasing availability of childcare assistance for working 
parents. 
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TABLES OF CHAPTER 4 
22 Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 2002 2010 
 Female Male Female Male (60%) Male (full) 
VARIABLES Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
% 25.1 74.9 25.3 74.7 19.9 80.1 19.3 80.7 19.3 80.7 
Real hourly wages 127.9 375.3 152.6 366.3 175.2 435.1 193.2 383.4 191.2 374.0 
 (3.95) (4.67) (2.67) (4.56) (3.75) (3.37) (2.02) (2.13) (2.12) (1.65) 
Log of real wages 4.466 5.657 4.786 5.612 4.926 5.843 5.117 5.736 5.121 5.735 
 (0.019) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
Less than 
secondary school 
0.725 0.180 0.713 0.357 0.624 0.165 0.588 0.317 0.588 0.318 
Secondary school 0.077 0.063 0.122 0.138 0.193 0.066 0.194 0.145 0.195 0.147 
High school 0.099 0.202 0.090 0.166 0.101 0.146 0.095 0.136 0.098 0.134 
Vocational school 0.055 0.135 0.049 0.146 0.073 0.122 0.082 0.152 0.077 0.152 
University  0.045 0.419 0.025 0.192 0.062 0.499 0.040 0.250 0.043 0.249 
Tenure  5.393 6.891 6.640 8.615 1.906 6.243 3.246 7.288 3.239 7.317 
 (0.174) (0.080) (0.094) (0.050) (0.062) (0.057) (0.073) (0.046) (0.056) (0.036) 
Age           
20-25 0.277 0.229 0.201 0.090 0.237 0.169 0.183 0.084 0.186 0.087 
25-35 0.339 0.460 0.415 0.437 0.296 0.452 0.349 0.430 0.347 0.426 
35-45 0.246 0.246 0.208 0.324 0.289 0.286 0.224 0.319 0.224 0.319 
45- 0.138 0.065 0.175 0.149 0.178 0.093 0.245 0.167 0.244 0.168 
Marital Status           
Single 0.316 0.399 0.243 0.156 0.313 0.373 0.267 0.206 0.266 0.206 
Married  0.593 0.550 0.757 0.844 0.584 0.554 0.733 0.794 0.734 0.794 
Divorced/widowed 0.091 0.051   0.103 0.073     
           
Household 
characteristics 
          
Head of household 
dummy 
0.095 0.097 0.673 0.799 0.103 0.104 0.631 0.744 0.634 0.743 
Rural  0.297 0.138 0.278 0.221 0.205 0.097 0.246 0.150 0.245 0.149 
Mean of years of 
education of 
household adults 
5.314 8.756 4.505 6.598 5.785 9.010 4.729 7.095 4.705 7.082 
 (0.074) (0.060) (0.036) (0.027) (0.064) (0.042) (0.045) (0.027) (0.035) (0.021) 
Presence of a 
formal sector 
worker in the 
household 
0.371 0.638 0.156 0.233 0.451 0.646 0.211 0.286 0.205 0.289 
Presence of a child 
in the household 
          
Age≤4 0.187 0.176 0.381 0.346 0.169 0.181 0.349 0.337 0.349 0.340 
5≤Age<11 0.358 0.266 0.415 0.427 0.341 0.242 0.404 0.383 0.407 0.382 
11≤Age<15 0.255 0.137 0.221 0.204 0.250 0.133 0.232 0.183 0.230 0.183 
           
Firm size           
Less than 10 0.717 0.134 0.774 0.205 0.639 0.172 0.729 0.220 0.727 0.220 
10-24 0.122 0.112 0.106 0.111 0.148 0.130 0.102 0.118 0.103 0.120 
25-49 0.075 0.202 0.062 0.168 0.138 0.237 0.100 0.210 0.102 0.210 
50- 0.086 0.553 0.058 0.516 0.075 0.460 0.069 0.452 0.069 0.451 
           
Observations 2,303 6,867 8,036 23,623 3,703 14,895 6,745 28,201 11,290 46,953 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.  Sample weights are used.
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23 Table 4.2: Selection Equation 
 2002 2010 
 Female Male Female Male 
VARIABLES Probit Single 
Index 
Probit Single 
Index 
Probit Single 
Index 
Probit  Single 
index 
         
Mean of years of 
education of household 
adults 
-0.018*** -0.018 -0.031*** -0.031 -0.025*** -0.025 -0.034*** -0.034 
 (0.006) . (0.003) . (0.004) . (0.003) . 
Secondary school -0.554*** -1.189*** -0.352*** -1.521*** -0.476*** -0.459*** -0.259*** -0.439*** 
 (0.069) (0.126) (0.028) (0.061) (0.046) (0.057) (0.026) (0.032) 
High school -1.096*** -2.204*** -0.590*** -2.218*** -1.095*** -1.084*** -0.501*** -0.970*** 
 (0.059) (0.224) (0.031) (0.0857) (0.045) (0.124) (0.031) (0.063) 
Vocational high school -1.125*** -2.174*** -0.752*** -3.009*** -1.075*** -1.059*** -0.547*** -0.974*** 
 (0.067) (0.223) (0.036) (0.115) (0.048) (0.121) (0.031) (0.063) 
University -1.395*** -2.742*** -0.926*** -4.189*** -1.605*** -1.602*** -0.948*** -2.073*** 
 (0.066) (0.284) (0.041) (0.162) (0.046) (0.180) (0.037) (0.120) 
Presence of a formal 
sector worker in the 
household 
-0.379*** -0.788*** -0.192*** -0.813*** -0.318*** -0.358*** -0.109*** -0.432*** 
 (0.042) (0.084) (0.027) (0.041) (0.030) (0.047) (0.024) (0.031) 
Marital Status         
Married 0.095 0.122*** -0.180*** -0.717*** -0.007 0.084*** -0.178*** -0.423*** 
 (0.060) (0.026) (0.040) (0.032) (0.042) (0.028) (0.037) (0.029) 
Divorced-widowed 0.163* 0.295*** . . -0.133** -0.016 . . 
 (0.096) (0.042) . . (0.061) (0.041) . . 
Head of household 
dummy 
-0.200** -0.463*** -0.224*** -0.868*** -0.125** -0.198*** -0.227*** -0.431*** 
 (0.082) (0.043) (0.034) (0.042) (0.054) (0.041) (0.031) (0.030) 
Presence of a child in 
the household 
        
Age≤4 0.180*** 0.368*** 0.155*** 0.693*** 0.184*** 0.226*** 0.165*** 0.390*** 
 (0.057) (0.048) (0.023) (0.026) (0.041) (0.034) (0.023) (0.026) 
5≤Age<11 0.107** 0.352*** 0.010 0.029* 0.225*** 0.224*** 0.031 0.011 
 (0.047) (0.042) (0.021) (0.015) (0.032) (0.033) (0.021) (0.017) 
11≤Age<15 0.194*** 0.416*** 0.024 0.077*** 0.133*** 0.151*** 0.068*** 0.058*** 
 (0.049) (0.047) (0.024) (0.016) (0.035) (0.027) (0.023) (0.018) 
Firm Size         
10-24 -0.826*** -1.326*** -0.727*** -2.330*** -0.698*** -0.525*** -0.762*** -1.364*** 
 (0.056) (0.133) (0.028) (0.087) (0.039) (0.058) (0.028) (0.074) 
25-49 -1.327*** -2.623*** -1.213*** -4.685*** -1.018*** -1.103*** -1.078*** -2.123*** 
 (0.057) (0.261) (0.029) (0.174) (0.037) (0.117) (0.026) (0.113) 
More than 50 -1.869*** -3.748*** -1.823*** -7.003*** -1.636*** -1.603*** -1.512*** -2.943*** 
 (0.049) (0.366) (0.026) (0.260) (0.038) (0.169) (0.025) (0.156) 
Age         
25-35 -0.408*** -0.917*** -0.394*** -1.323*** -0.440*** -0.451*** -0.439*** -0.913*** 
 (0.054) (0.093) (0.035) (0.041) (0.042) (0.055) (0.033) (0.061) 
35-45 -0.375*** -0.570*** -0.485*** -1.944*** -0.419*** -0.464*** -0.490*** -0.945*** 
 (0.067) (0.062) (0.041) (0.070) (0.049) (0.059) (0.040) (0.067) 
45- 0.270*** 0.509*** 0.040 0.163*** -0.005 -0.131*** 0.154*** 0.322*** 
 (0.082) (0.063) (0.043) (0.020) (0.058) (0.041) (0.042) (0.012) 
Constant 1.326*** 1.326 1.129*** 1.129 1.166*** 1.166 0.790*** 0.790 
 (0.058) . (0.034) . (0.047) . (0.034) . 
Hausman test statistics 20.67 198.17 105.91 63.249 
Hausman test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 9,170 31,659 18,598 34,946 
Dependent variable takes value 1 if the worker is in the informal sector. 
Base categories: less than secondary school (education), never married (marital status), less than 10 workers (firm 
size), 20-25 (age). The same base categories are used in the wage regressions. The constant and the coefficient of a 
continuous independent variable in single index selection equations cannot be identified. So, their values are 
normalised to probit estimates.   
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24 Table 4.3A: 2002 Wage regression for females (with correction) 
 Informal Formal 
VARIABLES q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
           
Secondary school 0.009 0.089 0.062 0.088 0.148 0.019 0.027 0.107*** 0.155*** 0.167** 
 (0.150) (0.077) (0.049) (0.055) (0.097) (0.039) (0.028) (0.033) (0.029) (0.066) 
High school 0.057 0.069 0.082* 0.162*** 0.230* 0.184*** 0.300*** 0.361*** 0.465*** 0.480*** 
 (0.133) (0.075) (0.049) (0.056) (0.124) (0.033) (0.026) (0.027) (0.033) (0.057) 
Vocational school -0.088 0.034 0.036 0.038 0.044 0.253*** 0.334*** 0.416*** 0.519*** 0.515*** 
 (0.139) (0.075) (0.062) (0.064) (0.079) (0.034) (0.027) (0.029) (0.033) (0.048) 
University  0.234 0.353*** 0.624*** 1.001*** 1.305*** 0.713*** 0.812*** 0.902*** 0.981*** 0.953*** 
 (0.188) (0.091) (0.133) (0.130) (0.213) (0.040) (0.025) (0.026) (0.032) (0.053) 
Tenure (10-2) -2.851** -2.678*** 0.468 2.120*** 2.458** 4.140*** 3.915*** 3.765*** 3.025*** 2.812*** 
 (1.274) (0.934) (0.751) (0.629) (1.065) (0.468) (0.328) (0.360) (0.377) (0.594) 
Tenure squared 2.950 3.447 -4.528* -8.639*** -8.460** -5.978*** -6.760*** -6.879*** -4.572*** -4.386** 
 (4.513) (3.269) (2.582) (2.310) (3.352) (1.709) (1.209) (1.352) (1.415) (2.124) 
Age           
25-35 -0.031 0.011 0.102** 0.110** 0.200** 0.043 0.133*** 0.144*** 0.127*** 0.152*** 
 (0.095) (0.066) (0.043) (0.048) (0.079) (0.034) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.035) 
35-45 0.171 0.199** 0.192*** 0.136** 0.254** 0.046 0.113*** 0.118*** 0.068** 0.081* 
 (0.114) (0.084) (0.055) (0.057) (0.099) (0.041) (0.029) (0.027) (0.031) (0.043) 
45- 0.454*** 0.334*** 0.362*** 0.260*** 0.187* 0.100** 0.164*** 0.130*** 0.096** 0.141** 
 (0.142) (0.095) (0.066) (0.076) (0.105) (0.048) (0.037) (0.035) (0.042) (0.062) 
Married  -0.346*** -0.098 0.030 0.125*** 0.169** 0.183*** 0.156*** 0.113*** 0.125*** 0.131*** 
 (0.111) (0.068) (0.042) (0.046) (0.083) (0.027) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.027) 
Divorced-widowed -0.062 0.062 0.077 0.156* 0.175 0.108* 0.054 -0.005 0.044 -0.006 
 (0.152) (0.118) (0.087) (0.094) (0.152) (0.057) (0.039) (0.040) (0.036) (0.070) 
Head of household dummy 0.166 0.102 0.091 0.170* 0.213 0.109*** 0.129*** 0.171*** 0.211*** 0.308*** 
 (0.137) (0.115) (0.071) (0.099) (0.139) (0.039) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.047) 
Rural  -0.289*** -0.267*** -0.301*** -0.329*** -0.363*** -0.095** -0.036 -0.013 -0.020 -0.065* 
 (0.084) (0.058) (0.047) (0.046) (0.059) (0.042) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.034) 
𝜆 0.730*** 0.284** 0.193** -0.043 -0.105 -0.715*** -0.683*** -0.639*** -0.642*** -0.648*** 
 (0.245) (0.138) (0.092) (0.103) (0.204) (0.106) (0.071) (0.068) (0.082) (0.119) 
𝜆2 -0.163* -0.006 0.012 0.073 0.071 0.319*** 0.314*** 0.294*** 0.304*** 0.269*** 
 (0.095) (0.053) (0.039) (0.046) (0.109) (0.068) (0.045) (0.045) (0.061) (0.080) 
Constant 3.600*** 4.008*** 4.335*** 4.604*** 4.956*** 4.443*** 4.596*** 4.845*** 5.117*** 5.427*** 
 (0.128) (0.078) (0.069) (0.071) (0.100) (0.050) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035) (0.063) 
Observations 2,303 2,303 2,303 2,303 2,303 6,867 6,867 6,867 6,867 6,867 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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25 Table 4.3B: 2002 Wage regression for females (without correction) 
 Informal Formal 
VARIABLES q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
           
Secondary school 0.235 0.180** 0.116 0.107 0.127 0.103*** 0.106** 0.142*** 0.208*** 0.223** 
 (0.143) (0.090) (0.132) (0.384) (0.092) (0.035) (0.048) (0.034) (0.038) (0.099) 
High school 0.341*** 0.249*** 0.223 0.168 0.275** 0.330*** 0.409*** 0.474*** 0.579*** 0.638*** 
 (0.103) (0.068) (0.160) (0.388) (0.129) (0.032) (0.045) (0.024) (0.036) (0.079) 
Vocational school 0.280** 0.265*** 0.199*** 0.076 0.090 0.364*** 0.441*** 0.510*** 0.624*** 0.646*** 
 (0.120) (0.088) (0.069) (0.060) (0.070) (0.032) (0.040) (0.029) (0.034) (0.158) 
University  0.643*** 0.608*** 0.953*** 1.145*** 1.322*** 0.911*** 1.001*** 1.061*** 1.138*** 1.147*** 
 (0.143) (0.111) (0.210) (0.436) (0.200) (0.031) (0.048) (0.020) (0.028) (0.048) 
Tenure (10-2) -2.889** -3.151** 0.210 1.781* 2.345** 3.896*** 3.899 4.019*** 3.457*** 3.158** 
 (1.367) (1.429) (3.567) (0.994) (0.997) (0.418) (2.600) (0.326) (0.422) (1.601) 
Tenure squared 2.292 4.823 -4.053 -7.402*** -8.258*** -4.552*** -6.362 -7.665*** -5.418*** -4.797 
 (4.852) (4.152) (10.251) (2.674) (3.145) (1.589) (8.692) (1.245) (1.653) (6.641) 
Age           
25-35 0.105 0.059 0.160 0.125 0.223*** 0.101*** 0.161*** 0.180*** 0.172*** 0.193 
 (0.100) (0.085) (0.197) (0.321) (0.071) (0.032) (0.059) (0.023) (0.025) (0.142) 
35-45 0.224* 0.259*** 0.255 0.163 0.262*** 0.078* 0.137** 0.149*** 0.090*** 0.100 
 (0.129) (0.092) (0.329) (0.313) (0.097) (0.042) (0.060) (0.028) (0.031) (0.080) 
45- 0.447*** 0.329*** 0.366*** 0.268*** 0.218** 0.091 0.142 0.149*** 0.079* 0.129 
 (0.151) (0.109) (0.095) (0.095) (0.094) (0.055) (0.138) (0.041) (0.047) (0.091) 
Married  -0.401*** -0.144* -0.011 0.110 0.169** 0.256*** 0.180*** 0.116*** 0.128*** 0.124 
 (0.109) (0.077) (0.056) (0.082) (0.078) (0.028) (0.059) (0.019) (0.021) (0.104) 
Divorced-widowed -0.032 0.029 0.086 0.110 0.249* 0.129** 0.068 -0.006 0.033 -0.052 
 (0.150) (0.202) (0.170) (0.404) (0.145) (0.052) (0.098) (0.040) (0.043) (0.187) 
Head of household dummy 0.021 0.135 0.088 0.188 0.177 0.126*** 0.157*** 0.177*** 0.226*** 0.301*** 
 (0.148) (0.118) (0.068) (0.407) (0.141) (0.042) (0.051) (0.030) (0.031) (0.055) 
Rural  -0.244*** -0.290*** -0.315** -0.337*** -0.354*** -0.083** -0.018 -0.033* -0.035 -0.110 
 (0.093) (0.075) (0.126) (0.095) (0.056) (0.038) (0.052) (0.018) (0.032) (0.127) 
Constant 3.719*** 4.099*** 4.368*** 4.683*** 4.920*** 4.107*** 4.328*** 4.608*** 4.868*** 5.163*** 
 (0.085) (0.072) (0.063) (0.390) (0.046) (0.034) (0.111) (0.023) (0.025) (0.053) 
Observations 2,303 2,303 2,303 2,303 2,303 6,867 6,867 6,867 6,867 6,867 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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26 Table 4.4A: 2010 Wage regression for females (with correction) 
 Informal Formal 
VARIABLES q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
           
Secondary school -0.013 -0.003 -0.015 0.007 0.103 0.078*** 0.111*** 0.123*** 0.139*** 0.208*** 
 (0.085) (0.048) (0.026) (0.036) (0.066) (0.022) (0.016) (0.015) (0.020) (0.030) 
High school -0.135* -0.174*** -0.080** 0.020 0.178** 0.123*** 0.185*** 0.249*** 0.362*** 0.498*** 
 (0.077) (0.046) (0.035) (0.044) (0.086) (0.021) (0.016) (0.014) (0.020) (0.029) 
Vocational school -0.203** -0.134** -0.051 0.009 0.133** 0.123*** 0.190*** 0.295*** 0.443*** 0.573*** 
 (0.087) (0.068) (0.034) (0.037) (0.061) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) 
University  -0.112 -0.029 0.091 0.386*** 0.554*** 0.476*** 0.613*** 0.820*** 0.974*** 1.130*** 
 (0.109) (0.079) (0.065) (0.105) (0.106) (0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.025) 
Tenure (10-2) 8.312*** 5.203*** 4.451*** 4.714*** 4.191*** 4.221*** 4.566*** 4.237*** 3.336*** 3.101*** 
 (1.413) (0.831) (0.682) (0.990) (1.171) (0.198) (0.184) (0.169) (0.226) (0.288) 
Tenure squared -38.460*** -22.979*** -18.353*** -12.674 -5.420 -3.844*** -6.802*** -8.126*** -6.324*** -6.310*** 
 (9.351) (5.091) (4.532) (8.017) (6.191) (0.765) (0.692) (0.563) (0.854) (0.994) 
Age           
25-35 -0.087 0.014 0.072** 0.059* 0.173*** 0.009 0.059*** 0.112*** 0.155*** 0.151*** 
 (0.071) (0.047) (0.031) (0.033) (0.060) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) 
35-45 0.001 0.060 0.083** 0.073* 0.201*** 0.070*** 0.082*** 0.129*** 0.173*** 0.198*** 
 (0.094) (0.053) (0.035) (0.040) (0.063) (0.020) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.025) 
45- 0.062 0.100* 0.125*** 0.106** 0.142* -0.002 0.046** 0.115*** 0.174*** 0.261*** 
 (0.095) (0.054) (0.038) (0.045) (0.074) (0.028) (0.021) (0.019) (0.024) (0.036) 
Married  -0.040 0.038 0.064** 0.114*** 0.114** 0.186*** 0.196*** 0.164*** 0.153*** 0.131*** 
 (0.079) (0.040) (0.028) (0.030) (0.052) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) 
Divorced-widowed 0.084 0.033 0.015 0.048 0.056 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.018 0.020 0.011 
 (0.080) (0.060) (0.042) (0.048) (0.083) (0.026) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.030) 
Head of household dummy 0.020 0.061 0.042 0.100** 0.114 0.179*** 0.198*** 0.217*** 0.215*** 0.217*** 
 (0.086) (0.047) (0.040) (0.039) (0.081) (0.026) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.023) 
Rural  -0.148** -0.162*** -0.156*** -0.167*** -0.212*** -0.014 -0.040*** 0.001 0.030* -0.005 
 (0.067) (0.033) (0.023) (0.022) (0.038) (0.018) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) 
𝜆 1.101*** 0.506*** 0.180*** -0.114 -0.448*** -0.766*** -0.676*** -0.530*** -0.537*** -0.394*** 
 (0.186) (0.079) (0.068) (0.070) (0.126) (0.054) (0.048) (0.049) (0.059) (0.075) 
𝜆2 -0.235*** -0.046 0.035 0.128*** 0.210*** 0.405*** 0.354*** 0.301*** 0.316*** 0.226*** 
 (0.068) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.051) (0.041) (0.037) (0.040) (0.044) (0.058) 
Constant 3.853*** 4.203*** 4.611*** 4.885*** 5.275*** 4.752*** 4.868*** 4.996*** 5.152*** 5.291*** 
 (0.161) (0.104) (0.045) (0.061) (0.077) (0.027) (0.023) (0.021) (0.025) (0.030) 
Observations 3,703 3,703 3,703 3,703 3,703 14,895 14,895 14,895 14,895 14,895 
Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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27 Table 4.4B: 2010 Wage regression for females (without correction) 
 Informal Formal 
VARIABLES q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
           
Secondary school 0.219* 0.154*** 0.050 0.045 0.053 0.121*** 0.149*** 0.150*** 0.177*** 0.232*** 
 (0.122) (0.054) (0.060) (0.037) (0.107) (0.023) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.025) 
High school 0.288 0.146*** 0.085 0.143*** 0.205* 0.235*** 0.285*** 0.319*** 0.446*** 0.569*** 
 (0.176) (0.045) (0.132) (0.044) (0.109) (0.020) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) 
Vocational school 0.253** 0.223*** 0.143*** 0.109*** 0.122 0.224*** 0.282*** 0.372*** 0.546*** 0.647*** 
 (0.103) (0.060) (0.047) (0.039) (0.093) (0.019) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.024) 
University  0.509** 0.501*** 0.497*** 0.735*** 0.981*** 0.652*** 0.783*** 0.949*** 1.108*** 1.234*** 
 (0.201) (0.070) (0.081) (0.095) (0.176) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) 
Tenure (10-2) 7.815** 4.784*** 5.048*** 4.621*** 4.977** 4.518*** 4.867*** 4.340*** 3.538*** 3.181*** 
 (3.408) (0.954) (1.541) (0.956) (2.161) (0.234) (0.207) (0.173) (0.201) (0.248) 
Tenure squared -36.778** -21.906*** -19.891*** -14.688* -8.570 -3.988*** -7.539*** -8.213*** -6.689*** -6.405*** 
 (16.397) (5.157) (6.638) (7.542) (7.348) (0.814) (0.751) (0.581) (0.804) (0.845) 
Age           
25-35 0.056 0.135*** 0.148** 0.116*** 0.135 0.060*** 0.110*** 0.147*** 0.181*** 0.173*** 
 (0.056) (0.048) (0.060) (0.033) (0.121) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) 
35-45 0.219 0.182*** 0.157 0.150*** 0.172** 0.125*** 0.128*** 0.160*** 0.197*** 0.216*** 
 (0.143) (0.057) (0.141) (0.036) (0.075) (0.023) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.024) 
45- 0.179 0.164*** 0.157** 0.174*** 0.129 -0.006 0.075*** 0.136*** 0.185*** 0.272*** 
 (0.136) (0.059) (0.062) (0.041) (0.091) (0.030) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022) (0.030) 
Married  -0.223 -0.010 0.035 0.080*** 0.140*** 0.189*** 0.197*** 0.165*** 0.155*** 0.133*** 
 (0.138) (0.047) (0.089) (0.027) (0.053) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) 
Divorced-widowed -0.079 -0.015 -0.014 0.007 0.048 0.053* 0.052** 0.005 0.012 0.006 
 (0.097) (0.073) (0.083) (0.050) (0.100) (0.029) (0.022) (0.015) (0.022) (0.027) 
Head of household dummy 0.148 0.092 0.058 0.079* 0.189** 0.183*** 0.203*** 0.222*** 0.224*** 0.208*** 
 (0.101) (0.058) (0.084) (0.041) (0.087) (0.024) (0.019) (0.015) (0.020) (0.023) 
Rural  -0.125** -0.182*** -0.164*** -0.178*** -0.209*** -0.042* -0.041*** 0.001 0.017 -0.015 
 (0.058) (0.036) (0.059) (0.024) (0.045) (0.022) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) 
Constant 3.922*** 4.333*** 4.691*** 4.965*** 5.202*** 4.465*** 4.605*** 4.808*** 4.963*** 5.152*** 
 (0.142) (0.046) (0.044) (0.032) (0.117) (0.024) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) 
Observations 3,703 3,703 3,703 3,703 3,703 14,895 14,895 14,895 14,895 14,895 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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28 Table 4.5A: 2002 Wage regression for males (with correction) 
 Informal  Formal  
VARIABLES q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
           
Secondary school 0.021 -0.018 0.018 0.104*** 0.124*** 0.117*** 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.083*** 0.106*** 
 (0.043) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.030) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.022) 
High school 0.060 0.036 0.062*** 0.135*** 0.235*** 0.261*** 0.265*** 0.244*** 0.226*** 0.227*** 
 (0.037) (0.029) (0.023) (0.032) (0.051) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) (0.016) (0.020) 
Vocational school 0.021 -0.055 0.045 0.098*** 0.117* 0.227*** 0.260*** 0.279*** 0.262*** 0.254*** 
 (0.045) (0.043) (0.033) (0.032) (0.061) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.021) 
University  0.280*** 0.222*** 0.387*** 0.651*** 0.916*** 0.672*** 0.685*** 0.670*** 0.633*** 0.687*** 
 (0.085) (0.060) (0.066) (0.092) (0.142) (0.018) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.024) 
Tenure (10-2) 0.575 0.661** 1.163*** 1.735*** 1.326*** 4.430*** 4.747*** 5.292*** 4.893*** 4.563*** 
 (0.438) (0.326) (0.253) (0.283) (0.347) (0.237) (0.197) (0.173) (0.208) (0.278) 
Tenure squared -3.836** -2.431* -3.148*** -4.253*** -2.879** -7.336*** -8.675*** -10.881*** -10.432*** -10.405*** 
 (1.842) (1.285) (0.916) (1.072) (1.333) (0.890) (0.776) (0.578) (0.722) (0.915) 
Age           
25-35 -0.003 0.016 0.015 0.054** 0.153*** 0.091*** 0.106*** 0.123*** 0.130*** 0.117*** 
 (0.045) (0.029) (0.022) (0.024) (0.044) (0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.020) (0.028) 
35-45 -0.025 0.018 0.043* 0.072** 0.121** 0.081*** 0.094*** 0.086*** 0.102*** 0.126*** 
 (0.053) (0.031) (0.025) (0.028) (0.048) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022) (0.032) 
45- 0.047 0.050 0.076*** 0.144*** 0.300*** 0.139*** 0.174*** 0.197*** 0.247*** 0.322*** 
 (0.051) (0.033) (0.027) (0.032) (0.054) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.028) (0.037) 
Married  0.023 -0.003 0.014 0.051* 0.005 -0.032 -0.055** -0.096*** -0.089*** -0.073*** 
 (0.056) (0.029) (0.023) (0.028) (0.042) (0.025) (0.022) (0.017) (0.019) (0.025) 
Head of household dummy 0.084* 0.069*** 0.061*** 0.036 0.061* 0.141*** 0.153*** 0.186*** 0.198*** 0.177*** 
 (0.049) (0.025) (0.020) (0.024) (0.036) (0.021) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) 
Rural  -0.222*** -0.171*** -0.128*** -0.094*** -0.080*** -0.055*** -0.009 0.003 0.013 0.010 
 (0.038) (0.024) (0.017) (0.021) (0.030) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) 
𝜆 0.432*** 0.385*** 0.215*** 0.110 0.129 -1.136*** -1.151*** -1.135*** -1.205*** -1.079*** 
 (0.102) (0.083) (0.067) (0.077) (0.131) (0.057) (0.050) (0.044) (0.053) (0.072) 
𝜆2 -0.059 -0.045 0.011 0.061* 0.077 0.541*** 0.567*** 0.541*** 0.549*** 0.413*** 
 (0.036) (0.033) (0.026) (0.033) (0.061) (0.051) (0.044) (0.038) (0.044) (0.059) 
Constant 3.920*** 4.230*** 4.538*** 4.785*** 5.002*** 4.547*** 4.788*** 5.088*** 5.451*** 5.770*** 
 (0.040) (0.028) (0.030) (0.019) (0.038) (0.025) (0.022) (0.019) (0.025) (0.034) 
Observations 8,036 8,036 8,036 8,036 8,036 23,623 23,623 23,623 23,623 23,623 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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29 Table 4.5B: 2002 Wage regression for males (without correction) 
 Informal  Formal  
VARIABLES q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
           
Secondary school 0.121*** 0.075 0.088*** 0.152*** 0.180*** 0.214* 0.224*** 0.204*** 0.184*** 0.159*** 
 (0.034) (0.096) (0.029) (0.045) (0.031) (0.113) (0.015) (0.012) (0.017) (0.021) 
High school 0.183*** 0.143*** 0.167*** 0.225** 0.351*** 0.432*** 0.443*** 0.404*** 0.392*** 0.370*** 
 (0.041) (0.028) (0.030) (0.107) (0.042) (0.031) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) 
Vocational school 0.180*** 0.124*** 0.194*** 0.191* 0.328*** 0.435*** 0.474*** 0.484*** 0.484*** 0.448*** 
 (0.047) (0.041) (0.033) (0.115) (0.076) (0.029) (0.184) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) 
University  0.514*** 0.448*** 0.671*** 1.033*** 1.297*** 0.968*** 0.950*** 0.920*** 0.889*** 0.923*** 
 (0.057) (0.064) (0.069) (0.156) (0.112) (0.031) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019) 
Tenure (10-2) 0.401 0.195 0.735*** 1.380* 0.839** 3.694*** 4.729*** 5.705*** 5.920*** 5.702*** 
 (0.769) (0.306) (0.270) (0.815) (0.386) (0.848) (0.459) (0.172) (0.236) (0.324) 
Tenure squared -3.392 -1.335 -1.917* -3.730 -1.644 -4.851 -8.306*** -11.661*** -12.841*** -12.911*** 
 (3.620) (1.318) (1.082) (3.216) (1.600) (3.853) (1.890) (0.568) (0.746) (1.132) 
Age           
25-35 0.071* 0.082*** 0.043** 0.068 0.146*** 0.171*** 0.175*** 0.199*** 0.198*** 0.193*** 
 (0.040) (0.030) (0.020) (0.150) (0.039) (0.058) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.031) 
35-45 0.102** 0.110*** 0.084*** 0.122** 0.174*** 0.233*** 0.212*** 0.222*** 0.228*** 0.243*** 
 (0.049) (0.034) (0.025) (0.060) (0.043) (0.048) (0.021) (0.020) (0.025) (0.036) 
45- 0.073 0.082** 0.069*** 0.170** 0.301*** 0.202*** 0.215 0.261*** 0.279*** 0.343*** 
 (0.047) (0.034) (0.026) (0.079) (0.052) (0.044) (0.183) (0.023) (0.029) (0.042) 
Married  0.064 0.041 0.041* 0.081 0.043 -0.016 -0.021 -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.087*** 
 (0.049) (0.032) (0.024) (0.108) (0.042) (0.079) (0.026) (0.019) (0.021) (0.025) 
Head of household dummy 0.107** 0.096*** 0.099*** 0.058** 0.093** 0.177*** 0.192*** 0.205*** 0.231*** 0.268*** 
 (0.051) (0.033) (0.019) (0.027) (0.038) (0.055) (0.022) (0.015) (0.019) (0.024) 
Rural  -0.228*** -0.182*** -0.143*** -0.099 -0.098*** -0.070* -0.034** -0.032*** -0.039** -0.024 
 (0.034) (0.021) (0.018) (0.135) (0.030) (0.036) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.023) 
Constant 3.917*** 4.277*** 4.581*** 4.808*** 5.059*** 4.061*** 4.301*** 4.605*** 4.934*** 5.280*** 
 (0.031) (0.023) (0.018) (0.105) (0.026) (0.049) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.025) 
           
Observations 8,036 8,036 8,036 8,036 8,036 23,623 23,623 23,623 23,623 23,623 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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30 Table 4.6A: 2010 Wage regression for males (with correction) 
 Informal  Formal  
VARIABLES q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
           
Secondary school 0.029 0.012 0.019 0.014 0.045 0.042*** 0.054*** 0.063 0.059*** 0.024 
 (0.030) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.029) (0.013) (0.011) (0.051) (0.011) (0.016) 
High school -0.031 -0.041* -0.045* -0.017 0.081* 0.087*** 0.134*** 0.189*** 0.219*** 0.237*** 
 (0.038) (0.025) (0.024) (0.030) (0.047) (0.016) (0.012) (0.039) (0.012) (0.017) 
Vocational school -0.069* -0.025 -0.045* -0.041 0.045 0.099*** 0.122*** 0.175*** 0.220*** 0.232*** 
 (0.039) (0.028) (0.027) (0.032) (0.044) (0.014) (0.011) (0.025) (0.014) (0.016) 
University  -0.149** -0.068 0.078 0.269*** 0.479*** 0.477*** 0.626*** 0.693*** 0.763*** 0.803*** 
 (0.062) (0.050) (0.060) (0.066) (0.142) (0.019) (0.013) (0.080) (0.012) (0.019) 
Tenure (10-2) 1.439** 0.469 0.212 0.013 -0.410 2.329*** 2.839*** 3.605*** 3.416*** 2.851*** 
 (0.582) (0.329) (0.336) (0.379) (0.528) (0.152) (0.133) (0.562) (0.149) (0.205) 
Tenure squared -2.881 -0.502 1.135 1.871 3.374 0.743 -1.499*** -4.660*** -4.879*** -4.558*** 
 (2.425) (1.428) (1.618) (1.699) (2.877) (0.538) (0.456) (1.314) (0.550) (0.768) 
Age           
25-35 0.105*** 0.093*** 0.075*** 0.064** 0.114*** -0.016 -0.003 0.028 0.068*** 0.099*** 
 (0.037) (0.024) (0.021) (0.031) (0.035) (0.020) (0.014) (0.022) (0.015) (0.021) 
35-45 0.104** 0.105*** 0.068*** 0.067* 0.160*** 0.012 0.042*** 0.061 0.134*** 0.198*** 
 (0.048) (0.029) (0.023) (0.036) (0.040) (0.023) (0.015) (0.037) (0.018) (0.023) 
45- 0.176*** 0.130*** 0.096*** 0.141*** 0.251*** 0.087*** 0.115*** 0.162*** 0.248*** 0.323*** 
 (0.050) (0.030) (0.023) (0.035) (0.045) (0.025) (0.017) (0.062) (0.021) (0.027) 
Married  0.014 0.036 0.051** 0.071** 0.026 0.001 -0.020 -0.054* -0.054*** -0.057*** 
 (0.038) (0.027) (0.022) (0.028) (0.038) (0.019) (0.017) (0.033) (0.012) (0.020) 
Head of household dummy -0.024 -0.012 0.028 0.024 0.067* 0.061*** 0.081*** 0.120*** 0.142*** 0.154*** 
 (0.039) (0.025) (0.019) (0.024) (0.037) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.017) 
Rural  -0.154*** -0.122*** -0.091*** -0.090*** -0.041 -0.004 0.004 0.011 0.020** 0.030** 
 (0.027) (0.018) (0.014) (0.019) (0.028) (0.014) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) 
𝜆 0.381*** 0.219*** 0.092 0.016 -0.071 -1.086*** -0.980*** -0.981*** -0.888*** -0.900*** 
 (0.118) (0.074) (0.090) (0.086) (0.111) (0.063) (0.044) (0.154) (0.048) (0.076) 
𝜆2 -0.032 0.007 0.044 0.086** 0.120*** 0.653*** 0.614*** 0.630*** 0.557*** 0.553*** 
 (0.042) (0.025) (0.035) (0.033) (0.045) (0.065) (0.044) (0.089) (0.046) (0.078) 
Constant 4.246*** 4.559*** 4.874*** 5.150*** 5.363*** 4.988*** 5.129*** 5.317*** 5.493*** 5.736*** 
 (0.056) (0.034) (0.031) (0.034) (0.037) (0.027) (0.016) (0.080) (0.019) (0.029) 
Observations 6,745 6,745 6,745 6,745 6,745 28,201 28,201 28,201 28,201 28,201 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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31 Table 4.6B: 2010 Wage regression for males (without correction) 
 Informal  Formal  
VARIABLES q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
           
Secondary school 0.087*** 0.055*** 0.049*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.122*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.107 0.076 
 (0.030) (0.020) (0.017) (0.023) (0.026) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.104) (0.236) 
High school 0.099** 0.049 0.042* 0.070** 0.158*** 0.217*** 0.235*** 0.274*** 0.302*** 0.333*** 
 (0.039) (0.066) (0.025) (0.030) (0.047) (0.014) (0.027) (0.012) (0.037) (0.045) 
Vocational school 0.056 0.067 0.042* 0.091** 0.112** 0.241*** 0.242*** 0.278*** 0.321* 0.343* 
 (0.041) (0.516) (0.023) (0.037) (0.044) (0.013) (0.046) (0.010) (0.166) (0.201) 
University  0.095 0.164** 0.283*** 0.555*** 0.879*** 0.694*** 0.801*** 0.858*** 0.912*** 0.964** 
 (0.069) (0.080) (0.040) (0.072) (0.107) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.073) (0.417) 
Tenure (10-2) 1.353** 0.524 0.054 0.517 -0.346 1.992*** 2.906*** 3.768*** 3.995** 3.343 
 (0.564) (1.064) (0.309) (0.409) (0.442) (0.152) (0.854) (0.137) (1.756) (2.715) 
Tenure squared -3.215 -0.461 1.572 0.047 4.327* 1.880*** -1.636 -4.635*** -6.329 -5.812 
 (2.916) (5.051) (1.511) (2.460) (2.353) (0.534) (3.050) (0.528) (7.015) (14.130) 
Age           
25-35 0.161*** 0.146*** 0.128*** 0.123*** 0.134*** 0.073*** 0.068*** 0.088*** 0.116** 0.145 
 (0.041) (0.052) (0.021) (0.025) (0.035) (0.019) (0.016) (0.011) (0.047) (0.440) 
35-45 0.196*** 0.176** 0.133*** 0.128*** 0.198*** 0.117*** 0.108*** 0.137*** 0.183 0.247 
 (0.048) (0.077) (0.024) (0.034) (0.039) (0.022) (0.020) (0.014) (0.130) (0.463) 
45- 0.152*** 0.133 0.121*** 0.157*** 0.242*** 0.127*** 0.142*** 0.187*** 0.248*** 0.324 
 (0.049) (0.104) (0.025) (0.033) (0.046) (0.023) (0.033) (0.017) (0.048) (0.460) 
Married  0.036 0.048 0.068*** 0.089*** 0.044 0.021 -0.009 -0.035*** -0.055 -0.059 
 (0.038) (0.044) (0.021) (0.027) (0.037) (0.021) (0.050) (0.011) (0.073) (0.364) 
Head of household dummy 0.035 0.036 0.045** 0.049* 0.115*** 0.130*** 0.136*** 0.145*** 0.181*** 0.194 
 (0.034) (0.039) (0.018) (0.027) (0.029) (0.016) (0.034) (0.011) (0.032) (0.197) 
Rural  -0.191*** -0.139*** -0.110*** -0.108*** -0.065** -0.019 -0.002 -0.001 -0.009 0.001 
 (0.026) (0.037) (0.014) (0.021) (0.027) (0.012) (0.018) (0.009) (0.049) (0.209) 
Constant 4.280*** 4.602*** 4.887*** 5.127*** 5.353*** 4.556*** 4.776*** 4.988*** 5.197*** 5.440*** 
 (0.041) (0.069) (0.022) (0.025) (0.029) (0.017) (0.034) (0.013) (0.102) (0.036) 
Observations 6,745 6,745 6,745 6,745 6,745 28,201 28,201 28,201 28,201 28,201 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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10 Figure 4.1: Decomposition results for female sample 
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11 Figure 4.2: Decomposition results for male sample 
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5 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 
32 Table 4.A1: Exclusion criteria for the sample 
 
2002 2010 
Frequency % Frequency % 
Full sample   300689  522171  
Dropped observations     
Non-wage earners 253589 84.3 429932 82.3 
Age over 65 or less 20 4198 1.4 6480 1.2 
Extreme  values of experience (inconsistent with the age) 13 0.0 0 0 
Has more than one job 688 0.2 2585 0.4 
Extreme working hours (over 84 hours in a week) 276 0.1 754 0.1 
Reported zero wages 787 0.3 4781 0.9 
Divorced-widowed male 309 0.1 788 0.1 
Random 60 sample (only for men)   23297  
Final sample 40829 13.6 53544 10.3 
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6 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
Turkey has experienced major transformations in its course towards industrialisation. 
During the development process, it became more industrial and urbanised with increasing 
levels of education across the population.  Over this time period, it also became more 
integrated with the world economy and created a stronger relationship with the western 
world both culturally and economically. On the other hand, the labour market in Turkey 
exhibits some interesting characteristics that are not observed in many other countries with 
the same income levels. In this context, the overall aim of this thesis was to examine and 
analyse three specific issues over the post 2000 period in which household level datasets 
have become available.  
The first empirical study presented in Chapter 2 examined the decreasing wage inequality 
observed in the Turkish labour market with a particular focus on the effect of increasing 
educational attainment on the wage distribution. Two waves of the LFS for the years 2002 
and 2010 were used in the analyses. To explore the underlying reasons behind the 
decreasing wage inequality, a two-step procedure was applied. In the first step, a selection 
equation was estimated to account for the possible selection bias due to non-random 
selection into wage employment. Due to the existence of unpaid family workers and the 
self-employed and the different characteristics of these individuals from those who simply 
do not participate in the work force, use of a simple probit model in the first step of the 
correction process can be misleading; just like labour force participation, the decisions 
about being in unpaid family work and self-employment are not random. Therefore, the 
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methodology proposed by Dubin and McFadden (1984) was exploited as this methodology 
accounts for the selection bias where the number of choices is more than two.  
In the second step of the procedure, a decomposition methodology proposed by Lemieux 
(2002), which is a unified form of two commonly used decomposition techniques in the 
literature which were proposed by Juhn et al. (1993) and DiNardo et al. (1996), was 
applied. In this methodology, changes in the wage distributions are decomposed into three 
components, namely, the effect of returns to human capital (price of human capital), the 
effect of changes in the composition of human capital (changes in covariates) and changes 
in residual distribution (price and composition of unmeasured human capital 
characteristics). The changes in the residual wage inequality are further decomposed into 
two factors: the effect of changes in the distribution of unobservable characteristics and the 
effect of the pricing function of unobservable characteristics. Considering the differences in 
the wage determination processes, the analyses were performed separately for men and 
women.  
The results of both the selection equations and the decomposition provide very important 
findings for understanding the changes in the labour market in Turkey. Consistent with the 
findings in the literature from other countries, the results of the selection equation showed 
that education increases the probability of choosing wage employment. Having other 
members of the household in the wage sector, and being the head of the household 
increases the probability of being in wage employment. Presence of children, being 
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married, and presence of self-employed members in the household all have a decreasing 
effect on wage employment. The results of the selection equation for men revealed that 
education, presence of children in the household, having other members of the household in 
the wage sector, and being head of the household increase the probability of choosing wage 
employment. Living in a rural area, and the number of unpaid family workers in the 
household all increase the likelihood of being self-employed. Arguably the most important 
finding of the selection equations is that, when the effect of education on the probability of 
being in wage employment for the years 2002 and 2010 is compared, it can be seen that 
education does not increase the probability of being a wage worker (as opposed to being 
economically inactive) in 2010 as much as it did in 2002. 
The decomposition results that are obtained in the second step give the relative shares of 
the factors that affect the wage distributions. According to the decomposition results, the 
decreasing wage inequality observed in Turkey between 2002 and 2010 was mainly due to 
two factors: the decreasing between group inequality which is related to decreasing 
coefficients for education and the decreasing within group inequality due to the decreasing 
skill pricing function of unmeasured skills. On the other hand, the role of changes in the 
distribution of covariates is found to be negative and small. The results of the study suggest 
that increases in number of universities and the reform to the education system which 
increased the years of compulsory education, had a substantial effect on the wage 
distribution in Turkey between 2002 and 2010. Due to the increasing number of 
universities and reforms in the educational system, the supply of educated labour rapidly 
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increased in Turkey. However, steep decreases in the returns to education and an increasing 
share of university graduates in unemployment suggests that the labour market could not 
accommodate the increasing supply.  
This study  contributes to the existing literature two main ways. First, it analyses the impact 
of an increase in the ‘education’ of the labour force on wage inequality, as the literature 
mainly focuses on other aspects such as technology and labour market institutions. Second, 
it is the first application of the Lemieux (2002) model in a context of a middle income 
country.  
The findings of the empirical analyses presented in Chapter 2 provide crucial suggestions 
for policy makers. Firstly, following the increase in the number of universities and reforms 
in the educational system, the supply of educated labour rapidly increased in Turkey. 
However, steep decreases in the returns to education and the increasing share of university 
graduates in unemployment are evidence that the labour market could not accommodate 
this increasing supply. Accordingly, wage inequality decreased as a result of relatively low 
demand for the educated workers. As noted in Chapter 2, the share of university graduates 
among the male unemployed has become higher than that for high school graduates since 
2008. Moreover, according to the TurkStat employment statistics (TurkStat web database), 
the unemployment rate for university graduates which was around 6-8 per cent in 1990’s 
became 11 per cent in 2010. This indicates that a large number of university graduates are 
facing the problem of unemployment. This leads to inefficiency since skilled labour, which 
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is a valuable resource, remains idle. To overcome the problem, policy makers could 
consider encouraging investments that create new employment opportunities and also R&D 
investments even though it should be acknowledged that such investments may lead to 
labour saving technologies. 
Secondly, substantial change in the skill pricing function can be interpreted as a sign of 
quality differences between universities. The establishment of new universities under the “a 
university in each city’’ project has been criticized by many authors (e.g. Dortlemez, 1995; 
Kaynar, 2005). It is argued that the scientific requirements and maintenance of minimum 
standards have been ignored as politicians used the stimulating effects of universities on 
local economies in their election campaigns. Decreasing quality of university education has 
two crucial economic outcomes; it reduces the productivity of the educated labour below its 
potential and causes an inefficient allocation of resources - resources which are quite 
limited in many developing countries. Therefore, in addition to issues regarding 
accessibility, policymakers should give importance also to the quality of education when 
decisions are made on education policies. 
In the second empirical study presented in Chapter 3, using data from the Household 
Structure Survey (HSS) for the year 2006, the relationship between domestic violence, 
social norms, and female autonomy in the household is analysed. Female autonomy has 
been empirically found to affect the labour force participation of women in Turkey. 
Domestic violence is included in the analyses not only because it is argued to have an 
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effect on female autonomy but also because of its monetary and non-monetary costs on the 
economy. Finally, social norms are included as they affect both female autonomy and 
domestic violence. To analyse the relationship between domestic violence and female 
autonomy in the household, an Item Response Theory (IRT) model is applied.  
In this setting, female autonomy and social norms are assumed to be latent variables as 
their true values are unknown yet there are some indicators which measure them with some 
error. Accordingly, the model design consists of two parts, namely, the measurement model 
in which the effect of the latent variables on their indicators is modelled, and the structural 
model in which the relationship between the observed and latent variables is examined. 
According to the results of the measurement model, women having a say on the choice of 
entertainment/holiday, relationships with the relatives and neighbours, in other words 
people outside the household, are the best indicators of female autonomy in the household. 
On the other hand, having a say in the house setup, is the weakest among the indicators of 
the female autonomy. This result is not surprising since house setup, or housework, is 
traditionally accepted as the duty of women. In terms of the husband’s social norms, 
indicators showing husbands’ agreement on “Having a male child increases the prestige of 
the wife” and “Continuation of the family is guaranteed only by a son” have greater factor 
loadings. This means that superiority attached to a male child (or may be male as a gender 
in general) by the husbands seems to be the strongest indicator of social norms of 
husbands. 
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The results of the structural model explain the key relationships that are the focus of the 
analyses. First, domestic violence has a negative effect on female autonomy. This finding 
suggests that women who are victims of domestic violence have less autonomy in the 
decision making process, they are forced to be ‘in line’ with the preferences of the husband. 
This result is consistent with the findings of Eswaran and Malhotra (2011) who proposed a 
non-cooperative model of spousal violence in which women are, in the presence of 
violence, forced to allocate resources in accordance with the husbands’ choice. Second, 
female autonomy has a significant and negative effect on domestic violence. In other 
words, the incidence of violence is less likely to occur once the autonomy of women, which 
is promoted by the income and the education they possess and reflected by their presence in 
the decision making process, gains acceptance. This result is in accordance with the 
feminist theory on violence which asserts that intimate violence stems from the inequalities 
within the household and it is used by husbands to maintain subordination of women. 
Finally, the strength of the husband’s social norms on traditional gender roles positively 
affects the risk of violence. This result supports Heise (1998) who argues that adherence to 
rigid gender roles increases the likelihood of violence against women.  
There are some potential limitations of the study. The first limitation is the cross-sectional 
nature of the data. As Kaplan et al. (2001) note, a cross-sectional design of a model with a 
feedback loop gives only a snapshot of an on-going dynamic process. In that sense, the 
model used in this study, controlling for husband’s social norms, analyses the effect of 
female autonomy on violence by comparing the incidence of violence for women with 
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different levels of autonomy. Therefore it is not possible to analyse the effect of female 
autonomy on violence over time for the same women. In other words, the change in 
incidence of violence due to the increasing autonomy of an individual woman can only be 
analysed with panel data which is not available here. Second, although the SEM model 
accounts for the measurement errors of the indicators of the latent variables, the incidence 
of violence is likely to be underreported by the respondents given the intimate nature of the 
subject. Moreover, the dataset only contains information about physical violence; however, 
violence can take a sexual or an emotional form as well. Additionally, the dataset provides 
information about violence that occurred only in last 12 months. 
Nevertheless, this study makes significant contributions to the existing literature on 
domestic violence and female autonomy. First, it analyses the two-way relationship 
between female autonomy and domestic violence within the same model. Second, 
exploiting the advantages of SEM it accounts for the endogeneity and measurement error 
problems and finally, it tests the importance of social norms at the individual level.  
The results of the analyses presented in Chapter 3 provide many suggestions for policy 
makers. For example, education and income not only weaken the strength of traditional 
social norms for both men and women but also promote a higher level of female autonomy. 
Therefore, policy makers should consider focusing on education, particularly promoting the 
educational attainment of women. According to the Global Gender Gap Report 2013, the 
female labour force participation rate in Turkey is 30 per cent and this ratio puts Turkey in 
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the 123rd place out of 136 countries. As already mentioned in the first section, around 24 
per cent of women, who do not participate in the labour force, report that they do not have 
autonomy regarding their participation decision. Therefore, policies targeting new 
employment opportunities for women should be accompanied by campaigns promoting 
female autonomy in cooperation with the civil movements and organisations that support 
empowerment of women’s socioeconomic status. 
The third empirical analysis of the thesis presented in Chapter 4 examines the structure of 
the informal sector employment in Turkey. To do so, the differences between the informal 
and formal sector wages are decomposed along the entire distribution. A decomposition 
procedure which not only allows for correction of the potential self-selection problem in 
wage estimations but also decomposes the informal/formal sector wage gap at any quantile 
of interest, is applied. Using this method, the wage differentials between these two sectors 
are decomposed into two factors, namely, the characteristic effect and the coefficient effect. 
In the context of the formal/informal sector wage gap, a relatively strong coefficient effect 
is an indicator of market segmentation as it shows that workers in the informal sector earn 
less even after controlling for differences in their characteristics. In contrast, if the 
characteristic effect is stronger, it means that the wage gap is mainly due to differences 
between human capital endowments, not because the two sectors have different wage 
determination processes. 
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The results of the empirical analysis suggest a heterogeneous structure for the informal 
sector in Turkey in which the lower tier consists of workers who involuntarily participate in 
the informal sector and the higher tier includes the workers who voluntarily choose to be in 
the informal sector. It is also found that the wage gap between the formal and informal 
sectors is higher and the segmentation at the bottom end of the wage distribution is more 
spread out (i.e. observed in a wider range of quantiles) for females than it is for males.  
The main limitation of the analysis is that, since there is no data on their earnings, the self-
employed are not included in the estimation. Nevertheless, it is not expected that this 
exclusion will affect the generality of the results, especially for females since the share of 
self-employed is very low in total female employment. For instance, Tansel and Kan 
(2012) include the self-employed in their analysis as well as employees and find a 
heterogeneous structure for the informal sector employment in Turkey. Their results, both 
for men and women, are consistent with the findings of this chapter. In that sense, 
exclusion of the self-employed, at least qualitatively, does not seem likely to have affected 
the findings of the chapter.   
Notwithstanding this limitation, this research contributes to the previous literature by 
providing a more detailed analysis of segmentation in the Turkish labour market. The 
results of the analyses are consistent with the findings of Tansel and Kan (2012) who also 
find a heterogeneous structure in the informal sector. However, the results of the analyses 
show that taking the selection into account substantially changes the results of the wage 
181 
 
 
 
 
regressions and where in the wage distribution the segmentation between the formal and 
informal sectors occurs. It is found that returns to higher levels of education, especially at 
the lower quantiles, disappear in the informal sector once the selection term is introduced 
into the wage estimation. It is also found that the decomposition results overestimate the 
spread of segmentation over the higher quantiles when the selection term is omitted. On the 
other hand, when the correction term is included, it is seen that the spread of segmentation, 
particularly for males, is much narrower. The results are also consistent with the findings of 
Baskaya and Hulagu (2011), who document a higher formal and informal wage gap for 
females than for males. In this study, it is also shown that the gap for females is not only 
higher at the mean wages, but also at all quantiles of the wage distribution.  
The findings of the chapter provide useful information on informal sector employment in 
Turkey for policy makers. For instance, the results of the analysis show that the informal 
sector workers who are at the bottom of the wage distribution involuntarily participate in 
the informal sector. Due to the unregulated nature of the informal employment, these 
workers do not enjoy the protection from exploitation such as wages below the minimum 
wage, working in risky environments, and working with unsafe equipment. Moreover, 
these individuals do not have employment benefits such as health insurance. To eliminate 
such problems, policy makers should consider more efficient ways to detect the firms 
which avoid registering their employees. On the other hand, it is also found that some of 
the workers in the informal sector voluntarily choose to be in the informal sector. 
Therefore, before formulating a policy which targets elimination of informality, it is 
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important to understand the motivations of these individuals. For instance, the results of the 
selection equation show that individuals, women in particular, who have children 
(especially those who have young children) are more likely to be in the informal sector. A 
possible explanation is that these individuals may choose to work in the informal sector to 
avoid the rigid working hours in the formal sector in order to spare more time to take care 
of their children. Accordingly, policy makers could focus on increasing availability of 
childcare assistance for working parents. 
In conclusion, the empirical studies presented in this thesis provide several interesting 
insights into three specific issues related to problems in the Turkish labour market. In that 
sense, the results of the thesis can be useful for policy makers as they provide information 
on the changes in the Turkish labour market and the underlying reasons behind the 
problems that are observed in it. Moreover, this thesis contributes to the literature on wage 
inequality, female autonomy and domestic violence, and the structure of informal sector 
employment by providing empirical evidence from an upper middle income country.  
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